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Foreword by Lord Hutton of Furness
In my interim report last October, I set out the case for further reforms to public service 
pensions. I explained the principles that I believed should govern any future reforms and the 
values that should underpin this process going forward. 
In this, my final report I am setting out how I believe it is possible for public service 
employees to continue to have access for the foreseeable future, to good quality, sustainable 
and fairer defined benefit pension schemes. For this to happen there will need to be 
comprehensive reform – reforms that can balance the legitimate concerns of taxpayers about 
the present and future cost of pension commitments in the public sector as well as the wider 
need to ensure decent levels of retirement income for millions of people who have devoted 
their working lives in the service of the public. I am taking as given the new landscape 
in which the Consumer Prices Index is the measure of inflation and a rise in employee 
contributions is imminent.
Establishing a relationship of trust and confidence going forward will be very important. 
Ministers have already accepted the conclusions of my interim report that pension reform 
must not simply become a race to the bottom. This has helped set the right parameters for 
the debate about the next steps. Ministers have also been clear that the pension promises 
that have been made must be honoured. This is important too in order to correct the 
widespread view that pension reform invariably means losing pension rights that have 
already been accrued. It does not. The more this can be stressed the better. Trade unions for 
their part have also been willing to accept the need in the past for changes to public service 
pensions that address the shifting sands of economic, demographic and social change and as 
a consequence there have already been some significant reductions in the projected cost of 
public service pensions.
Effective reform will require this dialogue to continue. I strongly believe that a process 
must be established in which both sides to the debate can have full access to information, 
can properly communicate their views, and understand the nature and purpose of any 
changes. Establishing such a process will be fundamental to building consensus over long 
term pension reform in the public sector; how people are treated in this process will be as 
important as the changes to pension schemes themselves. This must not however become 
a recipe for procrastination. We need to get on with the process of change if we are to 
maximise the benefits from reform. These benefits include certainty about the future, a fairer 
distribution of the enormous risks and costs involved in maintaining any form of defined 
benefit pension, and long term financial sustainability. 
In considering which reforms to propose I have considered a wide range of options from 
notional and collective defined contribution, lump sum accrual or cash balance mechanisms 
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and career average defined benefit schemes. Each has much to commend them. They are 
all capable to different extents of achieving the four principles of reform I set out in the 
interim report. I have however been influenced by the need for simplicity, clarity and ease 
of implementation. The more complicated a scheme is to describe, the harder it will be to 
implement and the less likelihood there is of active engagement and support.
My main recommendation therefore is that Government should replace the existing final 
salary pension schemes with a new career average scheme and, when everything is ready, 
move existing members to the new scheme for future accruals. I am recommending this 
course of action as I believe this is the fairest way of spreading the effect of change across the 
generations, and represents the quickest way of ending the in-built bias against those public 
service employees whose pay stays low over their career, inherent in final salary schemes. 
Maintaining the link to final salary for the purposes of calculating the value of a person’s 
accrued rights under the existing schemes will however ensure fair treatment for those who 
have built up rights in these schemes and will mean that those closest to retirement, perhaps 
in their 50s today, who have less time to adjust are least affected and all existing scheme 
members retain the link to final salary for the years they have already accrued. 
As I set out in my interim report rising life expectancy has led to a substantial increase in 
the proportion of adult life that a public service worker can expect to spend in retirement. 
To adjust to this change I am recommending that Normal Pension Age is linked to State 
Pension Age and tracks planned increases. In principle the link to State Pension Age would 
apply across all public service workers, as this marks the end of a working life that may span 
professions and sectors. However, for the uniformed services – the armed forces, police and 
firefighters – where pension age has historically been lower to reflect the unique nature of 
their work a pension age of 60 is appropriate.
This link to State Pension Age will address rising longevity, the main risk to the sustainability 
of public service pensions. But to manage other pressures I also recommend that ministers 
should set a clear cost ceiling for these new schemes going forward – I suggest the percentage 
of pensionable pay paid by the taxpayer – with automatic stabilisers built into their design 
to keep future costs under more effective control. These stabilisers will mean that scheme 
members might need to increase their contributions, or take a smaller pension, the choice 
should be the subject of discussion with staff but an automatic default must be agreed. 
This will allow a new framework of public service pensions to be established which will 
be much more resilient and better able to absorb the kind of shocks that have profoundly 
affected the viability of defined benefit schemes over the last few decades. It will also provide 
confidence to taxpayers that there will be firm limits set on how much they can be expected 
to contribute to public service pensions.
I also consider that there is a powerful case for more independent oversight and much 
stronger governance of all the public service pension schemes. This should keep government, 
taxpayers and scheme members better informed about the financial health of these schemes. 
There should be minimum standards set for scheme administration. There is also a proper 
and legitimate role for representatives of the workforce to be formally involved in these new 
governance arrangements.
5Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report - 10 March 2011
The current legal framework for public service pensions needs a complete overhaul and I am 
making specific recommendations in this area.
As a package, these changes will make public service pension schemes simpler and more 
transparent, fairer to those on low and moderate earnings, better able to deal with the 
changes that we know are coming to our economy and our society and will therefore help 
ensure greater prospects for sustainability over the long term. Ministers and ultimately 
Parliament itself must decide how generous they want public service pensions to be. For 
my part, I consider that there is a strong argument for designing future public service 
pension schemes in such a way that they at least deliver the replacement rates set out in the 
Turner Commission in 2005. Making these changes will not be easy or straightforward. 
Confronting the fundamental challenges posed to our pension system caused by rising 
life expectancy, managing inflation and in some cases investment risks over the long term, 
ensuring productivity in the wider economy and value for money for taxpayers requires us to 
make difficult choices.
In overcoming these challenges we will all be required to think differently about our 
working lives as well as our retirement. But it does not mean we have to give up the idea 
of designing a pension system that can deliver decent retirement incomes. If the changes I 
am recommending are implemented as a whole, then I see no reason why this should not 
be possible. I remain convinced that this is well within our grasp. My recommendations are 
therefore designed to make the changes that will be necessary to ensure that this vital part of 
our national retirement savings system is to continue to both set high standards – something 
the public service should, in my view always seek to do – and command the trust and 
confidence of all those concerned.
I believe this is a balanced deal that will ensure public service workers continue to have good 
pensions and taxpayers can have confidence that the costs are controlled. This deal is set out 
in full in the report and summarised in the diagram below.
Over the last nine months I have been fortunate to have had the support and assistance of 
an extraordinarily talented group of people within the Commission. I want to thank each of 
them for the help they have given me. I would also like to thank my panel of experts (Ron 
Amy, Professor Nicholas Barr, Lord Michael Bichard, Professor David Blake, Niki Cleal, 
Baroness Jeannie Drake, Carl Emmerson, Professor John Hills and Professor Alasdair Smith) 
for their comments and contributions. What appears in the pages that follow are of course 
my conclusions alone. But I strongly believe they hold out the prospect of managing rather 
than succumbing to the powerful forces of change that are requiring individuals, companies 
and Governments all over the world to re-think their approach to pensions.
Lord Hutton of Furness
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Executive Summary
The case for reform revisited
Ex.1 In its interim report the Independent Public Service Pensions Commission found 
that the current public service pensions structure has been unable to respond flexibly to 
workforce and demographic changes in the past few decades. This has led to: 
 • rising value of benefits due to increasing longevity;
 • unequal treatment of members within the same profession;
 • unfair sharing of costs between the employee, the employer and taxpayers; and
 • barriers to increasing the range of providers of public services.
Ex.2 The interim report recommended long-term structural reform as the issues could not, 
in the Commission’s view, be dealt with through traditional final salary defined benefit 
schemes. But neither could they be dealt with appropriately through a funded, individual 
account, defined contribution model for all employees. The Government accepted the 
report’s conclusions and affirmed its commitment to maintaining some form of defined 
benefit pension provision for public service employees. 
Ex.3 The Commission takes as given the recent changes to public service pension schemes, 
including the use of the Consumer Prices Index as the measure of inflation and an imminent 
rise in employee contributions. These changes have reduced cost pressures, but have not 
addressed fundamental longer-term structural problems.
Ex.4 Since the interim report the wider pensions landscape has continued to evolve. Of 
particular relevance to the Commission’s work is the 2011 Pensions Bill, which proposes 
accelerating the planned increases in the State Pension Age. The State Pension Age is now 
planned to be 66 for both men and women by 2020. 
Ex.5 When considering the possible reform options for public service pensions the 
Commission used its framework of principles outlined in the interim report. Public service 
pensions should, in the Commission’s view, be:
 • affordable and sustainable;
 • adequate and fair;
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 • supporting productivity; and
 • transparent and simple.
Ex.6 In the light of these principles, the Commission has concluded that public service 
pension schemes should aim to ensure adequate incomes in retirement for those who have 
worked a full career in the public service. Pensions are also an important part of the reward 
package and can therefore help public service employers to recruit and retain staff. But they 
are an inflexible tool for workforce management; a task in which they are unlikely to provide 
value for money. 
Recommendation 1: The Government should make clear its assessment of the role of public 
service pension schemes. Based on its framework of principles, the Commission believes 
that the primary purpose is to ensure adequate levels of retirement income for public service 
pensioners.
Recommendation 2: Pensions will continue to be an important element of remuneration. The 
Commission recommends that public service employers take greater account of public service 
pensions when constructing remuneration packages and designing workforce strategies. The 
Government should make clear in its remits for pay review bodies that they should consider how 
public service pensions affect total reward when making pay recommendations.
The deal
Ex.7 The package of reforms recommended by the Commission is a balanced deal that 
will deliver fair outcomes for public service workers and for taxpayers and build trust and 
confidence in the system. Public service workers should receive a good pension in retirement 
and their accrued rights must be protected. They must also be involved in the process of 
change and they have a right to expect schemes to be well-run with greater transparency. 
And taxpayers must be able to feel confident that risks and costs are shared fairly: in 
particular that the cost of increasing longevity is being managed and that there are safety 
valves in place to control future cost. There also needs to be independent assurance on the 
sustainability of public service pensions. The deal set out by the Commission is designed to 
meet these objectives.
Ex.8 In the interim report the Commission set out its view that public service pensions 
must deliver adequate pension levels. In the final report we have defined this further to 
provide a clear benchmark for the minimum level of benefit required.
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Recommendation 3: The Government should ensure that public service schemes, along with 
a full state pension, deliver at least adequate levels of income (as defined by the Turner 
Commission benchmark replacement rates) for scheme members who work full careers in 
public service. Employers should seek to maximise participation in the schemes where this is 
appropriate. Adequate incomes and good participation rates are particularly important below 
median income levels.
Ex.9 Protecting accrued rights is a prerequisite for reform both to build trust and 
confidence and to protect current workers from a sudden change in their pension benefits 
or pension age. It is also right that those closest to retirement will be least affected by any 
changes to scheme design.
Recommendation 4: The Government must honour in full the pension promises that 
have been accrued by scheme members: their accrued rights. In doing so, the Commission 
recommends maintaining the final salary link for past service for current members. 
Ex.10 The main risks within defined benefit schemes are: investment; inflation; salary; and 
longevity risk. While government, as a large employer, is capable of bearing the majority 
of the risk associated with pension saving efficiently, and should continue to do so through 
a defined benefit pension, present schemes involve too much risk for government and the 
taxpayer. 
Ex.11 There should be a fairer sharing of risk between government (and ultimately 
taxpayers) and scheme members than exists within the present schemes. Achieving this will 
mean moving current members to new schemes. Allowing current members to continue 
to accrue further benefits in the present schemes for many decades would be unfair and 
inequitable to the new members coming behind them. 
Recommendation 5: As soon as practical, members of the current defined benefit public 
service pension schemes should be moved to the new schemes for future service, but the 
Government should continue to provide a form of defined benefit pension as the core design.
Ex.12 But the taxpayer should also have confidence that public service pension costs are 
under control and are sustainable. That requires mechanisms in the scheme design to share 
cost and risk fairly and a fixed cost ceiling to assure cost control.
Ex.13 Transparency and effective oversight of public service schemes is required for public 
service workers and taxpayers to have confidence in the system and improve the quality of 
debate about the future of public service pensions. Currently there is inconsistency in what 
scheme data and assessments, such as valuations, are published and such information is often 
difficult to access. This lack of transparency prevents comparisons and hinders analysis. 
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Recommendation 6: All public service pension schemes should regularly publish data which, 
as far as possible, is produced to common standards and methodologies and is then 
collated centrally. This information should be of a quality that allows simple comparisons 
to be made across Government, between schemes and between individual Local Government 
Pension Scheme (LGPS) Funds.
The design 
Ex.14 The Commission’s view is that defined benefit should continue to be the core 
design for public service pensions as an efficient design for a large employer to share risk 
with employees. But as set out in the interim report, and expanded further in this report, 
final salary does not provide the right design for future public service schemes. Final 
salary schemes unfairly benefit high flyers who can receive up to twice as much in pension 
payments per £100 of contributions. It exposes taxpayers to salary risk (the risk that higher 
than expected salary rises increase the cost of providing pensions), which should be borne 
by the scheme member who benefits from the salary rise. And final salary creates a barrier to 
employees moving from the public to private sector. These inherent problems of final salary 
schemes impact on fairness and sustainability and have led the Commission to conclude that 
an alternative model should be chosen for the future.
Ex.15 Career average schemes allow pension to be accrued on the basis of earnings in each 
year of service. In these schemes future earnings do not affect past years’ pension accrual so 
mobility between sectors is easier, salary risk remains with members and the unfairness of big 
benefits to high flyers is removed. Career average benefits can be delivered through a cash 
balance scheme. Cash balance could provide greater flexibility to alter benefits in the light of 
changes in longevity.
Ex.16 So both career average and cash balance schemes could provide a good match against 
the Commission’s principles and in terms of the distribution of risks between member and 
taxpayer. On balance, the Commission has decided to recommend career average as the 
option that provides more certainty for members, is better understood and will be more 
practical to implement. The Commission is not recommending specific levels for accrual 
rates, indexation and employee contributions as these determine cost, which is a matter for 
the Government. The Government will need to make a decision about these parameters after 
consultation with scheme members.
Recommendation 7: A new career average revalued earnings (CARE) scheme should be 
adopted for general use in the public service schemes. 
Ex.17 In a career average scheme the level of indexation and the accrual rate determines 
how different types of members are impacted by the scheme. The Commission favours 
indexation by average earnings during the accrual phase to maintain the value of the benefits, 
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offset by lower accrual rates for a given cost. Uprating benefits in line with average wage 
increases ensures that benefit accrual in early years is broadly linked to earnings increases and 
therefore better relates to a member’s level of earnings at retirement. It is a better indexation 
measure than prices which unfairly benefits the years worked late in a career compared to the 
years worked at the start and is therefore unfair between younger and older members.
Recommendation 8: Pension benefits should be uprated in line with average earnings 
during the accrual phase for active scheme members. Post-retirement, pensions in payment 
should be indexed in line with prices to maintain their purchasing power and adequacy during 
retirement.
Ex.18 Regarding the indexation of deferred members’ benefits, there is a trade-off to be 
made. If the indexation measure were the same as for active members this would favour 
mobility. If it were lower, for example, if active members’ benefits were indexed by earnings 
and deferred members’ benefits by prices, this would favour retention. The Government 
should decide on whether pre-retirement indexation for deferred members is on an earnings 
based measure or prices based measure, as this decision will need to be based on the explicit 
objectives that government has about recruitment and retention versus mobility. 
Ex.19 Employee contribution rates across public service pensions schemes vary 
considerably, both in level and structure, as the result of historic developments and 
negotiations over a number of years at scheme-specific level. Contribution rates should be 
set so that members appreciate the value of their pensions but not so high that they lead to 
scheme members, especially at lower income levels, opting out of the pension scheme. Any 
transition to a more uniform structure for employee contribution rates will be complex and 
must be considered in the context of overall remuneration.
Ex.20 Higher earning individuals are better positioned than lower earners to bear some 
of the risks associated with pension provision. In addition, higher earners are likely to live 
longer than lower earners and so will derive more benefit from their scheme for the same 
level of pension. It is desirable for the design of public service pension schemes to recognise 
this.
Ex.21 However, the introduction of a cap on pensionable earnings or hybrid schemes 
(schemes which have both defined benefit and defined contribution features) does not seem 
attractive due to the complexity this introduces to the system, the significant transitional 
issue of the cash flow loss to government revenue and the Commission’s view that there are 
advantages to having senior management and their staff in the same scheme. However, there 
is a case for tiered contribution rates to reflect the different characteristics of higher earners.
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Recommendation 9: A single benefit design should apply across the whole income range. 
The differing characteristics of higher and lower earners should be addressed through tiered 
contribution rates. The Government should consider the trade off between affordability and 
the impact of opt outs on adequacy when setting member contribution levels. 
Ex.22  More generally, if state pension benefits were to change in future the Government 
would need to consider the future benefit and contribution arrangements in public service 
pensions to ensure they are still fair.
Ex.23 Choice in pension schemes can have significant advantages for scheme members and 
government alike. However, choice should be limited within the core design of the schemes, 
because of the evidence of undersaving when choice is available and the need to avoid undue 
complexity. But members should be given choice over their ability to make additional 
contributions to their pensions in a simple and transparent manner: this will encourage 
greater provision for retirement. Choice over when to draw pension benefits could be 
facilitated by providing information on how retirement income would change with the age 
at which the pension was taken, with information starting to be provided perhaps 5 or 10 
years before Normal Pension Age. Actuarial enhancement and reduction should be applied 
in the new schemes in response to late or early retirement, with caps on pension accrual 
either increased or lifted entirely. 
Ex.24 At present, most public service pension schemes provide for abatement, where some 
people who return to work in a job covered by the same scheme from which they draw their 
pension receive a reduced pension as a result. This can have a significant negative impact on 
an employee’s effective salary if he returns to work.
Recommendation 10: Members should have greater choice over when to start drawing their 
pension benefits, so they can choose to retire earlier or later than their Normal Pension Age and 
their pension would be adjusted accordingly on an actuarially fair basis. Flexible retirement 
should be encouraged and abatement of pensions in its current form for those who return to 
work after drawing their pensions should be eliminated. In addition, caps on pension accrual 
should be removed or significantly lifted.
Ex.25 Replacing or removing abatement of pensions and increasing or removing caps on 
pension accrual would have cost implications for pension schemes which will need to be 
considered as part of the wider package.
The controls
Ex.26 Whichever overall design for public service schemes is adopted, longevity risk is the 
principal risk that needs to be managed. Life expectancy has increased dramatically in the last 
few decades and future changes are uncertain. These changes have been recognised within 
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the State Pension system. Following that lead would be an appropriate way to help members 
bear pre-retirement longevity risk and will increase the chances of scheme members having 
adequate retirement incomes.
Recommendation 11: The Government should increase the member’s Normal Pension Age 
in the new schemes so that it is in line with their State Pension Age. The link between the 
State Pension Age and Normal Pension Age should be regularly reviewed, to make sure it is still 
appropriate, with a preference for keeping the two pension ages linked.
Ex.27 The introduction of the link to the State Pension Age, which will initially move 
Normal Pension Ages to 65, will move the proportion of adult life in retirement for public 
service pension scheme members back to about a third: roughly where it was in the 1980s. 
The current State Pension Age of 65 is already the Normal Pension Age for most new 
entrants to public service pension schemes. Moving to this for future accrual will more fairly 
distribute the benefits between scheme members. In the long term, the timetabled increases 
in State Pension Age should help to keep the proportion of adult life in retirement for 
members around this level, on current life expectancy projections. 
Ex.28 This measure and the other design features proposed by the Commission should 
achieve much of the Commission’s aim regarding sharing risks and costs fairly between 
employees and the Government. However, an additional safety valve, a cost ceiling based 
on the proportion of their total pensionable pay bill, is needed in case costs within the new 
schemes increase due to factors not taken account of in the scheme design. This will ensure 
that public service pensions remain affordable and sustainable.
Recommendation 12: The Government, on behalf of the taxpayer, should set out a fixed cost 
ceiling: the proportion of pensionable pay that they will contribute, on average, to employees’ 
pensions over the long term. If this is exceeded then there should be a consultation process to 
bring costs back within the ceiling, with an automatic default change if agreement cannot be 
reached.
Ex.29 What is included within this cost ceiling is a matter for the Government to determine 
in consultation with employees and their representatives. However, if the ceiling is exceeded 
measures will need to be taken to bring costs back down below it. There should be a default 
stabilising mechanism that could take the form of an increase in employee contributions or 
a decrease in accrual rates which would automatically reduce costs if negotiations between 
employers and scheme members were unsuccessful.
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Applying the design
Ex.30 There are differences between the individual public service schemes in factors such 
as the distribution of pensionable pay, average career length and life expectancy. But, for 
most schemes, these differences are generally similar to, or smaller than, those seen within 
the schemes. The modernised schemes generally apply standard features to their members 
and this is accepted as an appropriate approach, as tailoring schemes to all the differences 
seen would create a complex and costly system and would be likely to reduce member 
understanding. This would seem to suggest that for most schemes variation in pension 
features is not the most appropriate way to deal with these differences where they are seen. 
Recommendation 13: The Commission is not proposing a single public service pension 
scheme, but over time public service pensions should move towards a common 
framework for scheme design as set out in this report. However, in some cases, for example, 
the uniformed services, there may need to be limited adaptations to this framework.
Ex.31 The uniformed services (the armed forces, police and firefighters) are in a somewhat 
different position, given that the pension ages in the uniformed services schemes still 
generally reflect an assumption that pension for the majority of long-serving members should 
be payable from age 55 or less. This assumption may no longer match expectations, given the 
increases in life expectancy that have been seen since the 19th and first half of the 20th century 
when these pensions ages were set. 
Ex.32 But this does not take away from the fact that the nature of the work the uniformed 
services perform is unique and that this needs to be reflected in their Normal Pension Ages. 
The modernised firefighters scheme has struck a balance between recognising these changes 
in life expectancy, but also recognising the unique nature of the service provided by scheme 
members. The Commission’s view is that the Normal Pension Age in this scheme, 60, 
should be seen as setting a benchmark for the uniformed services as a whole. This position 
will need to be kept under regular review to make sure it is still appropriate, given future 
changes in life expectancy projections and experience of healthy life expectancy. 
Recommendation 14: The key design features contained in this report should apply to all public 
service pension schemes. The exception is in the case of the uniformed services where the 
Normal Pension Age should be set to reflect the unique characteristics of the work involved. 
The Government should therefore consider setting a new Normal Pension Age of 60 across 
the uniformed services, where the Normal Pension Age is currently below this level in these 
schemes, and keep this under regular review.
Ex.33 The LGPS provides a set of final salary-based benefits similar to those in many of 
the unfunded schemes. The membership also shares characteristics with membership of very 
large unfunded schemes and there are overlaps in coverage with unfunded schemes. There 
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may be a higher proportion of part-time, lower-earning members in the LGPS, but there are 
also many such members in schemes like the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme and the 
National Health Service Pension Scheme. 
Ex.34  There are good reasons for Government to fund pensions from future taxation and 
finance them on an unfunded basis if this is done in a transparent way and taken account of 
within fiscal planning in an appropriate manner. The Commission has therefore concluded 
that the funding boundary, with the LGPS funded and other major schemes unfunded, 
should remain where it is. This will continue the mixed approach to the funding of public 
service pension schemes. 
Recommendation 15: The common design features laid out in this report should also 
apply to the LGPS. However, it remains appropriate for the Government to maintain the 
different financing arrangements for the LGPS in future, so the LGPS remains funded and 
the other major schemes remain unfunded.
Ex.35 As for the categories of people who should in future be entitled to join public service 
pension schemes, it is ultimately for the Government to decide how much pensions risk it is 
willing to bear in order to meet its wider policy objectives. While continuing access to public 
service pension schemes helps to remove the pensions barrier for external contractors, there 
are good reasons for the Government to limit access, including the increased long term risk 
government would bear in relation to those schemes.
Ex.36 In addition, since the publication of the Commission’s interim report the 
Government has announced reviews of the Fair Deal policy and the discount rate, which 
are relevant to many of the issues around access to schemes. The Commission expects that 
the outcome of these reviews would, at least in part, help to facilitate the Government’s aim 
for increased plurality of provision for public services. And a move to a new public service 
pension scheme design, as laid out in this report, should also help to remove some of the 
barriers to plurality of service provision.
Recommendation 16: It is in principle undesirable for future non-public service workers to 
have access to public service pension schemes, given the increased long-term risk this places 
on the Government and taxpayers.
A transparent and effective system 
Ex.37 Currently in the public service pension schemes there is not always a clear separation 
of duties between those responsible for the governance of public service pension schemes and 
those delivering the benefits to scheme members. This can lead to a lack of transparency and 
of clarity as to who is responsible for what. And members of public service pension schemes 
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are sometimes not formally represented in the existing governance arrangements, which can 
lead to a lack of adequate member involvement in analysis and decisions.
Recommendation 17: Every public service pension scheme (and individual LGPS Fund) should 
have a properly constituted, trained and competent Pension Board, with member 
nominees, responsible for meeting good standards of governance including effective 
and efficient administration. There should also be a pension policy group for each scheme 
at national level for considering major changes to scheme rules.
Ex.38 Not all public service pension schemes communicate with members on a regular 
basis. Currently it is a requirement of defined contribution schemes in the private sector 
that they provide members with an annual benefit statement: this is not the case for defined 
benefit schemes (the great majority of public service pension schemes), which only have 
to provide a statement if requested. Yet the provision of information supports the general 
requirement to improve awareness of pensions and to assist members taking ownership of 
their pension requirements.
Recommendation 18: All public service pension schemes should issue regular benefit 
statements to active scheme members, at least annually and without being requested and 
promote the use of information technology for providing information to members and 
employers. 
Ex.39 Public service pension schemes are not subject to external independent regulation 
in the way that private sector schemes are. While this full regulatory system would not 
be appropriate for public service schemes it seems reasonable that members of all pension 
schemes should be clear about how their scheme is run and by whom and be confident that 
their interests are being protected.
Recommendation 19: Governance and the availability and transparency of information would 
be improved by government establishing a framework that ensures independent oversight 
of the governance, administration and data transparency of public service pension 
schemes. Government should consider which body or bodies, including, for example, The 
Pensions Regulator, is most suitable to undertake this role.
Ex.40 While the recommendations in this report on scheme features aim to create a 
sustainable public service pensions system for the future, it is important that given the 
implications for long-term public finances this is monitored by an independent body to 
make sure it is achieved. Given its role to provide independent advice on the public finances 
the Office for Budget Responsibility is best placed to play this role.
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Recommendation 20: When assessing the long term sustainability of the public finances, the 
Office for Budget Responsibility should provide a regular published analysis of the long 
term fiscal impact of the main public service pension schemes (including the funded LGPS). 
Ex.41 Management of investment funds is an additional aspect of pension scheme 
governance for the funded public service pension schemes, most notably for the LGPS. 
While there are many areas of good practice around the management of these funds there 
are also areas that could be improved around publication of comparable Fund data and 
assessment of sustainability.
Recommendation 21: Centrally collated comprehensive data, covering all LGPS Funds, 
should be published including Fund comparisons, which, for example, clarify and compare 
key assumptions about investment growth and differences in deficit recovery plans. 
Ex.42 Good administration is a key enabler in the delivery of accurate and timely pension 
payments. Currently a clear definition of what good administration (and governance) looks 
like in public service pension schemes is not readily available. 
Recommendation 22: Government should set what good standards of administration 
should consist of in the public service pension schemes based on independent expert 
advice. The Pensions Regulator might have a role, building on its objective to promote good 
administration. A benchmarking exercise should then be conducted across all the 
schemes to assist in the raising of standards where appropriate.
Ex.43  A number of commentators have also suggested that public service pension 
schemes offer scope for the streamlining their administration functions and more shared 
arrangements. This is relevant to all schemes, but particularly for the administration of 
the locally run schemes. A number of local authorities have already begun to explore 
opportunities to share administrative services and contracts and the Commission’s view is 
that this should be encouraged. 
Recommendation 23: Central and local government should closely monitor the benefits 
associated with the current co-operative projects within the LGPS, with a view to 
encouraging the extension of this approach, if appropriate, across all local authorities. 
Government should also examine closely the potential for the unfunded public service schemes 
to realise greater efficiencies in the administration of pensions by sharing contracts and 
combining support services, including considering outsourcing.
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Ex.44 There is a complex and inconsistent overall legal architecture that has developed 
piecemeal over the last 100 years or more. There is a strong case for introducing new, 
overarching, primary legislation to set the new public service pension scheme framework. 
This would provide greater transparency, simplicity and certainty that the reforms would 
satisfy common basic principles. 
Recommendation 24: The Government should introduce primary legislation to adopt a new 
common UK legal framework for public service schemes. 
Delivering the change 
Ex.45 Implementation is key: the first stage will require the detailed development of 
proposals by the Government including the Government’s decision on affordability issues 
while applying the common set of design principles.
Recommendation 25: The consultation process itself should be centrally co-ordinated: to 
set the cost ceilings and timetables for consultation and overall implementation. However, the 
consultation on details should be conducted scheme by scheme involving employees 
and their representatives. 
Ex.46 This will avoid a cumbersome process while permitting any necessary variation in 
timetables between schemes. It will also provide for standardisation while allowing individual 
schemes to enter into negotiations. Each consultation, as required by law, will need to be 
accompanied by a full equality impact assessment to allow for deeper consideration of issues 
the reforms may pose for various groups. And there should be early upfront communication 
with scheme members, to encourage their participation in the consultation process.
Ex.47 The Commission recognises that these reforms cannot be achieved overnight. There 
are several steps that will need to be taken before the necessary legislative process can be 
started and the consequent administrative changes made. And these steps are crucial in 
ensuring that the reforms are a success and deliver sustainable public service pension schemes 
for the foreseeable future.
Recommendation 26: The Commission’s view is that even allowing for the necessary processes 
it should be possible to introduce the new schemes before the end of this Parliament and 
we would encourage the Government to aim for implementation within this timeframe. 
Ex.48 Meeting the implementation timetable would be facilitated by considering delivery 
issues, particularly scheme administration, at an early stage. And there needs to be a clear 
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governance structure for the implementation plan. This is important for several reasons. 
First, it increases transparency in the process. Second, it allows the monitoring of delivery 
against targets and gives early warning if it looks like the timetable is slipping. Third, it 
allows individuals responsible for delivering the reforms to be held to account.
Recommendation 27: Best practice governance arrangements should be followed for both 
business as usual and the transformation process, for each scheme. And there will also 
need to be the right resource, on top of business as usual, to drive the reforms; particularly 
given the challenging timescale and scope of the reforms.
Ex.49 An important part of delivering this change and managing the transition is protecting 
existing members. Members will of course have their past service rights protected. The 
Commission has also noted in the evidence submitted to it the widespread expectations 
among public servants that the final salary link would be maintained. The Commission is 
sympathetic to the argument that this would be in line with the principle of accrued rights. 
And given the major transition involved in moving to the reformed schemes it would also be 
fair.
Ex.50 The Commission’s expectation is that existing members who are currently in their 
50s should, by and large, experience fairly limited change to the benefit which they would 
otherwise have expected to accrue by the time they reach their current scheme normal 
pension age. This would particularly be the case if the final salary link is protected for past 
service, as the Commission recommends. 
Ex.51 The reforms proposed by the Commission should, as a whole, deliver a framework 
for public service pensions that is affordable and sustainable, adequate and fair, supports 
productivity and is transparent and simple. It represents a balanced deal for public service 
workers and taxpayers that should deliver a long-lasting settlement in which they can have 
trust and confidence.
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1 The case for reform revisited
Box 1.A: Summary
 • In the interim report, the Commission outlined the case for long-term structural reform 
of public service pension schemes and concluded that the final salary structure of most 
current schemes can be unfair to employees and taxpayers. In the context of uncertain 
and increasing longevity, the Commission also felt that current scheme designs are not 
sufficiently robust to ensure the sustainability of public service pensions.
 • The Commission felt that there was a rationale for short-term cost savings in recognition 
of the substantial unanticipated increases in longevity. In practice these savings could only 
be realised by increasing member contributions. The Commission recommended that any 
increase should be managed so as to protect the low paid, and if possible staged.
 • The Government accepted the report’s conclusions and committed to maintaining some 
form of defined benefit (DB) pensions provision for public service employees. It announced 
staggered and progressive increases in member contributions, of three percentage points 
on average. In response to the report, the Government also announced public consultations 
on the discount rate and on the Fair Deal policy that protects the pension entitlements of 
employees who are transferred out of the public sector. 
 • The Government should make clear its assessment of the role of public service pension 
schemes. Based on its framework of principles, the Commission believes that the primary 
purpose is to ensure adequate levels of retirement income for public service pensioners.
 • Pensions will continue to be an important element of remuneration. The Commission 
recommends that public service employers take greater account of public service pensions 
when constructing remuneration packages and designing workforce strategies. The 
Government should make clear in its remits for pay review bodies that they should consider 
how public service pensions affect total reward when making pay recommendations.
The interim report
1.1 The Commission published its interim report on 7 October 2010. This showed that the 
life expectancy of those reaching the age of 60 has increased by an unprecedented amount 
since the Second World War (Chart 1.A).
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Chart 1.A: Period life expectancies for those reaching age 60 – general 
population
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Note: Period life expectancies represent the amount of time an individual is expected to live under the assumption that 
mortality rates are equal to the experience of other individuals in that year (see Box 4.C of the interim report). When 
life expectancy is increasing, period life expectancies tend to understate somewhat the actual anticipated lifespan of a 
particular cohort reaching the age of 60.
1.2 These improvements have consistently been underestimated (see Chart 4.B). As a result, 
time in retirement, and thus pension costs, have been much higher than originally expected. 
A female pensioner in the NHS scheme who retired at the age of 60 in 2010 could expect to 
spend around 45 per cent of their adult life in retirement, compared to around 30 per cent 
for pensioners in the 1950s (see Chart 4.A). These developments are discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 4.
1.3 There have been significant reforms to the main public service pension schemes over 
the last decade, including increased pension ages for new members and a change in the 
indexation of pensions from RPI to CPI indexation. Some of these changes have reduced 
projected benefit payments in the coming decades. For the interim report the Commission 
asked the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) to project future public service 
pensions expenditure. It projected benefit payments to fall gradually to around 1.4 per cent 
of GDP in 2059-60, after peaking at 1.9 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in  
2010-11. 
1.4 Future costs are inherently uncertain and sensitive to assumptions on life expectancy, 
size of workforce, earnings growth and the implementation of reforms. Chart 1.B 
demonstrates the possible impact of altering some of these assumptions. Given the current 
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design of public service pension schemes, the general public cannot be sure that schemes will 
remain sustainable in the future. 
Chart 1.B: Projected benefit payments as a percentage of GDP – 
sensitivity analysis
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Source: GAD projections for IPSPC and IPSPC analysis.
Note: The fan chart shows how the projections would be affected by altering assumptions about productivity growth, 
public service workforce growth and life expectancy (see Annex C of the interim report).
1.5 The interim report also assessed the fairness of public service pensions. It showed that 
the final salary design of most current schemes is much more beneficial to high flyers than 
to those with slower salary growth. High flyers can receive almost twice as much in pension 
payments per £100 of employee contribution than low flyers.1
1.6 New analysis by the Commission, using a dataset of over one million members of 
the Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS), confirms that this is an important issue. 
Though data are not available to track the difference between high and low flyers directly, 
Chart 1.C shows that those who retire on a higher salary in a final salary pension scheme 
receive a significantly higher annual pension per £100 of employee contributions. The 
median annual pension payout for an employee who retired on a salary in the highest fifth 
was £42 for each £100 of contributions. This is almost 30 per cent higher than the pension 
payout for someone who retired on a salary in the lowest fifth. Larger benefits for high flyers, 
relative to their contributions, are an inherent feature of final salary pension schemes, but 
this does not happen in several other possible scheme designs.2
1 IPSPC (2010), Interim Report, Box 5.C, p.94.
2 Pensions Policy Institute (2010), The future of the public sector pensions, Chapter 5.
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Chart 1.C: Median annual pension receipts for each £100 of 
contributions
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Note: Based on current pensioners who retired from the Local Government Pension Scheme in 2008.
1.7 The results are especially striking because the LGPS has long had a system of 
differentiated contributions. Historically, manual workers paid less than non-manual 
employees, while contributions in the reformed scheme are tiered on the basis of income, 
with higher earners paying more. Analysis by the Pensions Policy Institute confirmed that 
the current tiered contributions in the NHS scheme are insufficient to offset the higher 
benefits received by high flyers.3
1.8 Another potential unfairness arises from the concentration of previous reforms in most 
schemes on new members. This implies that new joiners often receive significantly less 
generous pension entitlements than their colleagues in pre-reform schemes. For instance, 
the Pensions Policy Institute estimated that, on average, post-reform public service pension 
schemes now provide benefits worth around 18 per cent of salary, compared to 20 per cent 
of salary for members of the pre-reform schemes (Table 1.A).4 For a median earner, this 
is equivalent to a reduction in pension benefits of about £560 per annum.5 If the planned 
increases in member contributions (described below) are enacted, the average effective 
benefit rate for members of reformed schemes could be expected to fall to around 15 per 
cent of salary.
3 IPSPC (2010), Interim Report, p.95.
4 IPSPC (2010), Interim Report, p.97.
5 Based on a full-time public sector employee – see Office for National Statistics (2010), ‘The changing face of public 
sector employment 1999-2009,’ Economic and Labour Market Review, July.
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Table 1.A: Recent changes in average effective employee benefit rates 
for the main schemes
Average employee benefit rates Members of old 
schemes – 
% of pay
Members of new 
schemes – 
% of pay
with RPI indexation 24 21
with CPI indexation (from April 2011) 20 18
Source: Pensions Policy Institute.
Note: Based on the seven main public service pension schemes (NHS, teachers, LGPS, civil service, police, fire and  
armed forces).
1.9 The Commission determined that current public service final salary pension schemes 
could harm productivity. By leaving almost all risks with employers, they can make it 
difficult to attract new providers to achieve gains in the efficiency and quality of services. 
The ‘Fair Deal’ policy requires private and voluntary sector employers to provide comparable 
pensions when they take on public sector workforces. Smaller private and voluntary sector 
employers are often unwilling to take on such risks. Labour market flexibility could also be 
undermined by final salary pension schemes, since they create strong barriers to mobility 
from the public to the private sector. 
1.10 The interim report showed that pension scheme membership in the private sector has 
declined significantly in the last fifteen years, with fewer than 35 per cent of private sector 
employees now members of employer-sponsored pension schemes (Chart 1.D). Pension 
membership has remained high in the public sector, and the Commission made clear that 
any structural reforms to public service pensions should aim to maintain or increase levels of 
employee participation. This is discussed further in Chapter 3.
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Chart 1.D: Membership of employer-sponsored pension schemes 
among UK employees
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Note: There was a methodological change between 2005 and 2006, which has a marginal impact on results. The 
‘Unknown’ category was introduced in 2005.
Interim conclusions
1.11 The Commission firmly rejected the claim that current public service pensions are 
‘gold plated.’ The average pension paid to pensioner members is around £7,800 per year, 
while the median payment is around £5,600. It also rejected the idea of a ‘race to the 
bottom,’ emphasising instead that public service pensions should ensure adequate retirement 
incomes for those who have devoted their careers in the service of the wider community. 
1.12 The Commission determined that longer term structural reform of pensions was 
required, because current schemes had proved unable to respond flexibly to changes in 
working lives and longevity. They had also resulted in an unfair balance of risks between 
scheme members and taxpayers. The inherent problems of final salary pension schemes, 
particularly in terms of fairness and sustainability, led the Commission to decide that 
alternative models should be chosen for the future (Box 1.B).
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Box 1.B: How do current final salary schemes measure up to the 
Commission’s principles?
 • Affordable and sustainable: Due to the link between pension benefits and final earnings, 
the majority of salary risk (the risk that higher than expected salary rises increase the cost 
of providing pensions) in current schemes is borne by the Government. Members receive a 
substantial increase in pension rights from salary rises as they approach retirement, with the 
costs falling on public service employers.
 • Adequate and fair: Any pension design is capable of delivering adequate pensions. The 
available evidence suggests that current final salary schemes in the public sector do achieve 
this. However, high flyers typically derive more value from final salary schemes than low 
flyers, leading to unfairness between scheme members. A high-flying employee could 
receive almost twice as much in pension payments per £100 of contributions than a low 
flyer. In addition, the balance of risks between the government and the member is one-
sided, leading to unfairness between the taxpayer and scheme members.
 • Supporting productivity: Final salary schemes restrict labour market mobility. Depending 
on the Government’s underlying objectives for the scheme this may be desirable for the 
retention of skilled higher earners. However, at the macroeconomic level a more flexible 
labour market should increase efficiency across the economy as a whole.
 • Transparent and simple: The current schemes are reasonably well understood and simple 
to administer. However, transparency is an issue since it can be difficult to ascertain the 
benefit derived from the scheme, relative to contributions paid in, for higher and lower 
earners, and high and low flyers. For the taxpayer, there is little transparency of expected 
cost, since this depends on future pay developments.
1.13 The Commission was also asked to consider the case for short-term savings. It 
concluded that increased longevity meant that there was a clear rationale for short-term 
savings, to ensure a fairer distribution of costs between taxpayers and members. Because most 
benefit payments in the short term reflect accrued rights (see Chart 2.B), only an increase 
in member contributions could produce significant immediate savings. The Commission 
recommended that any increase in contributions should be managed so as to protect the low 
paid, and staged in order to minimise the impact on opt out rates. The Commission felt that 
there was also a case for reviewing the discount rate6 used to set contribution rates in the 
unfunded public service pension schemes, and for reviewing the ‘Fair Deal’ policy, which 
determines the pension rights of public sector workers transferred to the private sector.
The Government’s response
1.14 The Government responded to the Commission’s interim report in the Spending 
Review published on 20 October 2010.7 The Government accepted the conclusions of 
6 For a definition of the discount rate see IPSPC (2010), Interim Report, Box 4.D.
7 HM Treasury (2010), Spending Review 2010.
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the report and committed to continuing with a form of defined benefit pension for public 
service workers. 
1.15 It also agreed to carry out a public consultation on the discount rate; this was 
published on the 9 December 2010 and closed on 3 March 2011. In addition, on 3 March 
2011 the Government launched a consultation on the Fair Deal policy.
1.16 The Government further announced that it would implement progressive changes to 
the level of employee contributions, leading to an additional saving of £1.8 billion a year by 
2014-15, to be phased in from April 2012.8 This is equivalent to a rise in contribution rates 
of three percentage points on average. The armed forces will be exempt from the increases, as 
recommended by the Commission.
Updating the landscape
1.17 The economic landscape, along with that of pensions, is continually changing. 
The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) published its Economic and fiscal outlook in 
November 2010. This forecast GDP growth to rise steadily from 2010, peaking at 2.9 per 
cent in 2013, before easing slightly as a result of demographic changes. Annual public service 
pensions expenditure is expected to rise to £33.2 billion by 2015-16, an increase from £32.9 
billion forecast in June 2010.
1.18 The Commission’s preferred measure of the cost of public service pensions is the 
level of benefit payments as a percentage of GDP. This can give a good sense of the share 
of national income that has to be devoted to public service pensions expenditure. Other 
criteria can also be useful in certain contexts, though the widely-used net cash expenditure 
figure (the gap between current contributions received and current benefit payments) is 
not an appropriate measure. As well as being inherently volatile, it is a mismatch between 
contributions made in respect of future benefits and payments of previously accrued 
benefits, and so provides no insight into long-term affordability.9 As a proportion of national 
income, public service pensions spending is expected to be broadly stable in the short term, 
remaining between 1.7 and 1.8 per cent of GDP throughout the forecast period (Chart 1.E).
8 The figure for expected savings is in addition to the £1 billion of savings already expected through cap and share 
mechanisms. It does not include any savings from the LGPS.
9 The National Audit Office writes that this measure ‘has no advantages as a measure of pension costs’ (National Audit 
Office (2010), The impact of the 2007-08 changes to public service pensions).
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Chart 1.E: Projected public service pensions expenditure
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Source: Economic and fiscal outlook, Office for Budget Responsibility, Tables 4.2 and 4.18, 2010.
1.19 The OBR’s revised forecasts of GDP growth, inflation and the public sector workforce 
could also have an impact on the longer-term cost of public service pensions. Relative to its 
Budget forecasts, the OBR expects a somewhat smaller reduction in the number of public 
sector workers (falling to 5.17 million in 2014-15) and a somewhat smaller gap between 
RPI and CPI inflation. Both of these factors could be expected to increase long-term public 
service pension spending, but they are partially offset by expectations of slightly higher GDP 
growth in the medium term. Overall, the Commission assesses that the changed projections 
suggest a modest increase in long-term public service pension expenditure as a proportion 
of GDP, but this does not imply any substantial alteration to the conclusions reached in the 
interim report, as shown in Chart 1.B.
1.20 In the wider public sector, remuneration practices could be affected by any changes 
resulting from Will Hutton’s review of public sector pay, discussed in Box 1.C.
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Box 1.C: The Hutton Review of Fair Pay in the Public Sector
The Hutton Review of Fair Pay, chaired by Will Hutton, published its interim report in December 
2010. It reported that pay dispersion has increased in the public sector, largely following private 
sector trends (though to a much lesser extent). Though top pay often appears to be below 
that of private sector comparators, there are developments in governance, transparency and 
competitiveness that could enhance the perceived fairness of pay awards. There is also a good 
case for referring pay to a pay multiple.
The central conclusions of the report were that:
 • private sector top pay has raced ahead – and in some areas of the public sector it has 
been felt that executive pay needs to try to keep up. Looked at in terms of responsibilities, 
public sector executive pay often looks well behind that in the private sector. For instance, 
the Permanent Secretary of the Home Office (earning about £200,000) is responsible for 
a budget of over £10 billion. Private sector chief executives with budgets of that size have 
median salaries in excess of £2.5 million;a
 • there is thus some evidence that public sector executive pay is often lower than that 
in the private sector. But it is difficult for the public to be sure that senior pay matches 
performance, since there is a ‘patchwork quilt’ of pay arrangements, and good governance 
and transparency are not always guaranteed;
 • public sector pay needs to be more focused on managing and rewarding performance. 
Good governance arrangements can help to ensure that public sector pay is fair – but 
they are unlikely to be enough on their own. There is a strong case for a maximum pay 
ratio. There should be disclosure requirements based on such a pay multiple and a greater 
emphasis on the competitiveness of executive labour markets; and
 • public sector bodies that are furthest from government tend to provide the highest lead 
salaries. As the public sector is reformed, there is a risk that unfair pay increases may rise. 
Restricted labour markets for senior positions unnecessarily fuel pay inflation.
The final report will be published in March 2011, and will set out recommendations on:
 • governance and transparency;
 • the pay multiple;
 • performance pay; and
 • market competitiveness.
a) Hutton Review of Fair Pay (2010), Interim Report, p.51.
The principles of reform revisited
1.21 The Commission’s four main principles for public service pensions were chosen to 
provide a balanced and comprehensive framework with which to consider the case for reform 
in the interim report. The Commission has assessed the options for long-term structural 
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reform in the final report against these same principles. The principles reflect the range of 
issues covered in the evidence submitted to the Commission in its calls for evidence and 
stakeholder events. 
Affordable and sustainable
1.22 Public service pension expenditure must be affordable. To be sustainable, it must 
remain affordable over time. The affordable level of pension cost is a decision for the 
Government within the context of a wide range of priorities. But it cannot be assessed in the 
short term alone since the effects of pension decisions build up and persist over decades.
1.23 Affordability should also be analysed in the context of the Government’s overall 
expenditure. A reform that reduces the take-up of means-tested benefits such as Pension 
Credit, for instance by reducing the number of people opting out from public service 
pension schemes, might have a substantial positive impact on long-term finances. This could 
not be calculated by looking at public service pension spending on its own.
1.24 In order to be sustainable, a scheme must be able to manage and share risks effectively, 
without dramatic increases in costs. The Commission has assessed options for change 
according to their ability to deliver an affordable and sustainable system, one which has the 
robustness and flexibility to withstand future uncertainties.
Adequate and fair
1.25 Public service pensions should provide an adequate level of retirement income for 
public service workers with a reasonable degree of certainty, while maintaining high levels of 
employee participation.
1.26 Chapter 2 sets out the Commission’s view on adequacy, informed by stakeholder 
engagement and responses to the interim report. Long-term structural reform options have 
been analysed against their ability to deliver an adequate income for different groups. 
1.27 As well as providing adequate levels of income in retirement, public service pensions 
should be fair. This includes fairness in the distribution of contributions and benefits 
between members of the same pension scheme – by income, by career path and by time of 
entry; fairness between different schemes; fairness between generations of taxpayers; and 
fairness between taxpayers and the public service employees. The fairness of different scheme 
designs, in their distribution of both costs and risks, is discussed further in Chapter 3. 
Support productivity
1.28 To support productivity, public service pension scheme design should support an 
efficient labour market for employees so that the taxpayer can be confident that public 
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services provide value for money. While not its primary purpose, scheme design should look 
to aid the recruitment and retention of the right people in the right jobs in a cost-effective 
and flexible way, and should usually avoid barriers to the movement of employees between 
sectors.
1.29 The interim report showed that existing public service pensions can be a barrier to 
the outsourcing and mutualisation of public services that could drive greater productivity 
and efficiency in public services. The current landscape on access to schemes is assessed in 
Chapter 5, in the light of HM Treasury’s ongoing review of the Fair Deal policy. 
Transparent and simple
1.30 Public service pensions should be widely understood. Scheme members need to know 
their entitlements and potential future benefits. The population as a whole needs to be 
confident that public service pensions offer value for money. Key design features and costs 
to employers and employees should thus be set out clearly and transparently. It follows that 
public service pension design should be as easy to understand as possible. Only with good 
general understanding can the Commission hope to achieve the wide agreement that is 
central to reform.
1.31 In line with this principle, the Commission thinks it is very important that public 
service pension schemes, like those in the private sector, have a clear legal framework and a 
governance structure that outlines clearly the roles of interested parties. Chapter 6 discusses 
how to achieve these goals in more detail.
Application of the principles
1.32 These principles form the basis for assessing the long-term reform choices. As discussed 
in the interim report, the principles were not weighted and nor was the evidence associated 
with them. Some principles are in conflict. For example, some of the options to ensure long-
term sustainability (discussed in Chapter 4) are relatively complex and therefore difficult to 
understand, contrary to the principle of transparency and simplicity. This report attempts to 
make the trade-offs plain so that the advantages and disadvantages of different options are 
clear.
The purpose of pensions
1.33 In light of these trade-offs, it is important to consider the purpose of public service 
pensions. There are many possible reasons for public service employers to provide pension 
benefits to their employees.10 Those that stand out are centred on adequacy and fairness and 
on supporting productivity.
10 Barr and Diamond (2008), Reforming Pensions, Chapter 2, discuss the purposes of pensions in general.
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Adequacy and fairness
1.34 At the core of occupational pension schemes is the aim of ensuring that income is 
adequate across an employee’s lifetime. Since an extra pound is of more value to someone 
when he is poor than when he is rich, an individual’s lifetime welfare will usually be higher if 
consumption is smoothed over the life cycle, consuming a roughly equal amount each year.11 
Given that people’s earning capacities are typically lower in later life, this can be a strong 
motivation for providing pensions.
1.35 It could be argued that individuals should just be left to make their own arrangements 
to smooth income in retirement. But there is good evidence that people might then make 
decisions which are harmful either to themselves, with undersaving resulting in inadequate 
resources in later life,12 or to wider society, for instance because of a reliance on means-tested 
benefits.13 There are thus good reasons for governments to promote consumption smoothing 
through pension schemes. 
1.36 Insurance is a further central motivation for pensions. By providing constant pension 
payments throughout an employee’s lifetime, government can help to insure against the risk 
of low incomes for those who live for longer than they had expected. Public service pension 
schemes also provide an element of family insurance through survivors’ pensions and death 
in service benefits (partially insuring family members against the risk of the death of the 
pension holder).14
1.37 Governments could also have an interest in promoting poverty relief and redistribution 
towards the worse off through public service pensions, though the state pension system is 
of most importance in this respect. The Commission’s analysis suggests that, under current 
scheme designs, about 1 in 8 of public sector pensioners with at least 20 years’ service could 
expect to be eligible for means-tested Pension Credit payments at some stage in their lives.15 
In these circumstances, the true fiscal cost of providing pensions to the low paid might be 
relatively low, because the occupational pension in part replaces other income from the state.
1.38  However, there are other ways of achieving poverty relief and redistribution within the 
overall pension system, particularly the basic State Pension and Pension Credit, so these are 
not central motivations for occupational pensions. To encourage pension saving and to avoid 
11 In technical terms, individuals display declining marginal utility of consumption; see Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), 
‘Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data.’ There are many potential 
complications to this simple story. For instance, because housing, taxation and travel costs are typically lower in retirement 
than during the working life, the consumption level required to maintain a given standard of living is usually somewhat 
lower in retirement. But the broad life-cycle hypothesis has a strong theoretical basis and good empirical support.
12 Laibson (1996), ‘Hyperbolic Discount Functions, Undersaving, and Savings Policy.’
13 See Feldstein and Liebman (2002), ‘Social Security’, who describe the US social security system as a way ‘to prevent 
free-riding in the presence of altruism.’
14 These ancillary benefits are discussed further in Chapter 3.
15 Based on the Pensim2 database provided by the Department for Work and Pensions (see Annex C). Most of those who 
are eligible for Pension Credit payments have relatively short careers in the public sector; about 1 in 3 of all employees 
with some service in the public sector could expect to receive Pension Credit payments.
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reliance on state benefit it is important to maximise participation in public service pension 
schemes where this is appropriate, as discussed in Chapter 3.
Supporting productivity
1.39 Pension schemes could help public service employers to recruit and retain effective 
employees. In principle, providing remuneration through pensions could be more cost-
effective than doing so through pay, for the following reasons:
 • Selection. Because pension schemes do not provide remuneration until late in life, 
they might attract particular kinds of employee – those who value the future more 
highly, work more effectively, and are less likely to leave their jobs.16 This could 
make it relatively cheaper to provide remuneration though pensions instead of pay. 
This reason could be most important for society as a whole where the employer 
provides substantial training, as in the NHS and armed forces – by hiring people 
who are likely to stay for several years, the employer will find it easier to recoup its 
investment.
 • Motivation. Pensions could play a role in encouraging employees to work hard. For 
instance, the presence of an adequate and secure pensions guarantee could support 
employee engagement and commitment to their employers.17
 • Risk transfer. If employees value the risk transfer implicit in many pension schemes, 
they might be prepared to receive lower total remuneration in return. For instance, 
employees might prefer not to bear the risk of variation in the price of annuities at 
retirement (and so variation in retirement income). Most defined benefit schemes 
transfer this risk to the employer.
1.40 These are potentially important impacts. However, a downside of providing 
remuneration through pensions is that pensions lack the flexibility and responsiveness to 
circumstances that pay can provide. For instance, an employer who finds that a particular 
set of skills is in high demand can increase pay for people with those skills, or offer retention 
bonuses to current employees. It is much harder to target pensions in a similar fashion. 
1.41 Moreover, there is evidence that the valuation of pension entitlements by employees 
is lower than their cost to public service employers.18 Greater transparency, discussed in 
Chapter 6, could help to reduce this gap, but it suggests that pensions will often not be 
as cost-effective in recruiting and retaining employees as other aspects of remuneration. 
Pension design should also guard against perverse effects. The interim report discussed the 
16 Ippolito (2002), ‘Stayers as ‘Workers’ and ‘Savers’: Toward Reconciling the Pension-Quit Literature.’
17 Evidence submitted to the Commission by Towers Watson suggests motivation as a possible important reason for 
public service pension provision.
18 See IPSPC (2010), Interim Report, Chapter 6.
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effect of final salary pension schemes in reducing labour market mobility, which could harm 
productivity in the wider economy. 
1.42 Overall, the Commission feels that public service employers have historically used 
pensions excessively for workforce management, a task for which they are not very well 
suited and in which they are unlikely to provide value for money. Public service pensions 
should continue to be a valuable part of the reward package, helping to attract and motivate 
high-quality employees.
Implications
1.43 The purpose of public service pensions has rarely been clearly articulated, perhaps 
because of the disparate histories of public service pension schemes and their varying roles. 
In its recent report on the 2007-08 reforms, the National Audit Office commented that 
the Treasury ‘did not make a clear statement about the purpose of public service pensions 
and the types of employee behaviour it wished to encourage and support through them...’19 
It recommended that, in the light of the IPSPC’s recommendations, ‘the Treasury, 
Government departments and public service employers should agree and communicate a 
clear view of the purpose of public service pensions...’20
Recommendation: The Government should make clear its assessment of the role of public 
service pension schemes. Based on its framework of principles, the Commission believes 
that the primary purpose is to ensure adequate levels of retirement income for public service 
pensioners (Recommendation 1).
1.44 The Commission does not believe that public service pensions should be primarily 
concerned with workforce management. But employer contributions to current public 
service pensions can be worth a fifth or more of the pay bill, and pensions will continue to 
be an important part of remuneration. As such, public service employers and pay review 
bodies should consider the impact of public service pensions on recruitment, retention and 
workforce management. The interim report found no evidence that pay is lower for public 
service workers to reflect higher levels of pension provision.21 Therefore current pension 
schemes do not appear to offer best value for money. However, there is evidence to suggest 
that some highly-skilled workers earn more in the private sector, particularly in the South 
East and London,22 and the careful design of remuneration packages for these groups could 
be especially important.
19 National Audit Office (2010), The impact of the 2007-08 changes to public service pensions, p.34.
20 National Audit Office (2010), The impact of the 2007-08 changes to public service pensions, p.10.
21 IPSPC (2010), Interim Report, Chapter 6.
22 See Pensions Policy Institute (2008), An assessment of the Government’s reforms to public sector pensions, p.48 and 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (2011), Green Budget 2011, Chapter 7.
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Recommendation: Pensions will continue to be an important element of remuneration. The 
Commission recommends that public service employers take greater account of public service 
pensions when constructing remuneration packages and designing workforce strategies. 
The Government should make clear in its remits for pay review bodies that they should 
consider how public service pensions affect total reward when making pay recommendations 
(Recommendation 2).
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2 The deal
Box 2.A: Summary
 • The package of reforms recommended by the Commission is a balanced deal that delivers 
fair outcomes for public service workers and for taxpayers and builds trust and confidence 
in the system.
 • The Government should ensure that public service pensions, along with a full state pension, 
deliver at least adequate levels of income (as defined by the Turner Commission benchmark 
replacement rates) for scheme members who work full careers in public service. Employers 
should seek to maximise participation in the schemes where this is appropriate. Adequate 
incomes and good participation rates are particularly important below median income 
levels.
 • Government, as a large employer, is capable of bearing the majority of the risk associated 
with pension saving and should continue to do so. Government should continue to provide 
a form of defined benefit pension as the core scheme design. 
 • However, there should be a fairer sharing of risk between government (and ultimately 
taxpayers) and scheme members. It is fair for scheme members who are still working to 
bear more of the risks associated with changes in longevity, for example, by working longer 
if life expectancy increases. 
 • As soon as practical, members of the current defined benefit public service pension 
schemes should be moved to the new schemes for future service. Most schemes should 
link a member’s Normal Pension Age to their State Pension Age in the future. But current 
workers must be protected from a sudden change in their pension benefits or pension age. 
The Government must also honour in full the pension promises that have been accrued by 
scheme members. 
 • The taxpayer should have certainty that public service pension scheme costs are under 
control. The Government should set out a fixed cost ceiling for each scheme which is the 
proportion of pensionable pay that public service employers will contribute, on average, to 
employees’ pensions over the long term.
 • Every public service pension scheme (and individual Local Government Pension Scheme 
Fund) should have a properly constituted, trained and competent Pension Board, with 
member nominees, responsible for the delivery of good governance and administration. 
 • It is important that scheme members and taxpayers understand how public service pension 
schemes work and how much they cost. The Government should ensure that there is 
transparent publication and robust scrutiny of data associated with the schemes and that 
this is overseen by appropriate organisations.
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2.1 The diagram in the Foreword outlines the deal that the Commission believes will lead 
to a robust system for public service pensions in the future. This chapter builds on that 
picture. If implemented, the deal will strike a fair balance between public service workers and 
taxpayers in respect of public service pensions.
An adequate income
2.2 Ensuring that public service pensions continue to provide at least an adequate level of 
income in retirement is, in the view of this Commission, a crucial result of any structural 
reforms of the schemes.
2.3 In the interim report, the Commission began exploring the issue of adequacy in the 
public service pension context. It showed that under the current final salary arrangements, 
even before taking account of the lump sum payments, current public service pension 
schemes in conjunction with a full state pension would deliver an adequate level of income 
in retirement for those who work full careers in public service, based on the replacement 
rates1 defined by Lord Turner in his Pensions Commission report.2 
2.4 In the Commission’s final call for evidence, respondents were asked how the 
Commission should think about the issue of adequacy and whether a full state and public 
service pension should ensure people reach an adequate level of income. There was a fairly 
broad consensus that the benchmark replacement rates set out by the Turner Commission in 
2004 were the appropriate way of thinking about adequacy. Some respondents thought that 
these levels should be considered the minimum required. The Commission agrees with this 
view. The Turner Commission’s second report3 presented research evidence which suggested 
that the benchmark replacement rates were closer to what people thought was a ‘minimum’ 
income in retirement rather than a ‘comfortable’ level of income.
2.5 Similarly, most respondents felt that a full public service pension, in conjunction with 
a full state pension, should deliver at least an income at these levels. Again, the Commission 
agrees with these views and believes that the Government should ensure future public service 
pension schemes (in conjunction with a full state pension) deliver at least the minimum 
income level in retirement recommended by the Turner Commission for scheme members 
who have full careers in public service, and proportionately for those with part careers. This 
is particularly important for low earners, who are less likely to have any other assets and 
income sources that they can rely on in retirement. This will mean that those members who 
work a full career in public service and retire on below median incomes should receive at 
least two thirds of their final salary from a public service pension and full state pension.
1 These replacement rates measure the level of income immediately after retirement compared to the level of income 
immediately before retirement.
2 Pensions: Challenges and Choices The first report of the Pensions Commission, 2004.
3 A New Pension Settlement for the Twenty-First Century: The Second Report of the Pensions Commission, Appendix D, 
2005.
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Chart 2.A: Gross replacement rates delivered by typical current public 
service pension schemes and state pension system
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2.6 Chart 2.A shows that current schemes deliver these adequacy levels4 when combined 
with a full state pension after a lump sum has been taken. These replacement rates should be 
regarded as a minimum. To ensure that a comfortable level of income can be attained under 
the current schemes, scheme members who have worked full careers in public service would 
need to consider taking a smaller lump sum or have other income sources in retirement. 
2.7 Another key factor when thinking about adequacy is the level of participation in the 
schemes. There is little point designing a pension scheme that delivers adequate income 
levels, if public service employees, for one reason or another, decide not to remain members 
of the scheme once they are enrolled into it or decide not to join at all. At the moment 
around 85 per cent of public sector workers are members of an employer sponsored pension 
scheme. But this varies by income level. Chart 3.H shows that as earnings increase so do 
participation rates in public sector schemes. It is important that the future structure of 
public service pension schemes maintains or improves the participation rates of employees, 
especially below median earner income levels. Important considerations that will affect 
participation rates in the future are the level of employee contributions required, the trust 
that scheme members have in the scheme and the ease with which members are able to 
understand the scheme.
4 This is the level of income from a typical final salary public service pension scheme – a 1/60th accrual rate will deliver a 
pension of two thirds of final salary before any lump sum is taken and half of final salary after the maximum lump sum 
has been taken for a member who has 40 years of service. 
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Box 2.B: Automatic enrolment from 2012
The previous Government introduced plans for all eligible workers not currently in a qualifying 
workplace pension scheme to be automatically enrolled into one, as a way of supporting saving 
for retirement. 
Automatic enrolment will start to be implemented from October 2012, although a reviewa 
carried out for the current Government recommended that large employers who wish to enrol 
their eligible employees automatically ahead of the start date should be able to do so, from July 
2012.
A feature of these reforms is that employees who have opted out of schemes will be 
automatically re-enrolled into schemes around every three years, which should help to increase 
participation in pension schemes, including public service schemes, in the medium term.
a) The Pensions Bill 2011 entered the House of Lords in January 2011 and includes measures to implement the recommendations of the 
Making Automatic Enrolment Work Review
Recommendation: The Government should ensure that public service pension schemes, along 
with a full state pension, deliver at least adequate levels of income (as defined by the Turner 
Commission benchmark replacement rates) for scheme members who work full careers in 
public service. Employers should seek to maximise participation in the schemes where this is 
appropriate. Adequate incomes and good participation rates are particularly important below 
median income levels (Recommendation 3).
2.8 The level of income delivered by and participation in public service pension schemes are 
not the only important aspects to consider when looking at adequacy: certainty of income is 
also important.
2.9 As such, current workers must be protected from a sudden change in their pension 
benefits or pension age, particularly when they are close to retiring. The issue of transition is 
considered in more detail in Chapter 7.
2.10 Certainty of income will also be important in the future, especially for people with 
lower incomes. Therefore, it is crucial that risks associated with pensions are carefully 
considered when looking at potential new scheme designs.
Defining the risks
2.11 There are many different types of risk involved in pensions. Occupational pension 
schemes can be designed in ways that share risks differently between scheme members and 
the sponsoring employer, which is usually the Government and ultimately the taxpayer in 
the public service pension schemes. By looking at the different types of risk and making a 
judgement, informed by the principles outlined in Chapter 1, about who is best placed to 
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bear these risks, the Commission has been able to develop a shortlist of potential options for 
structural reform.
Identifying the risks in public service pension schemes
2.12 The types of risk in pension schemes can be categorised in many ways and vary by 
scheme structure, funding status and by the type of member. In Table 2.A below, the 
Commission’s interpretation of the key risks in the context of a defined benefit (DB) scheme 
are outlined. The risks are presented from the point of view of the employer, who bears the 
majority of risks in this type of scheme. They are also presented as downside risks – so risks 
that can increase the costs of running the schemes – although costs could fall if the risks 
move in the opposite direction to that presented here.
Table 2.A: Risks in defined benefit pension schemes
Type of risk Description of risk
Investment For funded schemes, this is the risk that lower than expected asset 
returns mean that there are insufficient assets to pay benefits 
when they come into payment. For unfunded schemes, the risk is 
that GDP (and therefore tax revenues which fund future pension 
commitments) does not rise as quickly as projected.
Inflation Risk that higher than expected price inflation increases the cost of 
providing pensions.
Salary Risk that higher than expected salary increases increase the cost of 
providing pensions.
Longevity Risk that higher than projected longevity increases the cost of 
providing a defined level of benefit. Longevity changes can 
happen before or after retirement.
Source: IPSPC analysis.
2.13 Defined contribution (DC) schemes, such as the Civil Service Partnership scheme, 
which are more typically found in the private sector are subject to a different set of risks. 
These are set out below, largely from the point of view of the members who typically bear 
most of the risks. The main exception is post retirement longevity risk which sits with 
whoever is paying the annuity, which is often an insurance company.
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Table 2.B: Risks in defined contribution pension schemes
Type of risk Description of risk
Investment The risk that lower than expected returns on contributions paid 
provides a lower than expected pension fund from which to buy 
an annuity at retirement.
Interest rate/annuity risk The risk that adverse market movements close to retirement 
reduces the amount of pension that can be bought from a fixed 
sum of money.
Inflation The risk that higher than expected inflation erodes purchasing 
power of benefits after they come into payment.
Longevity Before retirement: Risk that higher than expected life expectancy 
reduces the amount of pension that can be paid from a set 
amount of assets.
After retirement: Risk to the employer / insurer that higher than 
expected life expectancy increases the cost of providing a defined 
level of benefit.
Source: IPSPC analysis.
2.14 As indicated from the descriptions above, some of these risks apply before retirement 
only (such as salary risk in a DB scheme), some apply in retirement only (inflation risk 
in a DC scheme) and some risks can occur before or after retirement (such as changes in 
longevity). 
2.15 These risks have been identified as technical risks that impact on scheme design. The 
rest of this section focuses on these risks. Of course, pension schemes are inherently subject 
to many others that require consideration. Among them are governance and regulatory risk, 
the impact of demographic and behavioural changes and default risk (the risk that for one 
reason or another, possibly employer insolvency, the full pension is not paid out).
Current public service pension schemes: who bears the risk?
2.16 Within pension schemes the three main parties that may bear risk are the employer, 
the scheme members and in the event of insuring pension incomes, the insurer. Across the 
public services, almost all pension schemes are run on a defined benefit basis, and most of 
those provide benefits based on final salary. This places the majority of the risks in the hands 
of the employers – or in this case, mainly the Government and ultimately the taxpayer.
2.17 After retirement, DB schemes provide members with a pre-defined amount which is 
paid throughout the life of the member (and a surviving spouse) and indexed throughout 
this period in line with inflation. How much this benefit ends up costing the employer 
depends on both financial and longevity factors and the risks relating to these are borne by 
the employer.
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2.18 Before retirement, the risks are centred on how pension builds up and how much 
employees and employers respectively pay towards it. In a final salary scheme, the employer 
bears some salary risk, since those who retire on a higher than anticipated salary end up 
costing the employer more than they had provisioned for. In final salary schemes, members 
will have paid contributions to the scheme based on something similar to their average 
salary, but will receive benefits based on their final salary. Taxpayers will pick up the cost of 
the difference between average and final salaries and members will benefit where final salaries 
are higher than average salaries. This effect will be particularly visible where people have 
experienced rapid salary growth. In average salary schemes, members bear more of the risk – 
salary levels throughout a member’s career will determine their income at retirement as well 
as their contributions to the scheme.
2.19 The employer can also manage costs through the contributions it requires of its active 
members. In some current public service pension schemes ‘cap and share’ mechanisms have 
been introduced to share longevity risk with scheme members. This allows increases in costs 
caused by improvements in longevity to be shared by employees and employers up to a fixed 
employer cap. Above the cap increases are passed to employees.
2.20 In DC schemes, most pre-retirement risks fall on the member. Members are subject 
to the risk that investments in their fund do not perform well. At retirement the amount of 
pension the fund is able to finance is subject to longevity risk and interest rate risk. However, 
once an income stream is secured the investment and longevity risk passes to the insurer (if 
bought out) or the employer (if retained inhouse). If a member opts for a flat rate annuity 
which does not increase in line with changes in prices, they will also bear inflation risk in 
retirement.
Future public service pension schemes: who should bear the risk?
2.21 The question of who should bear the risk in pension schemes is subjective and 
complex. The Commission’s analysis, based on balancing the key principles, has led to the 
following conclusions.
2.22 It is not unreasonable to treat different groups differently, given the variations in 
capacity to bear risk. Younger members and those with higher earnings are arguably more 
able to take on risk given the ability to respond to adverse outcomes. Younger members have 
more time to make good any shortfalls in pension saving caused by changes in longevity or 
investment performance. Higher earners are likely to have other assets or income streams 
which they can rely on in retirement. However, the ability to bear risk must be differentiated 
from the ability to suffer losses. Younger members may have more capacity to bear risks, but 
that does not mean they should expect to be worse off as a result.
2.23 An extension of the age distinction is that retired members have little capacity to bear 
and manage risks, and as such, it is right for most risk after a member has retired to be with 
the employer (or insurer). 
44
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report - 10 March 2011
2.24 Salary risk and longevity risk before retirement are areas where increases in the cost 
of pension provision benefit members at an individual level, whether that is through higher 
pension income or pension income paid for a longer period. As such it is the Commission’s 
conclusion that it is reasonable for employers to share these risks with the members. 
2.25 Conversely, increases in pension costs because of uncertain asset returns or high 
interest rates or inflation are generally areas where members individually have little control 
and do not benefit. Large employers, such as government, have a better ability to bear these 
risks. For this reason, the Commission believes that these risks should not be passed to the 
member.
Table 2.C: Summary of the Commission’s view of who can bear risks in 
public service pension schemes
Younger members Older members Pensioner members
Longevity risk  Longevity risk  Longevity risk 
Lower earners Investment risk  Investment risk  Investment risk 
Salary risk  Salary risk 
Longevity risk  Longevity risk  Longevity risk 
Higher earners Investment risk  Investment risk  Investment risk 
Salary risk  Salary risk 
Key:  Cannot bear risk  Might be able to 
bear risk
 Can bear risk
Source: IPSPC analysis.
The implications for scheme design
2.26 The Commission has set out what it considers the optimal balance of risks should be 
against where risks sit in current public service pension schemes and under several alternative 
scheme structures. More information on this is included in Chapter 3.
2.27 The results show that final salary structures are not a good fit, primarily because of 
the salary effects. Defined contribution schemes are also a poor match as an occupational 
pension scheme offered by the Government as a large employer, leaving too much pre-
retirement risk in the hands of the members which can be borne more efficiently by the 
employer.
2.28 The analysis shows that the most appropriate structures, at least for the majority of 
scheme members, have a defined benefit design.
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Recommendation: The Government should continue to provide a form of defined benefit 
pension as the core scheme design (Recommendation 5b).
2.29 However, the Commission’s analysis shows that at present under the existing final 
salary schemes too many risks are faced by government and the taxpayer. As such, it is the 
Commission’s view (outlined in more detail in Chapter 7) that all members of the current 
defined benefit public service pension schemes should be moved to the new schemes for 
future service.
Accrued rights
2.30 In the interim report, the Commission showed the rights which have already been 
accrued by public service pension scheme members will make up the majority of benefits 
being paid for the next quarter of a century. This analysis is reproduced in Chart 2.B below.
Chart 2.B: Gross benefit expenditure by type of member
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Source: IPSPC interim report, Chart C.8.
2.31 Despite the fact that it may constrain options for reform, it must be a fundamental 
principle of any framework for public service pension schemes that the accrued rights of 
existing scheme members are not reduced. This raises the issue as to what constitutes an 
accrued right in the context of the public service pension schemes, and therefore which 
rights should be protected when implementing any change to the future benefit structure. 
More information on this issue is in Chapter 7.
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2.32 The Commission is clear that pensions in payment will not be affected by this review. 
In addition, current active members of final salary public service pension schemes should 
have their pension from the current schemes based on their final salary, rather than on their 
salary at the point they move into the new schemes for future accrual. This provides a level of 
transitional protection for scheme members, which should help to build trust and confidence 
in the process of reform, while allowing the introduction of new pension arrangements for 
the future which are seen as fair to members and taxpayers.
Managing the cost to taxpayers
2.33 Guaranteeing that public service pension schemes are designed to deliver at least 
adequate levels of income in retirement will help maintain the trust that scheme members 
have in the schemes and minimise the need for means-tested benefits for public service 
pensioners. However, taxpayers also need to be reassured about the future sustainability of 
the schemes.
2.34 Linking a member’s Normal Pension Age to their State Pension Age in most schemes 
(discussed in more detail in Chapter 4) will share the impact of rising longevity in the past 
and expected changes in the future more fairly. Ensuring that employer contributions to the 
public service pension schemes remain below a fixed cost ceiling will result in a degree of 
certainty about the future nature of the pensions promise for taxpayers and act as an extra 
safety valve in the system. The Government, on behalf of the taxpayer, should set out a fixed 
cost ceiling - the proportion of pensionable pay that they will contribute, on average, to 
employees’ pensions over the long term.
2.35 To some extent this approach has already been encompassed within current scheme 
designs with the cap and share mechanisms. Although these mechanisms have not yet 
been fully tested in practice, the NHS scheme operated an employer cost cap when they 
undertook the 2008 reforms. A cost ceiling would effectively replace the current cap and 
share mechanisms. An employer cost ceiling could factor in automatic adjustments to 
maintain a fixed cost level.
2.36 There are a number of different ways that a cost ceiling could be defined and there 
will be a decision for the Government to make about the level of the ceiling. There are also 
different ways of adjusting different types of schemes so that the ceiling is maintained. These 
issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
Scheme governance and transparency
2.37 An additional mechanism to help aid long-term sustainability is for the appropriate 
information about future costs to be readily available. Currently there is inconsistency in 
what scheme data and valuations are published and such information is often difficult to 
access. A minimum standard should be determined, to include the appropriate financial data, 
but also membership and valuation details across the schemes. It is the Commission’s view, 
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outlined further in Chapter 6, that the Office for Budget Responsibility should consider the 
sustainability of public service pensions when considering long-term fiscal sustainability and 
should ensure there is appropriate information available for them to make that assessment. 
2.38 The current arrangements for the governance of public service pension schemes require 
improvement to ensure that there is a fair balance between the interests of scheme members 
and taxpayers. Communication with scheme members should also be improved and the 
future schemes should be simple enough for members to understand.
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3 The design
Box 3.A: Summary
 • The Government should adopt a scheme based on career average earnings as the core 
public service pension scheme, to ensure there is an effective balance of risks between 
scheme members and employers. A single benefit design should apply across the whole 
income range.
 • The Commission is not recommending specific accrual rates, indexation levels or employee 
contributions. These are matters for the Government as they impact on affordability. 
Accrual rates, indexation methods and employee contribution levels do need to be 
considered together to ensure that pension schemes deliver at least adequate incomes, 
maintain high participation rates and are sustainable. 
 • Benefits should be indexed by earnings before retirement for active members of future 
public service pension schemes, to support adequacy of pension income at the point 
of retirement. The choice of either prices or earnings indexation for deferred members 
should depend on the Government’s assessment of the role of public service pensions and 
the balance between the competing principles of adequacy and fairness and supporting 
productivity. Post-retirement, pensions in payment should be indexed in line with prices to 
maintain their purchasing power and adequacy during retirement.
 • Caps on indexation, either pre or post retirement, should not be introduced. 
 • When setting member contribution levels the trade off between affordability and the 
impact of opt outs on adequacy should be considered by the Government. The differing 
characteristics of higher and lower earners, including that higher earners tend to live 
longer, should be addressed through tiered contribution rates.
 • Members should be provided with greater control over when to start drawing their pension 
benefits. Lump sums should continue to be made available to members of public service 
pension schemes through commutation.
 • Actuarial reduction and enhancement should be applied to early and late retirement, and 
caps on pension accrual should be removed or significantly lifted. Flexible retirement should 
be encouraged and abatement of pensions in its current form for those who return to 
work after drawing their pensions should be eliminated. The costs of these changes will 
need to be assessed and considered as part of the reform package.
 • Members should be encouraged to make additional contributions to their pensions in a 
simple and transparent manner.
 • Ancillary benefits should be broadly retained in their present form. The current system 
provides people with equal access to a range of valued, cost-effective benefits on top of 
their pension, which provides a useful safety net.
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From long-list to short-list of scheme design options
3.1 There are a huge number of potential different pension scheme designs, ranging from 
final salary defined benefit (DB) schemes to pure defined contribution (DC) schemes. In 
between there is a myriad of different approaches and hybrid options. The Commission 
identified seven distinct types of scheme (excluding hybrid schemes) to consider, which are 
shown in Table 3.A. 
Table 3.A: Scheme designs
Type of scheme Description
Final salary The pension at retirement is defined, based on the number of years of 
service and the member’s final salary at retirement. Once in payment, the 
amount of pension is guaranteed.
Career Average 
Revalued Earnings 
(CARE)
The pension at retirement is defined, based on the number of years of 
service and the member’s average revalued salary. Once in payment, the 
amount of pension is guaranteed.
Cash balance 
with guaranteed 
conversion terms
The pension pot at retirement is defined, based on the proportion of salary 
set aside each year and the guaranteed rate of interest earned. The pot is 
converted to pension on guaranteed terms that are set by the scheme at an 
agreed point before retirement. Once in payment, the amount of pension is 
guaranteed.
Cash balance with 
open market annuity 
The pension pot at retirement is defined, based on the proportion of salary 
set aside each year and the guaranteed rate of interest earned. This is 
converted to pension on open market terms (open market annuity rates). 
Once in payment, the amount of pension is guaranteed.
Notional defined 
contribution
The pension pot at retirement depends on the amount of contributions 
paid in and the return on the notional assets (no investments are actually 
made – the performance of a notional portfolio is tracked). This is converted 
to pension on open market terms (open market annuity rates). Once in 
payment, the amount of pension is guaranteed.
Collective defined 
contribution
The pension pot at retirement depends on the amount of contributions paid 
in and the return on the invested assets. Returns are smoothed since risk is 
shared amongst all participants in the scheme. The pension pot is converted 
to pension on open market terms (open market annuity rates). Risk sharing 
continues post-retirement, with conditional indexation of pensions in 
payment dependent on the financial health of the fund. The pension in 
payment can therefore increase or decrease.
Individual defined 
contribution
The pension pot at retirement depends on the amount of contributions 
paid in and the return on the invested assets. This is converted to pension 
on open market terms (open market annuity rates). Once in payment, the 
amount of pension is guaranteed.
Source: IPSPC analysis.
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3.2 Different types of schemes can be designed so that they give the same, or similar, 
outcomes for scheme members. As an example, a cash balance scheme with a guaranteed 
conversion factor can be designed to replicate a CARE scheme by choosing an appropriate 
accrual rate and pension conversion factor. On the other hand, many of these scheme types 
can be designed in ways that would lead to different outcomes for members. For example, 
a DC scheme could have returns linked to the market or guaranteed investment returns 
underwritten by the employer. 
3.3 The choice of scheme, and the choice of parameters within a scheme, therefore has a 
large impact on how the scheme looks and feels to the member, and how risks are shared 
between members and government. Since outcomes are more important to the Commission 
than the type of scheme, in the first instance the scheme types were rated against how well 
they matched up with the Commission’s view of who should bear the key risks, as set out in 
Chapter 2 (pre-retirement longevity risk is considered in Chapter 4):
 • Salary risk: The risk of higher than expected salary increases should lie with the 
member.
 • Investment risk: Government, as a large employer, is better placed to bear 
investment risk than members.
 • Post-retirement longevity risk: Pensioners have little scope to manage variation in 
their incomes post-retirement, and so government should bear this risk.
3.4 Table 3.B shows the results of the Commission’s risk analysis, which was used to 
generate a short-list of possible scheme designs for further consideration. 
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Table 3.B: Risk analysis of different scheme designs 
Type of scheme Who bears the 
salary risk?
Who bears the 
investment 
risk?
Who bears the 
post-retirement 
longevity risk?
Conclusion
Final salary Government  Government  Government  Rejected
CARE Member  Government  Government  Short-listed
Cash balance 
with guaranteed 
conversion terms
Member  Government  Government  Short-listed
Cash balance with 
open market annuity 
Member  Government  Government  Short-listed
Individual defined 
contribution
Member  Member  Government  Rejected
Notional defined 
contribution
Member  Both  Government  Rejected
Collective defined 
contribution
Member  Member  Member  Rejected
Key:  Risk borne by wrong party  Risk borne by correct party
Source: IPSPC analysis.
3.5 Schemes where the amount of pension is based on a member’s final salary were ruled out 
because of the finding in the interim report that they were unfair between scheme members. 
Those members who experience more rapid wage growth benefit disproportionately from 
these types of schemes, as set out in Chapter 1. Salary risk is retained by government, whilst 
the Commission believes this type of risk should be shared with scheme members.
3.6 The Commission also took the view that members are not better placed to bear 
investment risk than government as a large employer, especially at lower incomes where 
the uncertainty of pension amount is challenging to manage. Additionally, a funded DC 
scheme would create cash flow implications for government, while a notional DC scheme 
with returns linked to investment market performance would introduce extra investment risk 
into the system for government and scheme members. Funded or notional DC schemes have 
therefore been ruled out as the core scheme. 
3.7 Collective defined contribution schemes, where the amount of pension payable can be 
changed after retirement in response to longevity or investment performance, were rejected 
because the Commission took the view that there should be certainty about the level of 
income post-retirement. Pensioners (particularly older pensioners) have little scope to 
supplement their income once they have retired.
3.8 This left a short-list of scheme designs where the pension is related to average earnings 
over the whole of a member’s public service career (rather than final salary), where the 
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scheme has defined ‘investment’ returns and where there is certainty for the member in 
retirement. 
3.9 Career average schemes meet these criteria. Salary risk is borne by members and the 
defined benefit arrangement provides the recommended risk structure after retirement. There 
is no in-built way of managing longevity risk pre-retirement in career average schemes but 
the general career average structure could be combined with a risk-sharing mechanism to 
manage this risk (these mechanisms are considered in Chapter 4). 
Box 3.B: How a CARE scheme could work 
In a Career Average Revalued Earnings scheme, each year the scheme member earns an 
amount of pension based on the scheme accrual rate and their salary in that year. This is then 
revalued (or indexed) each year. At retirement each year’s accrual is summed up to give the total 
pension. The parameters used here are purely illustrative and are not recommendations by the 
Commission.
Consider Alice, who has 3 years of service in a CARE scheme with a 60ths accrual rate and 3 per 
cent revaluation. On joining the scheme she had a salary of £30,000 and this grew with pay rises 
each year.
Care example
Alice retires after 3 years with a pension of £1,605 a year. 
Under a final salary scheme with the same 60ths accrual rate, Alice would have ended up with 
a similar level of pension because the increase in her salary (4 per cent per year) is around the 
same as the level of indexation in the CARE scheme.
3.10 Cash balance schemes go one step further. As well as having the advantages of career 
average mentioned above, there is the potential to share longevity risk pre-retirement with 
members in a more straightforward manner than in career average schemes.
3.11 Under cash balance schemes it is the size of the pension pot at retirement that is 
defined, not the amount of annual pension. The pension pot is then converted to an annual 
pension using a pension conversion factor (a factor which determines how much money 
is needed in the pot to purchase £1 of annual pension income). The conversion terms 
Accrual Rate x 
Salary = Pension
Revalued in 
2012
Revalued in 
2013
Value at 
retirement
Year 1 (2011) £30,000 x 1/60 = £500 £500 + 3% = £515 £515 + 3% = £530 £530
Year 2 (2012) £31,200 x 1/60 = £520 n/a £520 + 3% = £535 £535
Year 3 (2013) £32,450 x 1/60 = £540 n/a n/a £540
Alice’s total annual pension at retirement £1,605
Source: IPSPC analysis.
54
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report - 10 March 2011
Box 3.C: How a cash balance scheme with guaranteed conversion 
terms could work 
In a cash balance scheme, each year a proportion of the scheme member’s salary is paid into a 
pension pot. This pension pot then grows each year with guaranteed interest until retirement. 
At retirement the pension pot is converted into an annual pension using a pension conversion 
factor. The parameters used here are purely illustrative and are not recommendations by the 
Commission.
Consider Bob, who has 3 years of service in a cash balance scheme in which 1/3rd of his salary 
is paid into his pension pot. His pension pot grows with 3 per cent interest each year, and at 
retirement £1 of annual pension costs £20. On joining the scheme he had a salary of £30,000 
and this grew with pay rises each year. 
Cash balance example
Bob retires after 3 years with a pension of £1,605 a year.
could be guaranteed when the member joins the scheme, guaranteed at some fixed point 
before Normal Pension Age (NPA) or set using annuity rates found on the open market at 
the point of retirement. Under the first option, all the longevity risk in respect of current 
members sits with government, while under the annuity option the pre-retirement longevity 
risk sits with the scheme members. If the conversion terms are initially flexible and are then 
set at some point before NPA, then longevity risk sits with member until the terms are 
guaranteed and with government after that point.
Accrual Rate x Salary 
= Pension
Revalued in 2012 Revalued in 2013 Value at 
retirement
Year 1 
(2011)
£30,000 x 1/3rd= £10,000 £10,000 + 3%= £10,300 £10,300 + 3%= £10,600 £10,600
Year 2 
(2012)
£31,200 x 1/3rd= £10,400 n/a £10,400 + 3%= £10,700 £10,700
Year 3 
(2013)
£32,450 x 1/3rd= £10,800 n/a n/a £10,800
Bob’s pension pot at retirement:                                                                                £32,100
This is converted into an annual pension:                                           £32,100 / £20 = £1,605
Bob’s total annual pension at retirement:                                                                     £1,605
Source: IPSPC analysis.
55
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report - 10 March 2011
Core design
3.12 The Government has a choice in the type of scheme it can adopt as the core model for 
public service pensions. The Commission believes this choice should be between the types of 
scheme shortlisted above. 
3.13 The main considerations in arriving at this final decision should be:
 • how much certainty should be provided for scheme members at different points in 
their careers;
 • the level of flexibility the Government wishes to have over pension costs; and
 • how understandable different designs are for scheme members.
The balance between certainty and flexibility
3.14 The balance of risks between members and government will determine both the 
amount of certainty available to members, which is an important feature of the adequacy 
principle, and the amount of flexibility government has to control costs, which is important 
for the affordability and sustainability principle. Certainty is an attractive design feature 
for members, since it leads to transparency and ease of understanding, enabling them to 
plan for their retirement. It also reduces the risk to the Exchequer of inadequate provision 
(the danger of members needing further support from the benefits system in retirement). 
However, certainty for members causes issues for government around the affordability and 
sustainability of pension schemes in situations where the cost of providing this certainty is 
greater than expected. Flexibility in scheme design may therefore be an attractive feature 
for government. There is a key trade-off between the adequacy and the affordability and 
sustainability principles in this area.
3.15 The interim report identified that the main driver of increased costs for public sector 
pension schemes in recent years was members living longer than expected. Government 
had effectively provided members with certainty that their pension would be paid for life 
at retirement, and when this cost more than expected, government bore the bulk of the 
increased cost. One of the reasons government bore most of this extra cost was because, until 
the reforms of the last few years, the existing schemes provide little flexibility for government 
to pass on any additional costs to members, other than by raising contributions paid by 
active members (who may not be those who benefitted from the certainty provided by 
government).
3.16 Members’ desire for certainty and government’s willingness to provide it in public 
service pension schemes may depend upon the scheme members’ income levels, as well as 
their age. For older members with lower incomes, certainty may be the main driver, both 
for members when planning for retirement, and government in assuring adequate levels of 
income in retirement and less reliance on state benefits. Government may be less willing 
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to guarantee certainty for scheme members with higher incomes, at least on their entire 
pension, since these people are more likely to have other assets and income sources available 
to them in retirement. 
3.17 Age is also an important factor. As people approach retirement, awareness of their 
retirement income may well increase. Although younger members may be less aware of what 
their retirement income may be, that is not to say they do not value certainty. It is likely 
however they will have a different perspective than those approaching retirement. Therefore a 
limited degree of certainty may be sufficient for younger members, with certainty increasing 
as retirement approaches so that people can plan for retirement with some peace of mind 
about their income level.
Understanding pension scheme designs
3.18 It is important that members are able to understand the scheme, so that they can 
plan for retirement. In order to gain an insight into the views of public service pension 
scheme members, and gauge how easy different scheme designs were to understand, the 
Commission invited a research team to undertake consumer research1 with public service 
workers. This was in the form of a deliberative workshop and there were 89 attendees with 
a broad diversity in terms of gender and representation across the 6 major public service 
pension schemes. Slightly more than half of the attendees were aged 46-59, with an under-
representation of younger workers and those in part-time and manual positions. It is likely 
that the attendees had a higher level of pensions knowledge, understanding and expertise 
than might be typically expected, due to the level of trade union representation at the event 
and the age profile of the attendees.
3.19 Research participants were asked to consider the relative merits of presenting pension 
benefits in terms of either the amount of pension that had been earned (the way a CARE 
scheme is usually presented), or as the ‘pot’ of money available to purchase a retirement 
income on guaranteed terms (the way a cash balance scheme with guaranteed conversion 
terms is normally presented). On balance, most participants felt that the amount of 
pension approach was a more helpful concept than the pension ‘pot’. This was because such 
pots of money could not actually be accessed by scheme members, and because people’s 
overwhelming priority was to plan their retirement by understanding what their pension 
income would be, irrespective of how this is actually calculated.
3.20 When surveyed, the attendees expressed a strong preference for final salary schemes, 
with 83 per cent of attendees stating that this was their preferred choice. In their view, final 
salary schemes were trusted and felt more certain than other options. Many felt that final 
salary arrangements were an important part of the package they signed up to in becoming a 
public service worker. 
1 Public service pensions reform: findings from consumer research, PwC, March 2011.
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3.21 Once final salary and defined contribution schemes were removed from the list (since 
these scheme designs had been ruled out by the Commission in its interim report), 40 per 
cent of people stated that career average was their preferred scheme design of those available. 
When asked to identify the scheme that was easiest to understand from the same shorter list, 
60 per cent of the attendees chose career average. More detailed results are shown in Table 
3.C.
Table 3.C: Results of deliberative workshop survey
Of the following 
schemes, which 
would you say you 
have a preference 
for?
Of the schemes on 
this shorter list, 
which would you 
say you have a 
preference for?
Of the following 
schemes, which 
would you say 
is easiest to 
understand?
Final salary 83% n/a n/a
Career average 4% 40% 60%
Cash balance with guaranteed 
conversion terms
2% 8% 4%
Cash balance with variable 
conversion terms
0% 0% 3%
Defined contribution 1% n/a n/a
None of the above 2% 37% 10%
I don’t understand any of 
them enough to make a 
choice
4% 10% 10%
Not answered 2% 4% 12%
Source: Survey results from IPSPC deliberative workshop.
3.22 The findings of the deliberative workshop suggest that members might find a CARE 
scheme preferable to a cash balance scheme, both in terms of ease of understanding and in 
helping them to plan their retirement. However there are a number of other factors that 
should be considered before making a choice between CARE and cash balance.
The choice between CARE and cash balance
3.23 CARE and cash balance schemes can be set up to provide very similar benefits. The 
main difference between the two is that in a cash balance scheme, while the ‘pension pot’ at 
retirement is defined in the rules, the amount of pension this will buy does not have to be 
defined. In a CARE scheme it is the pension that is defined.
58
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report - 10 March 2011
3.24 A cash balance scheme therefore provides additional flexibility for government as they 
can vary the pension conversion factor (the factor which converts the cash pot to a pension 
amount) to reflect changes in the cost of providing pensions. 
3.25 However, this flexibility will come at the cost of reduced certainty to members as they 
may not be able to predict their pension in retirement. This could be mitigated by providing 
members with regular pension projections, and providing members guaranteed conversion 
terms a defined period of time prior to retirement.
3.26 It is the view of the Commission that scheme members should be provided with a 
good level of certainty when it comes to the amount of their pension. As such, linking 
conversion factors to open market annuity rates, or only guaranteeing the conversion terms 
at some point after a member has joined the scheme, would not be appropriate solutions for 
public sector cash balance schemes.
3.27 In a CARE scheme there is no equivalent in-built way of managing costs, but the 
general career average structure could be combined with a risk-sharing mechanism (see 
Chapter 4) to manage this risk. It is likely that this approach will provide less flexibility for 
government, but would still provide an effective solution. 
3.28 The Commission’s view is that the initial attraction of a cash balance approach 
(that it provides greater flexibility for government, which will increase affordability and 
sustainability) is outweighed by the need for certainty for scheme members (which will help 
ensure the adequacy principle is met). In addition, our research shows that a cash balance 
approach is harder for members to understand than a straightforward career average scheme. 
Recommendation: A new career average revalued earnings (CARE) scheme should be 
adopted for general use in the public service pension schemes (Recommendation 7).
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Box 3.D: The distributional impact of moving from final salary to 
CARE
The Commission asked the Pensions Policy Institute (PPI) to undertake modellinga regarding 
potential scheme designs. The aim was to determine benefit designs that are, on average, of 
equivalent expected average value to scheme members as the current final salary arrangements. 
The chart below shows the effective employee benefit rate (EEBR), the value of the pension 
benefit, net of employee contributions, accrued annually by an average member of the scheme 
expressed in terms of a percentage of pay, for both a proxy to the current final salary schemes 
and an example CARE scheme.
The distributional impact of moving from final salary to CARE
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Under the example CARE scheme the EEBR is higher for a low flyer than in the proxy to 
the current final salary schemes, while for a high flyer it is lower. A CARE scheme therefore 
redistributes pension benefits from high flyers to low flyers. This redistribution occurs because, 
for a fixed cost, the savings from the removal of the final salary link for high flyers can be 
recycled into providing a better level of benefit for other scheme members. 
a) Further details of the modelling are given in Annex C, including definitions of low, mid and high flyers.
Higher earners and hybridity
3.29 Evidence submitted to the Commission suggests that higher earning individuals 
are better positioned than lower earners to bear some of the risks associated with pension 
provision, particularly investment risk. Due to their higher disposable incomes, higher 
earners have a greater capacity for self-provision of pension benefits than lower earners. They 
also report having a higher level of knowledge about pensions than people on lower incomes, 
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which means they may be more capable of making important decisions about their pension 
provision.2
3.30 It is also likely that they will have additional forms of savings and investments that they 
can use to provide capital and income in retirement, as Chart 3.A shows. 
Chart 3.A: Distribution of household wealth excluding pension wealth 
in 2006-08
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Source: Wealth and Assets Survey, Office for National Statistics. 
Note: The ONS advises that these figures should be treated with caution. The breakdown is only by earned income, so 
sources such as state pensions are not included as income.
2 DWP (2009) Attitudes to pensions: the 2009 survey, p.46.
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Box 3.E: Changes to pensions tax policy 
High earners are likely to be affected by changes to the pension tax relief system which were 
announced by the Government on 14 October 2010. 
The changes relate to the Annual Allowance, the amount of pension funding eligible for tax 
relief each year. From April 2011, this will be reduced to £50,000 from the current level of 
£255,000.a
The tax charge for exceeding the Annual Allowance will be a tailored charge, to cover the 
full marginal rate of relief from which an individual has benefited above the allowance. This 
is expected to follow current principles by adding the value of any excess provision to an 
individual’s income for tax purposes. The Government is to explore options which will allow 
individuals, in some circumstances, to pay a portion of any tax charge incurred for exceeding the 
Annual Allowance out of their pension entitlement, rather than current income. 
Many individuals who are currently in final salary schemes could face a tax charge under the 
new regime. This is most likely to happen if scheme members are high earners or experience 
a significant increase in their pensionable pay in one year, perhaps as a result of a promotion. 
This is because the amount of pension received from the scheme depends on final salary, and so 
increases in pay lead to increases in the member’s pension benefits.
Moving from a final salary scheme to a career average type scheme is likely to mitigate this effect 
over time,  particularly for those workers who have large increases in pay, since the link between 
pay increases and the increase in pension benefits will have been broken.
a) This amount will initially be fixed but might be indexed over the longer term. Where individuals exceed the Annual 
Allowance in a given year, unused allowance from up to 3 previous years will be available to offset against the excess 
provision. The fixed factor for valuing Defined Benefit accrual to test against the Annual Allowance will be 16 and the 
‘opening value’ of an individual’s Defined Benefit rights will be indexed, likely to be in line with CPI.
3.31 The Commission has considered options for different models of scheme designs at 
different income levels, and a single scheme across all income levels, against its four principles. 
Options for different treatment of high earners considered by the Commission include:
 • a cap on pensionable pay in the core DB scheme, with self-provision above this level;
 • a cap on pensionable pay in the core DB scheme, with employer-provided funded3 
defined contribution above this level;
 • a cap on pensionable pay in the core DB scheme, with a less generous DB scheme 
above this level; and
 • a single scheme across all income levels.
3 The Commission has rejected notional DC schemes with returns linked to investment market performance as it 
introduces extra investment risk into the system for government.
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3.32 The level of any cap would need to be decided. Table 3.D shows the proportion of 
scheme members that would be affected by the introduction of a cap on pensionable pay 
at various levels. A quarter of members would be affected if schemes were capped once 
pensionable pay was at £35,000 per year. Only 1 per cent of members would be affected by a 
cap set at £100,000 of pensionable pay per year.
Table 3.D: Estimated proportion of members affected by a cap on 
pensionable pay 
Theoretical pensionable 
earnings cap
Proportion of scheme 
members affected
£30,000 36%
£35,000 23%
£40,000 13%
£45,000 8%
£50,000 5%
£75,000 2%
£100,000 1%
Source: IPSPC analysis of scheme data returns.
Note: Schemes covered are NHS (England and Wales), LGPS (all of UK), police (England and Wales) (as at 31 March 
2008), teachers (all of UK), armed forces, principal civil service (UK and Northern Ireland), judiciary.
3.33 A cap on pensionable pay could have short-term implications for government cash flow 
as contributions would not be charged, or would need to be reduced, on any pay in excess 
of the cap. The Commission estimates that losing contributions above a cap set at £50,000 
of pensionable pay would see a reduction of contributions into the unfunded schemes of 
around £2.2 billion per year.4 If the cap was set at £75,000 of pensionable pay then the 
contribution reduction would be in the order of £0.9 billion per year. Alternatively, if 
contributions continued to be charged on total pay then this would likely lead to significant 
opt-out among higher earners, potentially leading to an even greater reduction in the 
contributions paid into the unfunded schemes.
3.34 Modelling5 undertaken by the PPI on behalf of the Commission has determined that 
capping pensionable earnings at £75,000 has a negligible impact on the benefits that can be 
offered below the cap (by recycling the savings into providing better benefits on earnings 
under the cap). This is due to the small number of people that would be affected by a cap at 
this level compared to the number of people below the cap. In order to have a meaningful 
impact the cap would have to be set at a much lower level. This would bring into question 
4 Calculations based on current salary levels and contribution rates after the introduction of the 3 per cent average 
increase in employee contributions that have been announced by the Government.
5 See Annex C for further details.
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whether such a structure could reasonably be described as targeting ‘higher’ earners and 
cause the cash flow issues described above.
3.35 When assessing the options for different treatment of people based on their level of 
earnings against the four principles, the Commission was considering:
 • affordable and sustainable: whether the option shares risks optimally, the impact on 
the size and certainty of future benefit payments and the short-term implications for 
government cash flow;
 • adequate and fair: whether the design would give all scheme members a good 
chance of reaching an adequate income in retirement and whether benefits are 
proportional to contributions paid;
 • support productivity: the effect of each option on staff motivation, as well as how 
the scheme impacts on recruitment and retention; and
 • transparent and simple: whether the scheme is understandable and allows members 
to plan for their retirement.
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Table 3.E: Assessment of different scheme designs for higher earners 
against the principles
Affordability and 
sustainability
Adequate and fair Transparent 
and simple
Supporting 
productivity
Self-
provision 
above a cap
Greatly reduces 
risk borne by Govt. 
Short-term cash 
flow problems 
but lower benefits 
paid out in future 
which increases 
sustainability 
Core level of benefit 
ensures minimum 
income level for all, 
but higher earners 
may not reach desired 
replacement rate if 
they do not make 
own provision 
Reasonably 
simple to 
understand. 
Higher earners 
may need 
information 
about how to 
make their own 
provision. 
Reduces 
incentive for 
higher earners 
to stay in or 
join public 
services. 
Employer-
provided 
funded DC 
provision 
above a cap
Greatly reduces risk 
to Government. Loss 
of contributions 
due to funded DC 
provision would 
cause cash flow 
issues. 
Core level of benefit 
ensures minimum 
income level for all, 
but higher earners 
may not reach desired 
replacement rate if 
DC scheme performs 
poorly 
Potential for 
confusion on 
total level of 
benefits being 
provided 
Provides 
decent 
incentives for 
higher earners 
to stay in or 
join public 
services 
Less 
generous 
DB provision 
above a cap
Reduces scale 
of risk to Govt. 
Contributions can 
be collected on all 
earnings and future 
benefits to be paid 
out are reduced 
Core level of benefit 
ensures minimum 
income level for all, 
but higher earners 
may not reach desired 
replacement rate 
Different 
accrual rates 
could cause 
confusion 
for scheme 
members 
Provides 
decent 
incentives for 
higher earners 
to stay in or 
join public 
services 
A single 
scheme 
across all 
income levels
No reduction in 
risk for Govt, but 
contributions can 
be collected on all 
earnings 
Ensures adequate 
levels of income. 
Higher earners 
may benefit 
disproportionately 
from schemes 
Easily 
understandable 

Provides good 
incentives for 
higher earners 
to stay in or 
join public 
services. All 
members are 
in the same 
scheme 
Key:  Poor outcome  Fair outcome  Good outcome
Source: IPSPC analysis.
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3.36 Although higher earners are better positioned than lower earners to bear some of the 
risks associated with pension provision, the introduction of a cap on pensionable earnings or 
a hybrid scheme does not seem attractive to the Commission due to:
 • increased complexity, in terms of administration and ease of understanding;
 • the cash flow implications caused by the loss of contributions on earnings above the 
cap;
 • the minimal impact that the introduction of a cap at a reasonable level will have on 
the improvement in the level of benefits offered below the cap; 
 • the impact on recruitment and retention of higher earners; and
 • the Commission’s view that there are some benefits for senior managers to be in the 
same scheme as their staff. 
Recommendation: A single benefit design should apply across the whole income range 
(Recommendation 9a).
Indexation
3.37 The exact level of future pension payments from DB pension schemes is uncertain. 
This uncertainty stems from a number of factors, one of which is how much accrued pension 
benefits are increased annually (the level of ‘indexation’), both before and after retirement. 
3.38 Indexation is the revaluation of pension benefits in line with some specified index, or 
according to some defined formula. The main aim of indexation is to maintain the value of 
the pension benefits over time.
3.39 Currently, public service pension scheme members are protected from the risks of price 
inflation after retirement, as increases to pensions in payment are linked to the statutory 
pension increases for State Second Pension. Government, and ultimately the taxpayer, 
therefore bears the risk of increasing prices. 
3.40 The indexation of pre-retirement benefits is provided through the link to final 
pensionable salary in the final salary design. Some risk is shared with members as an 
individual’s pay is not guaranteed to rise in real terms. However, over long periods pay has 
tended to rise considerably faster than prices (actuaries within government usually assume an 
underlying trend of general pay increases of 1.5 per cent per annum above the Retail Prices 
Index (RPI)). 
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3.41 In current public service career average schemes, a number of different pre-retirement 
indexation methods have been adopted. The civil service Nuvos scheme links to the statutory 
pension increases for State Second Pension and public service pensions in payment, which 
from April 2011 will be the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). The NHS career average designs 
for GPs and dentists used to link to average increases in GPs’ or dentists’ earnings or profits, 
and now use RPI+1.5 per cent instead as a proxy for long-term growth in average earnings.
Post-retirement indexation
3.42 The desire to provide adequate pensions means that it is important to maintain the 
real value of members’ accrued pension benefits. Post-retirement, it is maintaining the 
purchasing power of the pension that is important. 
Recommendation: Post-retirement, pensions in payment should be indexed in line with prices 
to maintain their purchasing power and adequacy during retirement (Recommendation 8b).
The options for pre-retirement indexation
3.43 The Commission considered a range of issues in relation to the indexation of benefits 
pre-retirement, specifically:
 • the trade off between pre-retirement indexation and accrual rate, and how this 
distributes benefits amongst scheme members with different salary and service 
profiles;
 • whether pre-retirement indexation should be in line with prices or some measure of 
earnings; and
 • whether pre-retirement indexation should be the same for current (active) and 
former (deferred) public service scheme members who have yet to retire.
The trade-off between indexation and accrual rate
3.44 There is a trade-off between the level of indexation and the accrual rate. A low 
indexation and high accrual rate scheme could be designed that is expected to provide a 
similar level of benefits over a full career as a high indexation and low accrual rate scheme. 
3.45 For a given cost, accrual rates will be more generous if a less generous indexation 
method is adopted, and vice versa. For example, earnings indexation will generally be more 
generous than prices indexation (since earnings typically outpace inflation over the medium 
to long term) and so the accrual rate will need to be lower in a CARE scheme with earnings 
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indexation. Affordability for the new scheme design can therefore be achieved by the 
balancing of indexation method and accrual rates. 
3.46 Modelling conducted by the PPI6 has determined that the three benefit designs shown 
in Table 3.F are, on average, of equivalent expected average value to scheme members.
Table 3.F: Scheme designs of equivalent expected average value to 
members
Accrual rate Pre-retirement 
indexation 
(actives)
Pre-retirement 
indexation 
(deferreds)
Post-retirement 
indexation
Proxy for the 
current final 
salary schemes
1 / 60ths Final salary link Prices Prices
CARE scheme 
with higher 
accrual / lower 
indexation
1 / 40ths Prices Prices Prices
CARE scheme 
with lower 
accrual / higher 
indexation
1 / 61sts Earnings Earnings Prices
Source: Pensions Policy Institute.
3.47 The modelling takes a broad brush approach to determining schemes of equivalent value, 
and so the results should be viewed as approximate. Full costing calculations based on full 
scheme data would be needed to determine the exact parameters that would lead to equivalent 
expected value. However, the modelling gives a reasonable approximation to the parameters.
3.48 The choice of indexation is therefore not solely related to cost, but also has an impact 
on both adequacy and fairness. The combination of accrual rate and indexation method has 
a direct impact on how valuable each year of accrued service is to the scheme member. It 
therefore determines the distribution of the value of benefits between members of different 
ages and with different career profiles. If indexation is in line with prices, then service 
accrued near retirement is the most valuable, and service accrued earlier in a career has 
progressively less value the further back in time it was accrued. If indexation is in line with 
earnings, then service accrued early in the member’s career retains more of its value (in terms 
of proportion of salary at retirement) relative to the final year of accrual before retirement. 
3.49 As an illustrative exercise, Chart 3.B below shows the value (pension accrued in terms of 
proportion of salary at retirement) to a hypothetical member of a year of accrual at each age 
from ages 25 to 65. The calculations are based on the two CARE schemes detailed in Table 3.F. 
6 Further details of the modelling are given in Annex C.
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Chart 3.B: The value of each year of accrued service in a CARE scheme 
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Source: IPSPC analysis.
Note: Salary increases throughout the member’s career are assumed to be in line with the growth in average earnings. If 
instead the member’s salary increases were higher than the growth in average earnings, then both lines would slope more 
steeply upwards from left to right, and vice versa.
3.50 The analysis assumes the same level of indexation for active and deferred members. It 
is worth bearing in mind however, that if the scheme design had deferred indexation at a 
lower level than active indexation then benefits would be worth less to those who leave, and 
the value of each year of accrual would then also depend on the number of years spent as a 
deferred member of the scheme.
3.51 Chart 3.B shows that in a high accrual and prices indexation CARE scheme, one year 
of pension accrual at age 64 is worth almost two and a half times as much as one year of 
pension accrual at age 25. 
3.52 A high accrual rate and prices indexation scheme therefore benefits those members 
who accrue service later in their careers, and is less valuable to those who accrue service 
earlier in their careers. The balance of indexation level and accrual rate will therefore have 
a direct impact on fairness between scheme members; for example, in a high accrual and 
prices indexation CARE scheme a public servant who works five years in the public sector 
at the start of their career will receive significantly less than a public servant who works five 
years in the public sector at the end of their career. At the extreme, the scheme could offer so 
little value for a young member relative to the employee contributions paid, that it would be 
rational for them to opt out as they could receive a better return on their contributions from 
a different savings vehicle. 
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3.53 The age disparity is much less for a low accrual and earnings indexation CARE scheme. 
One year of pension accrual is worth the same at all ages, since salary increases and pre-
retirement indexation are both assumed to be in line with average earnings.7
3.54 Low accrual rates and earnings indexation is therefore more equitable between younger 
and older scheme members, and between members who work the same number of years in 
public service, but at different points in their career. Chart 3.C illustrates this, and shows 
replacement rates at retirement for low flyers8 under some simplified career path structures in 
public service.
Chart 3.C: Illustrative replacement rates at retirement for a low flyer
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Source: IPSPC analysis.
Note: Indexation is assumed to be at the same level for both active and deferred members.
3.55 Chart 3.D shows that the results are similar for high flyers albeit that there is greater 
disparity in outcomes between a prices and earnings indexation scheme for high flyers 
compared to low flyers. This is due to the higher salary growth assumed for high flyers.
7 In the case of a member who receives salary increases in excess of average earnings, the low accrual / earnings 
indexation CARE scheme would show that the value of accrual is not flat, but increases with age. However, under such a 
scheme the age disparity would still be less than under a high accrual / prices indexation CARE scheme.
8 Further details of the modelling are given in Annex C, including a definition of low and high flyers.
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Chart 3.D: Illustrative replacement rates at retirement for a high flyer 
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Source: IPSPC analysis.
Note: Indexation is assumed to be at the same level for both active and deferred members.
3.56 It can be seen that the CARE scheme with earnings indexation and a low accrual rate 
produces the least disparity in the value of pension benefits between members who work a 
similar number of years in public service, but at different points in their careers. A CARE 
scheme with earnings indexation and a low accrual rate will not penalise those members who 
work in public service early in their working lives, before leaving the public sector. A scheme 
such as this will therefore be of particular advantage to those who have caring responsibilities 
later on in their adult life, for example women who may work in public service early in their 
working lives before leaving the labour market to raise a family. It is worth noting that if 
the scheme design had deferred indexation at a lower level than active indexation then the 
replacement rates for the short career early in working life scenario would be lower than 
those shown in Charts 3.C and 3.D.
Pre-retirement indexation: prices or earnings
3.57 As set out in Chapter 2, the Turner Commission outlined a set of benchmark 
replacement rates that specified an adequate retirement income in terms of an individual’s 
income at retirement. Therefore some link between earnings and the pre-retirement 
indexation method may be appropriate, in order that benefits accrued early in a career 
maintain their value relative to the wealth of the working population and to the individual 
concerned.
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3.58 The adequacy principle suggests that there is an argument for earnings indexation 
pre-retirement, since the value of the accrued pension benefits would be maintained relative 
to the wealth of the working population. Earnings indexation also scores well against the 
fairness principle, as it leads to more equitable outcomes between members of different ages. 
Recommendation: Pension benefits should be uprated in line with average earnings during the 
accrual phase for active scheme members (Recommendation 8a).
Indexation of deferred benefits
3.59 The Commission’s interim report stated that “labour mobility supports an efficient 
labour market and enhances productivity. Pension scheme design should not be an 
unintended barrier to movement into, or out of, the public sector.”9 The final salary structure 
of the current public service pension schemes discourages movement of individuals from the 
public to the private sector due to two factors:
 • the lower level of indexation applied to leavers’ benefits (deferred pensions); and
 • the increase in benefits resulting from promotions later in an individual’s career.
3.60 The removal of the final salary link would eliminate the barrier due to the second 
factor. However if different levels of indexation were to be applied to active and deferred 
members (earnings for active members, prices for deferred members, for example) then the 
barrier due to the first factor would remain. Differing levels of active and deferred indexation 
also raises the issue of fairness, since this would mean that a year of accrual would be worth 
different amounts to a member at retirement depending on whether they remain in or leave 
public service employment. This would have implications for adequacy, as accrued benefits 
may not maintain their value relative to the wealth of the working population.
3.61 Adopting the same level of pre-retirement indexation for both active and deferred 
members would in principle aid labour mobility as there would then be no financial 
detriment to the member when leaving public service employment, aiding transition of 
employees from the public to the private sector. This would also achieve fairness between 
scheme members who work in public service for a similar number of years, but at a different 
point in their careers. The actual impact on the decision to move sectors will depend on the 
individual’s understanding and valuation of how their pension will be affected.
3.62 Alternatively, if the Government assesses that an important role of public service 
pensions is to encourage staff retention, then pre-retirement indexation for active members 
could be set at a higher level than that for deferred members. For a given cost, this would 
also mean that a higher accrual rate could be offered to active members, as deferred members 
9 IPSPC (2010) Interim Report, p.102.
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would benefit less from the scheme. It should be noted that if this strategy is adopted then 
mobility and fairness issues would remain, albeit to a lesser extent than under current final 
salary arrangements.
3.63 The greater the variation in indexation before and after retirement, or between active 
and deferred members, the more complicated the scheme would be to administer and for 
members to understand. The principles of simplicity and transparency therefore suggest that 
variation should be kept to a minimum, unless there is a specific need for variation to meet 
an objective. 
3.64 The choice of either prices or earnings indexation for deferred members should depend 
on the Government’s assessment of the role of public service pensions and the balance 
between the competing principles of adequacy and fairness, and supporting productivity. 
Caps on indexation
3.65 The sharing of risk between scheme member and government could be adjusted 
by introducing caps on indexation. For example, some of the inflation risk borne by 
government under a prices indexation methodology could be transferred to the members by 
capping increases. In the private sector only around 1 in 6 active members of DB schemes 
are guaranteed uncapped inflation protection,10 so it could be perceived as unfair that public 
service pension scheme members are fully protected from any increases in prices. 
3.66 However the decision to introduce a cap on indexation should not be taken lightly. 
It presents a very real and significant risk to members during periods of high inflation, as 
the real value of their benefits could be significantly reduced over a relatively short period of 
time. The Commission is of the view that government is better placed to bear inflation risk 
than scheme members, and so a cap should not be introduced. This will provide certainty 
at the individual level, while the robust control mechanisms that the Commission is 
recommending (see Chapter 4) can be used to control costs. 
3.67 The issue of reductions to pension benefits, to take account of periods of deflation for 
example, should be considered. If there is no mechanism for reducing pensions in payment 
to maintain their real value then there is asymmetric sharing of risk between members and 
government, since government bears the risk of high inflation and members benefit from 
periods of deflation. This leads to unfairness between members and the taxpayer. Reducing 
pensions in payment would be challenging for pensioner members, and so a cumulative 
indexation regime should be considered, whereby negative adjustments during periods of 
deflation can be carried forward to reduce positive adjustments in future years.
10 Occupational Pension Scheme Survey Annual Report 2009, Table 4.14, Office for National Statistics.
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The impact of the proposed system on public service 
pension scheme members 
3.68 To assess the impact on adequacy of different possible scheme designs, the 
Commission has carried out modelling (described in Annex C) to see how the pension 
incomes of future public service employees could be affected by the three principal schemes 
modelled by the Pensions Policy Institute outlined in Table 3.F.
3.69 The three schemes perform very similarly in achieving adequacy targets. About two 
thirds of people who work in the public sector at any point in their careers would receive 
adequate pensions (as defined by the Turner Commission) at their State Pension Age. 
3.70 Long-serving public sector employees are very likely to receive adequate retirement 
incomes from sources including public service pensions, state pensions and private sector 
pensions. Chart 3.E looks at the impact of a CARE scheme with indexation by average 
earnings on employees with at least 20 years of service in the public sector. Adequacy targets 
are achieved for more than 90 per cent of those who retire in one of the bottom three 
income brackets, and for more than three quarters of those in the highest income bracket.11 
There is little variation between the different scheme designs in this respect, with the final 
salary proxy scheme and CARE with inflation indexation also performing well.
Chart 3.E: Proportion of members with careers longer than 20 years 
achieving adequacy target in a CARE scheme with earnings indexation
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Source: IPSPC analysis.
11 The gross income bands are based on earnings levels in 2005. The Commission’s analysis adjusts these bands in line 
with average earnings growth.
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3.71 There are though important differences in how the different schemes distribute their 
pension payments. As discussed in Chapter 1, final salary schemes are disproportionately 
beneficial to high flyers. This is reflected in Chart 3.F, which demonstrates that the lowest 
tenth of pension payments are on average almost 90 per cent higher in a CARE scheme with 
indexation by average earnings than in a final salary scheme, and a third higher in a CARE 
scheme with indexation by inflation. The top tenth of pension payments is about 6 per cent 
lower in a CARE scheme with indexation by average earnings, and 4 per cent lower in a 
CARE scheme with indexation by inflation.12
3.72 Relative to a final salary design, a CARE scheme would therefore redistribute pension 
payments from the highest earners to those in lower deciles. 
Chart 3.F: Pension payments from CARE schemes relative to final salary 
scheme, by deciles of pension income  
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Source: IPSPC analysis.
3.73 This analysis shows that there is no reason for a move away from final salary pensions 
to result in inadequate retirement incomes, but that there are likely to be winners and losers 
from a switch.
12 Because payments in the top decile are on average much larger than those in the bottom decile, much smaller 
percentage differences are associated with similar differences in total expenditure.
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Contributions and opt-out rates
3.74 Employee contribution rates across public service schemes vary considerably, both in 
level and structure. As a result public service workers in different pension schemes, and in 
some cases within the same pension scheme, pay a different proportion towards the cost of 
their pensions.
Table 3.G: Current contribution levels
Scheme Employee 
contribution (%)
Employer 
contribution (%)
Proportion of total 
contributions paid 
by employees (%)
Teachers 6.4 14.1 31
NHS 5.5 - 8.5 14 26 - 38
Civil service 1.5 or 3.5 19a 6 - 17
Police - 1987 scheme 11 24.2 31
Police - 2006 scheme 9.5 24.2 28
Fire - 1992 scheme 11 26.5 29
Fire - 2006 scheme 8.5 14.2 37
Armed Forces - officers 0 37.3 0
Armed Forces - others 0 21.4 0
LGPS 5.5 - 7.5 14 - 25b 18 - 35
Average private sector 
(open DB)c
5.4 14.9 27
Average private sector 
(open DC)c
3.0 6.4 32
Source: IPSPC analysis of scheme data returns.
a) Average rate, employer contribution rates tiered by earnings.
b) Employer rates determined at individual fund valuations, and include contributions to fund past deficits, as do many of 
the employer contributions to the unfunded schemes.
c) Occupational pension schemes survey 2009.
3.75 In the 2006 Fire Pension Scheme, employees pay 8.5 per cent of pay – almost 40 per 
cent of the total contribution required with the employer picking up the remaining 60 per 
cent. In the civil service, some longer serving employees pay 1.5 per cent – closer to 10 per 
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cent of the total contributions required with the employer therefore paying over 90 per 
cent.13
3.76 The current disparity in contribution levels across the schemes is the result of historic 
developments and negotiations over a number of years at the scheme-specific level. Therefore 
the rates will reflect pay negotiations and differing pension benefit structures, and as such 
cannot be considered independently of overall remuneration. 
3.77 In reviewing contribution rates the Commission considered four key questions:
 • what factors should influence the appropriate split of contributions between 
employer and employee?
 • should contribution rates vary by member?
 • what is the impact on opt-out rates? and
 • should contribution rates be more uniform across public service and if so, what 
factors should be considered during transition?
Factors influencing the split of contributions 
3.78 Theoretically, for scheme members it should not be the level of employee contribution 
that matters but the overall compensation package. In simple terms, for example, individuals 
should be indifferent between receiving £80 today plus an employer contribution to their 
pension of £20 or £90 today and having to make employee contributions of £10 of this for 
their retirement themselves, in addition to an employer pension contribution of £10. In 
practice, however, the level of employee contributions does matter. Asking employees to pay 
a contribution at all increases awareness that providing them with a pension costs money. 
Determining what the level of contributions should be is then a balance between competing 
factors.
3.79 High contribution rates could discourage participation, either because lower income 
employees are financially constrained and consider that they cannot afford to make higher 
contributions, or because people irrationally underestimate the value of the benefit being 
provided because it will occur so far into the future. Low employee contributions incentivise 
participation in the scheme due to the larger employer contribution which the employee 
would have to forgo if they opted out. Employees choosing to opt out rather than pay the 
pension contribution, particularly for those employees on low wages, has implications for 
adequacy of provision in retirement and potentially on means-tested benefits expenditure. 
13 These total contribution rates are based on the SCAPE discount rate of RPI + 3.5 per cent, which the interim report stated was at the high 
end of what is considered reasonable. Using a lower discount rate would result in higher total contributions required, and therefore on the 
current rates, the employee proportion would be lower.
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3.80 However, maintaining rates at a low level in the face of increasing pension costs will 
mean that employers will need to contribute more, which is costly and could lead to the 
schemes becoming unsustainable. This may require reductions in the generosity of pensions, 
which in turn could threaten adequate income levels in retirement. Rates very different from 
those seen in the private sector may be a barrier to labour market mobility. 
3.81 Therefore contribution rates should be set so that members appreciate the value of their 
pension (so schemes should be contributory). Care needs to be taken so that contributions 
are not so high that they lead to scheme members, especially at lower income levels, opting 
out of the pension scheme.
Variations by member 
3.82 The total contribution rate required from employers and employees to cover the cost 
of benefits accruing in a scheme is a single rate determined on a scheme wide basis. It is 
effectively a weighted average of the rates applicable to each member. Across a range of 
employees paying the same contribution rate, there are numerous cross-subsidies between 
members with different characteristics, meaning some members receive much better value 
from a fixed contribution rate than others. The degree of these cross-subsidies will depend on 
the scheme structure being considered.
3.83 Some public service pension schemes, for example the NHS and local government 
schemes, have contribution rates tiered by earnings. Tiered contributions were introduced 
to reflect the fact that high-flying high earners receive proportionately more benefit from the 
current final salary arrangements than lower earners, per pound of employee contributions 
paid.
3.84 Once the scheme design changes from final salary to CARE or cash balance this 
justification becomes less valid, since the discrepancy between the benefit derived from the 
scheme for high and low flyers is much reduced due to the loss of the final salary link. 
3.85 However there are other reasons why tiered contributions would remain appropriate. 
In general higher earners have a higher life expectancy and so may receive a pension for a 
longer time than those with lower earnings. Chart 3.G shows that individuals with higher 
pensions (which are a proxy for higher earnings and wealth) experience lower mortality than 
individuals with lower pensions. It is therefore reasonable to ask higher earners to contribute 
more, as they are likely to get more benefit from the scheme due to their pension being paid 
for longer. 
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Chart 3.G: Relationship between pension size and male mortality in 
self-administered pension schemes
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3.86 Furthermore, Chart 3.H illustrates how participation rates vary across all public service 
pension schemes by salary and by employment status. The general trend shows increasing 
participation with increasing salary, flattening out at higher earnings levels. The opt-out rate 
for those earning under £18,000 is almost 20 per cent, increasing to over 30 per cent for 
part-time workers.
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Chart 3.H: Participation rate by earnings
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3.87 There is therefore a case for different treatment of higher and lower earners to 
encourage greater participation amongst low-paid and part-time workers. It could be 
argued that contributions should be weighted so that those who earn more pay the most. 
Lower contribution rates for the lower paid encourages participation in pension schemes, 
contributing to higher provision in retirement and less reliance on state benefits.
3.88 Since a cap on pensionable pay or a hybrid scheme have been ruled out by the 
Commission, tiered contributions are also an effective way of differentiating between 
higher and lower earners. In the absence of a cap higher earners are able to accrue 
disproportionately higher pension benefits than lower earners, and so benefit more from 
the guarantees that government offers through the scheme. It is therefore reasonable to ask 
higher earners to contribute more to the cost of the scheme for the higher level of risk the 
scheme has underwritten.
Recommendation: The differing characteristics of higher and lower earners should be 
addressed through tiered contribution rates (Recommendation 9b).
Uniformity, transition and the impact on opt-outs
3.89 Given the current range of rates and structures any transition to a more uniform 
structure for employee contribution rates will be complex. As mentioned previously, 
employee contribution rates fit into an overall remuneration package. In some schemes low 
rates may be matched by lower pay. At the extreme, the armed forces pay no contributions 
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but an allowance for this is recognised when considering overall remuneration. Arguably, 
adjustments could be made to salaries to remove such effects across schemes without 
impacting on take-home pay to the employees, or to the cost of employment. However 
in order to do this, an assessment would be needed of how much of the difference in 
contribution rates between schemes is as a result of pay effects. The implications for total 
renumeration extend beyond the scope of this report and may require separate consideration.
3.90 Any increase in contribution rates is likely to result in some increase in opt-out rates. 
Even if met by an increase in salary, the extra cash available from opting out may entice 
employees out of the scheme. Managing the risk of opt out would be key to transitioning 
to a more uniform approach. At the very least, changes should be phased in over a specified 
period. Increasing education and awareness of the value and importance of pensions should 
also discourage opting out. 
Recommendation: The Government should consider the trade off between affordability and the 
impact of opt outs on adequacy when setting member contribution levels (Recommendation 9c).
Box 3.F: Changes to contracting out of State Second Pension
Arrangements for contracting out of the State Second Pension will be abolished for all those 
in defined contribution schemes from April 2012 and it will also become a flat-rate top-up to 
the basic State Pension (bSP) by 2030 for those contracted in. This will mean that from 2012 
contracting out will only be available to members of defined benefit schemes. The vast majority 
of these members are in public service schemes.
The move to a flat-rate system means that National Insurance contributions will gradually rise 
for those who are still members of contracted out schemes and are earning above £40,040 per 
annum, the majority of whom are in public service defined benefit schemes.
This increase in national insurance contributions, as well as the impact of any future reform of 
the state pension system, will need to be taken into consideration by the Government when 
setting contribution rates in the reformed public service schemes. It should be mindful of the 
potential effect on opt-out rates.
Choice
3.91 Individual choice and flexibility should be important parts of the pension scheme 
landscape. They can bring benefits for scheme members and government alike, by enabling 
scheme members to tailor their pension provision to their requirements. Many current 
public service pension schemes provide significant choice in some areas, for instance of the 
age at which pension payments begin and whether to take a retirement lump sum.
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3.92 Although choice empowers scheme members, there are risks involved. In particular, 
individual choice can lead to decisions that may harm either the member or possibly society 
as a whole. Limited public information, for instance about the risks involved in choosing 
different pension products, can lead members to make poor decisions. Even with good 
information, the complexity of pensions can result in poor decisions. Short-sighted decision 
making could leave the employee regretting in later life that they had saved too little.14
3.93 Even if employees make decisions that are individually rational, they might not be 
socially beneficial. Implicit guarantees against pensioner poverty could cause people to 
undersave, expecting to be bailed out in the future. Early retirement might be good for the 
employee but bad for society, for instance if continued employment would generate benefits 
to others (perhaps by increasing the productivity of other workers). Adverse selection 
(whereby, for instance, only those who expect to live longest choose to buy annuities) can 
cause markets to unravel and make almost everyone worse off.
3.94 There can also be significant potential administrative costs in providing for employee 
choice. There are typically economies of scale in both administration and fund management, 
implying that the cost per worker will be lower if everyone is provided with the same 
scheme design and management. Moreover, it could be costly to maintain the infrastructure 
necessary to enable employee choice, including advice services and implementation.
3.95  Choice should therefore be optimised, not simply maximised. Faced with too much 
choice, people can become overwhelmed and disengaged;15 Chart 3.I shows that fewer than 
half of men, and a third of women, believe that they understand enough to make a decision 
about retirement saving. In some areas, increasing choice would lead to an unacceptable risk 
of members failing to achieve adequate pension incomes in retirement. Pension schemes 
should therefore pick the most valuable areas in which to offer choice, bearing in mind the 
following:
 • keep choices simple;
 • use automatic enrolment;
 • design a good default option; and
 • allow people to commit now to (reversible) action in the future, thus using 
procrastination to assist policy.16
14 Hyperbolic Discount Functions, Undersaving, and Savings Policy, Laibson, 1996.
15 Choice overload and simplicity seeking, Iyengar and Kamenica, 2006.
16 Reforming pensions: principles, analytical errors and policy directions, p.12, Barr and Diamond, 2009.
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Chart 3.I: Percentage of respondents who understand enough about 
pensions to make a decision about saving for retirementa in 2006-08
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3.96 The Commission’s analysis suggests that most beneficial choice is connected to pension 
age and additional pension contributions, within a strong core pension system that will 
provide an adequate retirement income for those with full public service careers. 
3.97 Members already have significant choice over when to start receiving their pension 
benefits, above the minimum pension age. But there are concerns that it is currently difficult 
to make informed choices, and members may not understand the trade-offs involved in 
choosing an early or late retirement age. Chapter 6 discusses ways in which pension schemes 
can be made more transparent and easier to understand.
3.98 Actuarial reduction means that someone who retires early draws a reduced pension 
that reflects the greater cost of paying a pension for longer, and the risk of death in the 
intervening period. Similarly actuarial enhancement means that someone who retires late 
draws an increased pension that reflects that the pension will be paid out for a shorter time. 
Actuarial reduction and enhancement therefore adjust pensions on a cost neutral basis: 
there are no subsidies for early retirement and no incentives against continuing to work and 
retiring later. There are strong arguments for ensuring actuarial enhancement and reduction 
for future public service pensions. With increased longevity, it is particularly important not 
to penalise longer working lives. 
3.99 For similar reasons, caps on total pension accrual (for example, a limit on the 
maximum number of years of pensionable service) should be removed or significantly lifted 
so as not to discourage people from having a longer working life. 
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3.100 Replacing or removing abatement of pensions and increasing or removing caps on 
pension accrual will have cost implications for pension schemes which will need to be seen as 
part of the wider package. 
3.101 Flexible retirement, whereby employees continue to work while drawing some 
proportion of their pension, is likely to be increasingly important as working lives increase. 
As well as personal preferences, disability, ill health and family commitments could all lead 
employees to prefer to reduce their workloads in their 50s or 60s. Both the post-reform NHS 
scheme and the civil service nuvos scheme have introduced flexible retirement provisions. 
The Swedish state pension system is another possible model here; it allows members to draw 
25 per cent, 50 per cent or 75 per cent of their pension from the minimum pension age, 
while the remaining proportion continues to increase. Employers would need to be receptive 
to part-time working by older workers, or moves to jobs with reduced responsibilities. 
3.102 At present, most public service pension schemes provide for abatement, where some 
people who return to work in a job covered by the same scheme from which they draw their 
pension receive a reduced pension as a result. This can have a significant negative impact 
on an employee’s effective salary if he returns to work. The resulting disincentive for work 
could harm employees, employers and taxpayers, and looks hard to justify in the context of 
increasing working lives.
3.103 Abatement should therefore be eliminated under the new system, or replaced with a 
structure whereby pensions are initially reduced if an employee returns to work, but are then 
increased commensurately when the employee finally retires fully (as occurs in the US social 
security system). 
Recommendation: Members should have greater choice over when to start drawing their 
pension benefits, so they can choose to retire earlier or later than their normal pension age and 
their pension would be adjusted accordingly on an actuarially fair basis. Flexible retirement 
should be encouraged and abatement of pensions in its current form for those who return to 
work after drawing their pensions should be eliminated. In addition, caps on pension accrual 
should be removed or significantly lifted (Recommendation 10).
3.104 There is good reason to enable additional pension contributions to help retirement 
planning. Members approaching retirement who feel that their pension will not be sufficient 
(perhaps because of short service) could thus choose either to make additional contributions 
or to work for longer.
3.105 The format of additional contributions should be clear and transparent to employees. 
Defined benefit added pensions, as are currently available in several schemes, are particularly 
valuable, as they mean that employees can be confident in the relationship between their 
contributions and future pension receipts. These should be made available on a fiscally 
neutral basis – any subsidy to additional contributions would tend to privilege wealthier 
employees, as they are more likely to take advantage of the opportunity to contribute more. 
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3.106 Lump sums are currently available to members on retirement through pension 
commutation (exchanging a certain proportion of pension for a lump sum) or as a default 
option. It is possible to take a tax-free lump sum up to a limit of 25 per cent of the pension 
value. Lump sums are popular with members and can provide valuable flexibility by giving 
members a buffer fund to deal with contingencies. Therefore lump sums should continue to 
be made available to members of public service pension schemes through commutation.
3.107 The Commission has also explored whether there should be choice around the level of 
ancillary benefits that are provided by the public service pension schemes. This is explored in 
more detail in the next section. 
Ancillary benefits
3.108 Pension schemes in both public and private sectors typically offer a range of ancillary 
benefits, which are akin to insurance and are not directly linked to the pension itself. The 
main ancillary benefits are:
 • death benefits, which may become payable on the death of an active scheme member 
(death-in-service), someone with preserved pension rights (death-in-deferment) or 
upon the death of a scheme pensioner (death-in-retirement);
 • dependants’ benefits, which are payable to nominated partners (survivors’ benefits) 
and dependants (children’s benefits); 
 • pension guarantees, which guarantee to pay the member’s pension for a minimum 
period after retirement; and
 • ill-health/injury-related benefits, which are triggered when the scheme’s medical 
adviser agrees that the member is unable to perform their current job.
3.109 Ancillary benefits (with the exception of dependants’ benefits) are used by a small 
proportion of public sector employees but this is not surprising, given that they are similar to 
insurance in nature. For example, death-in-service benefits are, happily, infrequently used17 
and ill-health public sector retirement (estimated at 22,000 annually in the late 1990s)18 
has fallen significantly in the last decade,19 due to measures to tighten access and encourage 
healthier workplaces.
17 Less than 0.5 per cent of active members die in service annually. For example, 210 active members of the Armed 
Forces pension scheme died in 2009-10, out of an active membership of 198,032 (0.11 per cent); 368 out of 609,534 
active members of the Teachers Pension Scheme (0.06 per cent) died in 2009-10. 
18 Review of ill-health retirement in the public sector, HM Treasury, 2000.
19  For example, ill-health retirements in local government fell from 14.9 per cent of all retirements in 2004-05 to 7.4 per 
cent in 2008-09; in the NHS, ill-health retirements fell from 23 per cent of all retirements in the late 1990s to 8 per cent in 
2009-10.
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3.110 Although these benefits are used by a small number of members, they have been 
highly regarded whenever government has consulted on possible changes to schemes. The 
available evidence also suggests that the costs of providing these benefits are relatively small.20
Options for future ancillary benefit provision
3.111 The Commission considered a number of options in terms of ancillary benefit 
provision – amending these benefits, offering more choice in their provision, removing them 
entirely, providing them through the private sector or retaining them in their current form. 
3.112 There appears to be limited value from reducing or removing ancillary benefits. 
For individuals, any reductions in contributions would be marginal and are likely to be 
outweighed by the potential advantages of having these benefits (or the potential costs 
of not having them). For the Exchequer, any short-term savings may be outweighed by 
long-term costs. As mentioned in the previous section on choice, evidence suggests that 
people often choose inefficiently, underestimating their long-term needs and those of their 
families. Reducing or removing these benefits may result in people undersaving and thereby 
increasing their reliance on the State when they are older. 
3.113 Offering more choice on ancillary benefits would require schemes to provide people 
with a lot of information and support in order to make informed decisions. Providing choice 
would also make the system more complex and expensive to administer, and would increase 
the risk of adverse selection. And as was mentioned in the previous section, the ideal scenario 
is for choice to be optimised, rather than maximised.
3.114 Although information on the costs of ancillary benefit provision appears limited, the 
Commission has seen nothing to suggest that the private sector is better placed than the 
public sector to provide these benefits for public service pension scheme members, or that 
they could do so more cheaply. Government should be able to obtain economies of scale that 
most private sector schemes could not, and private sector provision is also likely to contain 
a profit element and to price to reflect risk. Therefore, ancillary benefits should be broadly 
retained in their present form. The current system provides people with equal access to a 
range of valued, cost-effective benefits on top of their pension, which provides a useful safety 
net.
20 There is little specific evidence the Commission has seen on the cost of ancillary benefits. It is difficult to cost and 
compare the individual elements of ancillary benefits between schemes; these benefits are inherently uncertain in nature 
and scheme valuations take place at different times, sometimes with varying methodologies. Papers from the Government 
Actuary’s Department indicate that ancillary benefits typically cost a few per cent of pensionable pay.
86
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report - 10 March 2011
87
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report - 10 March 2011
4 The controls
Box 4.A: Summary
 • Life expectancy has increased dramatically in the last few decades and future changes are 
uncertain. The Commission believes it is fair for members to bear the risks and costs of 
changes in life expectancy. 
 • There are a number of different mechanisms which could be used to share longevity risk. 
Certainty about how such mechanisms will be managed is essential for scheme members 
and taxpayers. The Government should therefore look to link a member’s Normal Pension 
Age (NPA) for most schemes so that it is in line with their State Pension Age (SPA). This will 
reflect changes in longevity over the last few decades and the likely nature of changes in 
the future.
 • The link to SPA should be regularly reviewed to make sure NPA remains in line with 
changes in life expectancy, but with a preference for keeping the two pension ages 
aligned. 
 • The mechanism discussed above, together with the design recommended in the previous 
chapter should achieve the Commission’s aim of passing appropriate risks to members, 
which in turn will provide increased stability of cost for government, and ultimately the 
taxpayer. 
 • However, the Commission believes there will still be a need for an overriding mechanism to 
ensure that public service pensions are affordable and sustainable. The Government should 
introduce additional mechanisms for controlling for future changes in longevity, or other 
costs, by introducing a fixed cost ceiling which, if breached, triggers a change to bring costs 
under the ceiling. This should be the subject of consultation between the Government and 
scheme members, with an automatic default change if agreement cannot be reached. 
4.1 The analysis of the risks in pension schemes in Chapter 2 concludes that it is appropriate 
for some risks to be shared with scheme members. The most significant of these risks 
is longevity. This chapter outlines how scheme design can be structured to share risks 
effectively and maintain control of scheme costs.
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Longevity
Longevity has increased 
4.2 As discussed in the interim report, longevity has increased significantly in the past 
few decades and the life expectancy of members of public service pension schemes is no 
exception. Chart 1.A illustrates how life expectancies from age 60 in England have increased 
for men and women in the general population since the 1840s.
4.3 This general increase in life expectancy has led to increases in the amount of time 
a public service pension scheme member can expect to spend in retirement. Chart 4.A 
compares the expected proportion of adult life spent in retirement for members retiring from 
the NHS Pension Scheme at age 60 over the past 50 years. The chart shows that current 
pensioners retiring at 60 can expect to spend around 40 to 45 per cent of their adult lives in 
retirement, compared with around 30 per cent for pensioners in the 1950s. This increase has 
been partially offset by increasing the Normal Pension Age (NPA) to 65 for new entrants 
into the scheme, though most members in public service pension schemes have a NPA of 60 
or less.
Chart 4.A: Proportion of adult life spent in retirement, based on NHS 
Pension Scheme
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4.4 Although greater longevity is a positive development, the unprecedented rise in life 
expectancy since the schemes were set up has meant that providing public service pensions 
has become significantly more expensive than was anticipated. This change has had a 
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profound effect on the sustainability of public service pensions but has not been the focus 
of informed public debate. The cost of pensions in 2004 in the NHS was a third higher 
than it would have been if assumptions about life expectancy were the same as those in 
1955. Similar results could be calculated for the other unfunded schemes. Since employee 
contributions have risen little over the period this increase in the cost of making pension 
commitments has mostly been paid for by employers and taxpayers.
Further changes in longevity are uncertain
4.5 It is generally assumed that longevity will continue to increase in the future, but there 
is significant uncertainty about the scale of any future changes. Increases in life expectancy 
have historically been recognised in future projections but the rate of improvements has been 
consistently underestimated. This is illustrated in Chart 4.B. 
	
Chart 4.B: Actual and projected period life expectancy at birth for UK 
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4.6 The chart emphasises that it is not possible to be confident about what the longevity 
experience will be in the future. Because of this, it is how the uncertainty is measured and 
managed that is important within a pension system. The implication of increasing, but 
uncertain, life expectancy is that schemes should have mechanisms in place to control the 
associated costs. 
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The State Pension and longevity changes
4.7 This observed and projected increase in life expectancy has already been recognised 
within the State Pension system with the Pensions Act 2007 proposing an increased State 
Pension Age (SPA) of 68 from 2046 for both men and women with interim increases to 66 
and 67. Further details are set out in Box 4.B.
4.8 Given the continuing increases in longevity, the current Government last year reviewed 
the timetable for increasing the SPA, specifically the increase to age 66, with a view to 
accelerating this timetable. The Government has now decided to bring forward the move to age 
66 from 2026 to 2020. Chart 4.C below shows the current timetable for increases in the SPA.
Box 4.B: Changes to State Pension Age
 • Under the Pensions Act 1995, the SPA for women was to be equalised with that for men, 
rising from 60 in 2010 to 65 by 2020. Under the Pensions Act 2007, the SPA for both men 
and women was expected to rise to 66 by 2026, to 67 by 2036, and to 68 by 2046. 
 • However, official projections of average life expectancy have since been revised upwards. 
Life expectancy projections made in 2009 indicate that men and women reaching 66 in 
2026 are expected to live, on average, at least 1.5 years longer than was thought at the 
time the Pensions Act 2007 was passed.a
 • As a result, in June 2010 the Government issued a Call for Evidence on the timing of the 
increase in SPA to 66. This was followed in November 2010 by the publication of a White 
Paper outlining the Government’s decision.b Provisions to enable this were included in the 
2011 Pensions Bill which was presented before Parliament in January 2011.
 • Under the Bill’s new proposals, the equalisation of SPA between men and women, by 
which both men and women will have a SPA of 65, is planned to happen by 2018 rather 
than 2020. The SPA for men and women will then rise from 65 to 66 between December 
2018 and April 2020, brought forward from 2026.
 • The 2011 Pensions Bill makes no proposals for adjusting the timetabled rise of the SPA to 
67 and 68. However, the Government signalled in the 2010 Spending Review that they are 
considering what future changes to SPA may be necessary.
a) DWP analysis based on Office for National Statistics Cohort Life Expectancy principal projections, for average life 
expectancy for men and women resident in the UK.
b) DWP (2010).A sustainable State Pension: when the State Pension age will increase to 66.
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Chart 4.C: Timetable for the changing State Pension Age
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Managing longevity changes in public service pension schemes
4.9 It is in the light of these changes in longevity and the SPA that the Commission 
considered the options for managing longevity risk within the public service pension 
schemes. As discussed in Chapter 2 the Commission’s view is that it is fair for the member 
to bear the longevity risk pre-retirement, or at least until close to retirement, as the 
Commission recognises the need for greater certainty closer to retirement. The Commission 
is also clear that bearing this risk means that tools to manage longevity should be activated 
if life expectancy decreases, and reduces scheme costs, as well as if life expectancy increases. 
The options considered and their assessment against the Commission’s principles is discussed 
below and set out in Table 4.A.
4.10 The Commission considered five options of managing longevity risk:
 • the baseline (current scenario in most of the schemes for new members), setting the 
NPA at 65;
 • conditional indexation pre-retirement linked to changes in longevity. How accrued 
benefits were uprated would then be dependent on changes to longevity;
 • link a member’s NPA to the current SPA timetable. Members would only be able 
to draw down their pensions without actuarial reduction at their SPA, and this date 
would be set a number of years before retirement;
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 • link a member’s NPA to the current SPA timetable but with regular review of that 
link. This would work as above but with the addition of a regular review of the link 
to SPA to examine whether it was still appropriate given changes in longevity and 
other factors; and
 • NPA automatically adjusted in line with set parameters, for example, it could be 
adjusted in line with life expectancy projections with the aim of targeting a set 
percentage or set number of years in retirement. 
4.11 In all cases, the linking of NPA to SPA would apply to future service only. The 
protection of accrued rights means that the benefits built up within the existing schemes 
would still be payable at the current NPA in those schemes.
4.12 In Table 4.A these options are assessed briefly against the principles. When considering 
them against the principles the Commission was specifically considering:
 • affordability and sustainability: whether the option manages past and projected 
increases in cost due to changes in longevity and whether it can manage the 
uncertainty surrounding future longevity;
 • adequate and fair: whether the option is likely to deliver an adequate pension so it 
does not rely on decreasing annual pension benefit levels in the scheme to cope with 
changes, and whether it treats members from different cohorts in a similar way and 
could provide sufficient lead-in time for any changes;
 • supports productivity: whether the option supports a changing length of working 
life in response to changes in longevity; and
 • transparent and simple: whether the way the option worked would be easy to 
understand and allow members to plan for their retirement. 
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Recommendation: The Government should increase the member’s Normal Pension 
Age (NPA) in most schemes so that it is in line with their State Pension Age (SPA). 
However, the link between the SPA and NPA should be regularly reviewed to make sure it is still 
appropriate, with a preference for keeping the two pension ages linked (Recommendation 11).
4.13 Future pension earned by members would then have a NPA in line with their SPA. 
For example, based on the revised SPA timetable illustrated in Chart 4.C, a member aged 45 
in 2011 would earn pension with an NPA of 66 and a member aged 25 in 2011 would earn 
pension with an NPA of 68. If the SPA timetable changed further in the future, then this 
would also change NPA for all pension earned under the new schemes.
4.14 Chart 4.D shows what these changes may mean for the expected proportion of life 
spent in retirement for public service employees if they retired according to the revised SPA 
timetable. The calculations are based on life expectancies used by HM Treasury in their 
long-term public finance report 2009, specific to public service employees, together with 
high and low variants based on ONS population projections. 
Chart 4.D: Expected percentage of adult life in retirement after 
changes
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Source: IPSPC analysis, using life expectancies prepared by GAD for the National Audit Office.a 
Note: Based on male SPA, under the revised timetable for increases – the female SPA is lower for those born before 1954.
Life expectancies are averaged between males and females.
a) National Audit Office: The cost of public service pensions. March 2010.
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4.15 The chart illustrates how increasing NPA in line with SPA manages much of the 
increase in life expectancy we have seen in recent decades, and the improvements that are 
currently anticipated in the future. The central line representing HM Treasury’s central 
life expectancy assumptions for public service employees maintains the average expected 
proportion of life spent in retirement at around 33 to 35 per cent, broadly in line with the 
level it was in the 1980s (based on the NHS analysis above).
4.16 Of course, life expectancy is uncertain. Therefore, as well as the central estimates, the 
chart illustrates alternative scenarios using the higher and lower life expectancy assumptions 
the Government Actuary’s Department also prepared for HM Treasury (in line with high 
and low life expectancy projections from the Office for National Statistics). The chart shows 
that if life expectancy followed the high variant assumptions, the percentage could increase 
up towards 40 per cent, and if it followed the low variant assumptions, the percentage would 
be around 30 per cent. 
4.17 As can be seen from the central life expectancy projection in Chart 4.D, once the 
final planned increase in SPA takes place in 2046 the expected proportion of adult life in 
retirement for public service workers is expected to start rising again. Without further action 
this would lead to increased costs due to life expectancy increases once again starting to rise 
over and above the allowance made in the proposed SPA timetable. 
4.18 The uncertainty in future life expectancy, and the increase in costs after the last 
planned transition of SPA to 68 are risks that would ideally be managed in a system with 
NPA linked to SPA.
4.19 The Government has stated in its White Paper1 that “to manage the ongoing challenges 
posed by changes in projected longevity, the Government will be considering the current 
timetable for these rises and will bring forward proposals in due course.” Given this 
statement from the Government, the Commission considers that a link to SPA for the NPA 
of the public service schemes should help create a sustainable pension system that manages 
longevity risk.
4.20 However, the Commission’s recommendation is that as well as the link to SPA 
being put in place, NPA should also be regularly reviewed by an independent body, to 
see if the link is appropriately tracking changes in longevity. The body would then make 
recommendations to the Government (either for each scheme or for the public service as a 
whole) on whether linking the NPA for public service pension schemes to the SPA was still 
appropriate, and if not, what the NPA should be.
4.21 It is of great importance that any changes to the planned NPA timetable are fixed and 
publicised so as to allow a sufficient notice period for members. This would allow members 
to accommodate the change within their retirement planning and would give members more 
certainty and increase trust in the scheme. 
1  DWP (2010) A sustainable State Pension: when the State Pension will increase to 66, Command Paper.
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4.22 Members would also be given choice around their retirement age, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. The aim would be to move away from a ‘cliff edge’ retirement age as working 
practices and expectations around working life change. Whilst members could take an 
unreduced pension at their NPA there would be nothing to prevent them retiring earlier and 
taking an actuarially reduced pension, or indeed continuing to work past NPA, perhaps on a 
part-time basis, and continuing to accrue pension rights. 
4.23 This approach should help to keep NPA within the public service pension schemes 
generally in line with developments in longevity and therefore ensure sustainability. A 
gradually changing NPA for the public service pension schemes broadly in line with changes 
in projected life expectancy would also assist in developing cultural expectations that as 
projected life expectancy changes so too should expectations of when to retire if people wish 
to maintain a steady standard of living in retirement. 
Additional measures for controlling scheme costs
The need for additional measures
4.24 It has been the aim of the Commission to design a public service pension scheme 
structure which will share risks and costs between employees and government fairly.
4.25 The design features discussed in Chapter 3 and those regarding life expectancy in the 
sections above should achieve much of this aim. For example, moving to CARE from final 
salary removes much of the salary risk associated with final salary pensions. Adjusting NPA 
in line with longevity increases through linking to SPA will remove much of the risk to costs 
of future increases in longevity.
4.26 However, the Commission believes consideration should also be given to an overriding 
mechanism to ensure that public service pensions remain affordable and sustainable. This 
mechanism would act as a safety valve in case costs within the new scheme increased due to 
factors not taken account of in the scheme design.
4.27 This mechanism could be expressed as a ‘fixed cost ceiling’ and would be the upper 
limit on the amount that the Government would commit to employees’ pensions over the 
long term to each scheme.
4.28 The four largest public service pension schemes2 introduced cost control mechanisms as 
part of the 2007-08 reforms through cap and share arrangements.3 These arrangements were 
agreed between employers and trade unions and the intention was that certain increases in 
pension costs were shared between employer and employee up to a cap on employer costs. 
Introducing a cost ceiling would establish processes similar in some ways to cap and share 
2  Teachers, NHS, Principal Civil Service and Local Government Pension Schemes.
3  See interim report pages 45-48 for a full description.
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but which reflect the future scheme structure and have an automatic default change that will 
take place if agreement is not reached.
Recommendation: The Government, on behalf of the taxpayer, should set out a fixed cost 
ceiling: the proportion of pensionable pay that they will contribute, on average, to employees’ 
pensions over the long-term. If this is exceeded then there should be a consultation process to 
bring costs back within the ceiling, with an automatic default change if agreement cannot be 
reached (Recommendation 12).
4.29 The details of the control mechanism should be subject to an explicit consultation 
which should include:
 • the process, timescales, parties involved;
 • the level at which the ceiling is set;
 • which scheme design features should be covered and what the automatic default 
change should be; and
 • which cost factors are covered, in particular the extent to which past service costs are 
allowed for.
Defining a fixed cost ceiling
4.30 There are many ways of defining, measuring and setting a cost ceiling. However, the 
most appealing options for consideration are:
 • pension expenditure each year as a proportion of GDP – essentially a cash  
measure; or
 • the estimated cost of pension promises accruing over the next year as a proportion of 
total or pensionable pay bill – essentially an accruals measure.
4.31 One advantage of using the GDP measure is that in theory it will give a good degree 
of predictability for government about costs in the future and, since tax revenues are highly 
correlated with levels of GDP, it will also ensure that commitments remain affordable.
4.32 However, this measure is very difficult to control as it is influenced by a large number 
of variables outside the control of pension schemes costs such as future levels of GDP and 
the size of the public sector workforce. Having considered these factors the Commission has 
determined that this option is not viable.
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4.33 The second measure is to look at the cost of the pension benefits accruing and keep this 
stable, either as a proportion of the total pay bill (i.e. for all employees whether in a pension 
scheme or not) or pensionable pay bill (i.e. for all pension scheme members).
4.34 Maintaining the pension cost under a ceiling based on total pay bill depends on the 
proportion of members choosing to participate in the scheme. Assessing pension costs as a 
proportion of pensionable pay bill avoids this impact of participation.
4.35 It is the Commission’s view that the proportion of pensionable pay approach is the 
most appropriate for the purpose of a cost ceiling. 
Changing a scheme to remain under a cost ceiling
4.36 Increases in cost due to rising longevity should be managed through the linking of 
NPA to SPA. However, in the event that this mechanism is not sufficient or other factors 
lead to an increase in costs, then the main options for parameters which can be changed in 
principle are:
 • an increase in employee contributions;
 • a reduction in the accrual rate (for future service accrual only);
 • a reduction in the indexation rate; and
 • a reduction in the value of ancillary benefits (future service only).
4.37 These options are listed in decreasing order of simplicity to implement. Adjusting 
the accrual rate or the contribution rate for a particular year determines the amount of 
pension earned, or the contribution paid, in that year only. Conversely, adjusting the rate 
of indexation or the ancillary benefits is likely to have wider implications. For example, 
adjusting the indexation rate may affect all benefits that have been built up to date. Ancillary 
benefits are likely to be the most complex to adjust and require the most significant changes 
to yield the necessary savings. 
4.38 The indexation option arguably has the advantage that it could potentially be applied 
to deferred and pensioner members rather than just active members, which could spread 
change more fairly, but adjusting pensions in payments has risks as pensioners may find 
it harder to manage the change. On balance, the Commission does not view varying 
indexation as an attractive option. 
4.39 Considering the first two options further against the principles, there are conflicting 
arguments from an adequacy perspective. On one hand, it might be preferable to exclude 
the possibility of large increases in employee contributions which could lead to widespread 
opt-out amongst scheme members, particularly the lower paid and younger members. 
Conversely, it could be argued that adequacy is more affected by reducing the accrual rate.
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4.40 This highlights a further difference in terms of cash flow. The contributions approach 
will have an impact on short-term cash flows only. The accrual rate approach would reduce 
the level of employer contributions in line with the constraints imposed by the ceiling. 
There would then also be a delayed impact as the pension to be paid in the future is reduced. 
Therefore, in terms of simplicity, employee contributions may be the more preferable 
approach as it only affects what is paid in, not also what is ultimately paid out.
4.41 Overall, the Commission considers that mechanisms which vary employee 
contributions or the accrual rate may be more preferable than looking to vary indexation or 
ancillary benefits.
Implementing a cost ceiling
4.42 A decision would also be needed on the level at which the costs are fixed: across all 
public service pension schemes or on an individual scheme by scheme basis. If set for all 
schemes then there would almost certainly be significant cross-subsidy between the different 
schemes. If costs rise in one scheme for whatever reason, benefits may need to fall or 
contributions to increase across all the schemes to compensate for this.
4.43 Therefore, it appears preferable that the cost ceiling mechanism should be set up and 
implemented at a scheme specific level, but that the process for operation should be common 
to all schemes. The process for the operation of the cost ceiling would need to be decided.
4.44 In the event of the evaluated cost of benefits exceeding the ceiling, the Commission’s 
view is that a default change should be generated. Government, employees and their 
representatives would then have the opportunity to discuss and negotiate a change that 
would meet the criteria of the ceiling. If no agreement could be reached then the default 
change would be implemented. 
4.45 A key consideration is how often costs should be reviewed so that they remain under 
the ceiling. The initial choices may be:
 • at each full actuarial valuation, carried out every three to four years. This is used to 
set the level of contributions required from employers and employees; or
 • when the current service costs are calculated each year for the purposes of reporting 
in resource accounts. These are calculated using a corporate bond discount rate 
and so the published figures are subject to market volatility. However, there does 
not appear to be an obstacle to calculating an equivalent cost based on more stable 
assumptions such as that used in the SCAPE4 actuarial valuation process (following 
the ongoing review).
4 Superannuation Contributions Adjusted for Past Experience.
100
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report - 10 March 2011
4.46 Whether a one-year turnaround time is practicable depends on the process set up to 
maintain the cost ceiling, for example, whether the system is automated to some extent or 
subject to negotiation. 
4.47 The Commission’s view is that the cost ceiling process should run following each 
actuarial valuation, therefore every 3 or 4 years.
4.48 Valuations for most public service schemes are calculated using the SCAPE discount 
rate which has historically been 3.5 per cent above RPI inflation but is currently under 
review by the Government. The process of setting the parameters for a cost ceiling would 
need to consider the interaction between the eventual choice of discount rate and the 
calculated scheme costs. 
4.49 For the Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS), valuations are carried out 
separately for each fund with the choice of discount rate also set at the fund-specific level. 
Consistency of approach across the schemes would require the cost of pensions accruing 
within the different schemes to be calculated on a consistent set of assumptions (e.g. by 
applying the SCAPE discount rate to the LGPS valuations).
Dealing with past service
4.50 The design of the cost ceiling will need to identify the costs that should be shared with 
the public service membership rather than picked up by the taxpayer.
4.51 What types of cost should be included within the cost ceiling is a decision for the 
Government in consultation with employees and their representatives. The previous cap and 
share arrangements had broadly envisaged that increased costs in respect of demographic 
factors, such as salary increases and longevity, would be shared with members, while the 
Government would bear increased costs in respect of financial factors, such as discount 
rate, inflation and specifically to funded schemes, investment returns. This approach would 
be consistent with our analysis of where risks should sit within the public service pension 
schemes.
4.52 There are different approaches to which parts of pension costs should be included 
under a fixed cost ceiling approach, for example:
 • the costs accruing as a result of service carried out in the year of cost evaluation 
(future service cost) only;
 • the future service cost plus the past service costs relating to the currently active 
members of the new schemes;
 • the future service cost plus the past service costs relating to all pension accrued to 
date within the new schemes; or
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 • the future service cost plus the past service costs relating to all pension accrued to 
date within the new schemes and the legacy (mainly final salary) schemes.
4.53 The first approach would only contain the costs accruing as a result of service carried 
out in future years. The three other options would cover increases in costs relating to past 
service. For example, if longevity increases, this will have costs associated for all years of 
service, which would not be picked up through only looking at future service costs. For past 
service within the proposed new scheme structure (options 2 and 3), this will be restricted to 
the longevity effects over and above the impact of adjusting NPA through the SPA link. To 
include the legacy schemes as well (option 4), the cost would cover the total longevity impact 
from a fixed NPA in the legacy schemes.
4.54 Past service cost might be difficult to estimate accurately in the unfunded schemes, but 
difficult to ignore in funded schemes since they will show up as part of the difference in the 
value of assets and liabilities. In the LGPS, the contributions towards the past service deficit 
are picked up by the employer.
4.55 There are significant pros and cons of including past service costs in the fixed cost 
ceiling.
4.56 Not including past service costs means that the Government (and ultimately the 
taxpayer) takes on all the risk associated with past service accrual. In fact, the only changes 
in cost to be shared would be those to come through from a change of assumptions. There 
would be no direct sharing of the cost impact of actual scheme experience unless the 
assumptions were also changed.
4.57 The general approach to past service within the cap and share agreements for the 
four schemes mentioned was that any changes to past service costs after the date of 
implementation of cap and share would fall within the cost share envelope. These agreements 
had been accepted by both the employers and the respective unions. Although it is not 
certain how these arrangements would have played out in practice, making no allowance 
for past service in the fixed cost ceiling would arguably be a weakening of the cost sharing 
agreements that had been agreed.
4.58 Excluding much of the past service costs is a view supported by the Railway Pension 
Commission who recommended that all costs associated with increased longevity of deferred 
and pensioner members be borne by the employers.5 If this approach was adopted it would 
mean this element of past service cost associated with changes in longevity would sit outside 
the cost ceiling and these costs would fall to the Government.
4.59 Including the past service costs within the cost ceiling would mean that the increased 
cost of accrued rights would need to be shared among the active scheme members, which 
will have negative implications for the benefit levels or contributions required from this 
group. For example, active members may not only bear the impact of increases in past costs 
5 Railway Pensions Commission (2008), Final Report.
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that they themselves may benefit from (which may be nothing, if a new member), but also 
any increases which deferred and pensioner members are benefiting from. 
4.60 The greater the extent that past service is included within the fixed cost ceiling, the 
greater the volatility of employee contributions or benefit rates. The effects, particularly those 
relating to pensioner and deferred members, are emphasised in mature schemes (those with 
a high number of pensioner and deferred members in relation to active members). This is 
because the increased cost of accrued rights will need to be shared amongst a relatively small 
active population.
4.61 The changes may discourage participation within the schemes. There may be an 
argument for targeting contribution increases at those who do have past service, but again 
there is nothing to stop these members leaving the scheme.
4.62  If it was felt that future service costs and past service costs could not be dealt with 
within the same cost ceiling, it may be worth considering a more tailored solution such as 
measuring increases in future service costs against one ceiling and capping the impact of 
past service costs at another. Given past discussions and agreements on this question, the 
Commission has concluded that the extent to which past service costs are allowed for in the 
fixed cost ceiling should be part of the consultation process following this report. 
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5 Applying the design
Box 5.A: Summary 
There are differences between the individual public service schemes in factors such as the 
distribution of pensionable pay, average career length and life expectancy. But, for most 
schemes, these differences are generally similar to, or smaller than, those seen within the 
schemes. The modernised schemes generally apply standard features to their members and 
this is accepted as an appropriate approach, as tailoring schemes for different groups creates a 
complex and costly system and would be likely to reduce member understanding. This would 
suggest that, for most schemes, variation in pension features is not the most appropriate way to 
deal with these differences where they are seen. 
The Commission is not proposing a single public service pension scheme, but over time public 
service pensions should move towards a common framework for scheme design as set out in 
this report. However, in some cases, for example, the uniformed services, there may need to be 
limited adaptations to this framework. 
For the uniformed services, expectations and life expectancy, have moved on since the Normal 
Pension Ages (NPAs) of 55 or less that are seen for the majority of long-serving members of 
the uniformed services schemes, were set. However, there is a need to recognise the unique 
nature of the work the uniformed services (the armed forces, police and firefighters) undertake. 
Therefore, in the case of the uniformed services schemes the Government should consider 
setting a new NPA of 60, where the NPA is currently below this level, and keep this under 
regular review, rather than linking their NPA to State Pension Age (SPA). 
The common framework should apply to the LGPS, where local needs should also be met mainly 
through varying pay and allowances. However, it remains appropriate for the Government to 
maintain the different financing arrangements for the LGPS in future, so the LGPS remains 
funded and the other major public service schemes remain unfunded. This would maintain a 
mixed approach to the funding of the public service pension schemes. 
As for who in future should be entitled to join these schemes, it is ultimately for the Government 
to decide how much long-term pensions risk it is willing to bear in order to meet its wider policy 
objectives. However, it is in principle undesirable for future non-public service workers to have 
access to public service pension schemes, given the increased long-term risk this places on the 
Government and taxpayers. 
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5.1 The public services include a very wide range of employees. This diversity could 
potentially affect the precise application of the Commission’s proposed reforms, summarised 
in Box 5.B below, and the transition to new arrangements.
Box 5.B: Key design features in the common framework
Based upon the four key principles described in Chapter 1, the Commission believes that future 
public service pension schemes should have the following features:
 • pensions should be defined benefit, based on career average revalued earnings;
 • pensions in payment should be indexed by inflation, while accrued benefits should be 
revalued by earnings for active members;
 • accrual rates, indexation methods and employee contribution levels should be considered 
together, to ensure that pension schemes deliver adequate retirement incomes and are 
sustainable;
 • a member’s Normal Pension Age (NPA) for future accruals should be linked with their State 
Pension Age (SPA); and
 • the Government should introduce a cost ceiling, to help control for future changes in 
longevity and other costs. 
The extent of variation across schemes and across their 
membership
5.2 The interim report1 noted that the development of public service pension schemes 
has not been a planned and fully coherent process and that there is a plethora of complex 
provisions. A wide range of professions are covered by different schemes but also within 
the same scheme. Again, as the interim report noted,2 different schemes, designs and 
contributions apply to people employed in similar public service jobs, sometimes for the 
same employer, for example, teachers are generally in the Teachers Pension Scheme (TPS)
and teaching assistants in the Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS). 
5.3 And information technology (IT), accountancy and public administration are found 
as professions across the public services. Within the civil service scheme groups as diverse 
as lawyers, economists, scientists and engineers are covered alongside groups such as border 
officers, coastguards, prison officers and some criminal investigators and police support staff. 
The situation is similar for most of the other public service schemes.
1 IPSPC (2010) Interim report, paragraph Ex.2.
2 IPSPC (2010) Interim report, paragraph 1.10.
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5.4 The great variation within schemes and the common features generally shared between 
schemes are an inevitable result of providing very large schemes covering much of a 
particular sector.
5.5 Schemes also display major common features that reflect centrally agreed pension 
policies, such as final salary design, multiple tiers of ill health pension, or flexibilities to take 
early pension.
5.6 There are differences in how approaches to pension design have been applied in practice, 
reflecting particular scheme characteristics. For jobs with a physical element, particularly 
in the uniformed services (the armed forces, police and firefighters), pension ages of 55 or 
less have been used to recognise the effects of ageing and limitations on longevity. Also, 
pension ages of 40 or less have been used by the armed forces as a device to aid retention and 
encourage exit. And the uniformed services in general have not adopted flexible retirement 
options, bearing in mind that unreduced immediate pensions have generally been available 
under their schemes’ rules by the age that flexible retirement options would have become 
available to them. 
5.7 However, whilst such factors are still important they are not as significant as they once 
were. This is, for example, reflected in the increases in longevity seen across all groups and in 
some of the changes already made to public service pension terms. These include the pension 
age of 653 that applies to new entrants to professions such as nursing or custody and care 
of prisoners and the normal pension age of 60 in the Firefighters Pension Scheme 2006 for 
those who serve until 60. And early leavers in the uniformed services now generally have a 
NPA of 65.4
5.8 Differences between the professions in the extent of work-related risks tend to be 
reflected in differences in pay and allowances and in the compensation terms that are 
provided, so, for example, the uniformed services have more valuable death and injury cover.
5.9 Alongside that, there are major differences in career and remuneration structures 
between groups within the same scheme that are not reflected in pension design. Those 
differences can be as great as or greater than the differences in career and remuneration 
between members of different schemes.
5.10 The average annual earnings within the six biggest public service schemes (police, 
teachers, armed forces, National Health Service (NHS), civil service and the LGPS) range 
from around £20,000 to nearly £40,000.5 However, this variation in average earnings 
between the schemes conceals wide variations in earnings within the schemes and similarities 
between the schemes in their pay distribution. This is shown in Charts 5.A and 5.B below. 
3 Instead of 55 or 60.
4 Covering those who leave the new firefighters scheme before age 60, those who leave the Police Pension Scheme 2006 
before age 55 and those who leave the Armed Forces Pension Scheme 1975 before about age 40 or the Armed Forces 
Pension Scheme 2005 before age 55.
5 Data returns to IPSPC except NHS: 2007 Scheme valuation and 2009-10 resource accounts; and civil service.
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The armed forces, teaching and the police have fairly similar distributions (though with a 
significant spike of low earners in the armed forces). There are also significant similarities 
between the NHS, civil service and local government schemes, although there are 
comparatively more high earners in the NHS. 
Chart 5.A: Distribution of pensionable pay in armed forces, teachers 
and police schemes
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Note: Police data as of 31 March 2008. Armed forces rates include pay during basic training.
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Chart 5.B: Distribution of pensionable pay in NHS, civil service and local 
government schemes
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5.11 However, there are large differences in the average career lengths for scheme members, 
ranging from 7 to 8 years for the LGPS, around 10 years for the armed forces, 11 for the 
NHS and 13 for the civil service to about 16 for judges, 18 for firefighters, 23 for teachers 
and nearly 25 years for the police.6 These averages would represent from under a quarter to 
over a half of a potential working lifetime.7
5.12 But, again, those averages disguise large variations in career length between members 
within schemes. Full information is not available at present for many of the schemes, but 
those for which comprehensive data have been obtained are included in Chart 5.C below. 
6 NHS - NHS staff turnover statistics 2007-08. Teachers - School workforce in England 2010. Civil service - tables prepared 
for IPSPC by Office for National Statistics. LGPS - Local government employers sample survey 2007. Armed forces 
- UK Regular Forces Intake and Outflow by Age 2009-10. Police - Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 22 July 2010. Fire - 
Operational statistics bulletin for England 2009-10. Judiciary - Data return to IPSPC from Ministry of Justice. 
The LGPS figures are based on all local government workers. Since relatively many workers choose to opt out of the LGPS 
scheme, and those who opt out are likely to have shorter careers on average, the average career length of those who stay 
in the scheme is likely to be somewhat longer. For comparison, the average career length of current local government 
pensioners is 16 years (source: local government scheme data returns). 
In most schemes average pensionable service is also greater than these figures for average career lengths because those 
who serve for a short time do not meet the minimum qualifying period required to get a pension from the scheme: two 
years for most schemes and three months for the LGPS.
7 Assumed here to mean the period between leaving full-time education and reaching State Pension Age.
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Chart 5.C: Variation of career lengths in public service pension schemes
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
m
e
m
b
e
rs
Years of service
Teaching LGPS Judiciary Armed forces Civil service
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Notes: The LGPS figures are based on pensionable service. Given the high proportion of part-time employees in the LGPS, 
this is likely to understate significantly actual years of service.
Armed forces figures reflect that there are many engagements that last either 4 years or around 20 years, when 
Immediate Pensions have been paid.
Judiciary figures reflect that most judges retiring in the last two decades were entitled to pensions of half pay after 15 
years’ service.
5.13 This chart indicates that there is a large spread in the length of service seen within the 
public service schemes, notwithstanding the peaks seen in some schemes, which are driven 
mainly by employment or pension terms. 
5.14 Life expectancy assumptions and experience do vary somewhat between schemes. 
Chart 5.D shows the projected life expectancy at 60 for those schemes for which we have 
comparable data. However, the variations in life expectancy are generally not that marked 
and the life expectations are above the average for the population as a whole.
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Chart 5.D: Projected life expectancy at age 60
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5.15 Most schemes do not have scheme specific data showing the underlying differences in 
life expectancy between members, but these are likely to reflect the different life expectancies 
of the different categories of workers within the schemes. And, as discussed above, there is a 
large variation in the types of worker represented within the different schemes. The types of 
variation in life expectancy that could be expected based on job classification are outlined in 
Chart 5.E, and this variation is greater than that seen in the averages between schemes. 
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Chart 5.E: Male life expectancy at age 65 by social class
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Standardisation and variation in core designs: one or many 
schemes 
5.16 The evidence presented above suggests that there are differences between the individual 
schemes in factors such as the distribution of pensionable pay, average career length and life 
expectancy. But, for most schemes, these differences are generally similar to, or smaller than, 
those seen within schemes in these parameters. 
5.17 The modernised schemes generally apply standard features to their members, for 
example, having one NPA or accrual rate. This is accepted as an appropriate approach, as 
tailoring schemes to all the differences seen would create a complex and costly system and 
would be likely to reduce member understanding. This would seem to suggest variation in 
pension features is not the most appropriate way to deal with these differences where they are 
seen, for the majority of schemes. 
Recommendation: The Commission is not proposing a single public service pension 
scheme, but over time public service pensions should move towards a common 
framework for scheme design as set out in this report. However, in some cases, for 
example, the uniformed services, there may need to be limited adaptations to this framework 
(Recommendation 13).
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The different position of the uniformed services
5.18 Despite the wide variations in membership characteristics within most schemes, most 
have handled pension ages as standard features across the membership rather than tailoring 
them to different groups within the workforce. Schemes have therefore generally adopted a 
NPA of 60 or 65 across the whole membership.
5.19 The only significant exceptions to this have been the use of NPAs of 55 or less for 
the members of the uniformed services who serve until that age although, as discussed in 
paragraph 5.7, this has been changing for deferred members of the uniform services and for 
members of the modernised firefighters scheme.
5.20 However, the pension ages in the uniformed services schemes still generally reflect an 
assumption that pension for the majority of long-serving members should be payable from 
age 55 or less. But this assumption may no longer match expectations, given the increases 
in life expectancy that have been seen since the 19th and first half of the 20th century; when 
these pension ages were set. 
5.21 It also seems that leavers from schemes such as the armed forces, police and 
firefighters are often well qualified for careers elsewhere and do not suffer from high levels of 
unemployment. 
5.22 For example, a National Audit Office survey in 2007 found that only six per cent 
of all leavers from the armed forces were unemployed.8 Similarly, Ministry of Defence 
surveys of service leavers show that 94 per cent of those seeking work who used the 
Department’s resettlement service9 were employed within six months.10 Those most prone 
to unemployment were those who left after less than four years’ service or on compulsory 
discharge. In the case of firefighters, exit surveys show that more than two-thirds of those 
who resign before retirement do so in order to take up other employment.11
8 National Audit Office (2007), Leaving the services.
9 Career Transition Partnership.
10 National Audit Office (2007), Leaving the services.
11 Fire and Rescue Service (2010), Operational Statistics Bulletin for England 2009-10.
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Chart 5.F: The employment status of armed forces leavers
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Source: National Audit Office (2007), Leaving the services.
5.23 There is less evidence about the employment of those above current NPAs, but we do 
know that there are currently about 1,200 active police officers over the age of 55 working in 
UK police forces.12
5.24 However, this does not take away from the fact that the nature of the work the 
uniformed services perform is unique and that this needs to be reflected in their NPAs. 
But, as discussed above, things have changed since the NPAs for the majority of long-
serving members were set. This has been recognised in the modernised firefighters scheme 
and the Commission’s view is that the NPA in this scheme, 60, should be seen as setting a 
benchmark for the uniformed services as a whole. This position will need to be kept under 
regular review to make sure it is still appropriate, given future changes in life expectancy 
projections and experience of healthy life expectancy. 
Recommendation: The key design features contained in this report should apply to all public 
service pension schemes. The exception is in the case of the uniformed services where the 
NPA should be set to reflect the unique characteristics of the work involved. The Government 
should therefore consider setting a new NPA of 60 across the uniformed services, where 
the NPA is currently below this level in these schemes, and keep this under regular review 
(Recommendation 14).
5.25 However, where future deferred members of the current uniformed services schemes 
already have a NPA of 65 it seems appropriate to link their NPA to the SPA in the new 
schemes, as suggested for the majority of public service schemes in Chapter 4. As SPA might 
reasonably be viewed as when someone could be expected to end their working life. 
12 Ministerial written answer, Hansard HC Deb, 9 November 2010, c200W.
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Variations across the UK Government Administrations
5.26 Although pensions policy, including public service pensions policy, is set at a national 
level, a number of the public service pension schemes are the responsibility of the Devolved 
Administrations rather than the UK Government. There has been scope for some variations 
in terms to meet local circumstances, but the resulting pension schemes have essentially 
been the same as those established by the UK Government. That has, for example, helped to 
prevent pension terms becoming an obstacle to transfers of staff and skills within a sector of 
the public service. It seems reasonable to continue with this approach. 
5.27 The key design features should be part of a UK-wide policy framework that extends to 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, with limited adaptations of other features to meet 
local circumstances. 
Impact on retention
5.28 The Commission recognises that there will be a need to deal with specific recruitment 
and retention requirements that vary within and between workforce groups over time 
and that cannot, and should not, be dealt with through the common design framework 
recommended in this report. 
5.29 The Commission’s view is that major variations in job demands and management 
needs for particular recruitment and retention effects should usually be reflected in pay 
and allowances, including lump sums payable after some years’ service, rather than special 
pension terms. Many such retention and reward incentives already exist and are usually 
more flexible than pensions. They can also be tailored more easily and quickly to reflect 
necessary skills, changes in the ages and backgrounds of new entrants  and any special, often 
temporary, demands. However, because offering up-front pay and lump sums instead of 
higher pensions in future can bring spending forward, it would be necessary to manage any 
change carefully.
Funding and local government pensions
5.30 The interim report13 recognised that the Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS) 
is in a different position to other very large public service schemes because it is funded, so 
contributions for employers and employees are invested and pensions are paid out of the 101 
different LGPS Funds across the UK. 
5.31 That requires some differences in how the scheme is managed. However, as the interim 
report also noted,14 the LGPS provides a similar set of final salary-based benefits to unfunded 
13 IPSPC (2010) Interim Report, paragraph 4.76.
14 IPSPC (2010) Interim Report, paragraph 4.94.
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schemes. There are overlaps in coverage with unfunded schemes, which sometimes cover 
similar workforces or other employees of an employer who also employs LGPS members.
5.32 The assessment of variations between and within schemes in this report seems to bear 
out that the LGPS membership shares many features with other schemes. For example, 
the members on average or higher earnings are comparable to those in other schemes and 
although the LGPS has a higher proportion of part-time, lower earning members, there are 
also many such members in schemes, for example, the civil service and NHS schemes. 
Recommendation: The common design features laid out in this report should also apply 
to the LGPS (Recommendation 15a).
5.33 The core benefits package would therefore apply to the LGPS as to unfunded 
schemes, with variation in the remuneration package mostly being handled through pay and 
allowances. 15 
5.34 On the issue of whether schemes should be funded or unfunded, the interim report 
suggested that it was reasonable, on balance, for government to structure public service 
pension provision on a mainly unfunded basis.16 Funding is not needed to safeguard 
statutory benefit promises backed by the taxpayer and effective, transparent long-term 
fiscal planning can be used to help manage risks. This is discussed further in Chapter 6. It 
is doubtful whether increasing government taxation or explicit borrowing to invest monies 
in pension funds would lead to higher economic growth. Funding schemes through gilt 
issuance would probably result in an increase in the cost of government borrowing and there 
would be investment management costs and risks if the schemes moved to a funded basis. 
And, as the interim report noted,17 the transitional cash flow effect of moving to funded 
pensions could be £20 billion or more a year for many years.
5.35 However, the interim report also suggested that the current LGPS should continue on 
a funded basis.18 One issue that the Commission subsequently considered was that whether 
it might be possible to consider moving to an unfunded basis for future LGPS service at the 
point that the reform package recommended in this report was implemented. That would 
then mean that, for future service, the LGPS might be managed like the unfunded police 
and firefighters schemes that are also administered by local government. 
15 Most of the processes for assessing future and past costs and long-term sustainability and employee contributions 
would also be comparable to those in unfunded schemes. For example, there would need to be a transparent 
consolidation of valuation information across the LGPS, key assumptions that were provided and used on a consistent 
basis across schemes, assuming that investment risk were to be excluded from the LGPS fixed cost envelopes, and 
negotiation and consultation on implementing the results. Such processes were underway in planning for cap and share, 
as discussed in Chapter 2 of the interim report.
16 IPSPC (2010) Interim report, paragraph 4.74.
17 IPSPC (2010) Interim report, paragraph 4.73.
18 IPSPC (2010) Interim report, paragraph 4.93.
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5.36 That approach could provide some additional cash for central government in the short 
to medium term and would eventually remove the annual fund investment management 
costs of around £300 million. However, it would also increase the deficits across the LGPS 
funds (as they would no longer get the employer and employee contributions) and the 
resulting pressures would need to be made good by government at some stage. Also around a 
quarter of LGPS members are not employees of local authorities;19 this approach would place 
these members into an unfunded scheme. 
Recommendation: It remains appropriate for the Government to maintain the different 
financing arrangements for the LGPS in future, so the LGPS remains funded and the other 
major schemes remain unfunded (Recommendation 15b).
Access to public service pension schemes 
5.37 In recent years, there has been a drive to encourage alternative models of public service 
delivery. This has led to services that were traditionally delivered by the public sector being 
increasingly delivered by outside bodies. This trend is likely to continue, as the current 
Government is interested in pursuing opportunities for increasing the involvement of the 
private sector, voluntary sector and mutual organisations in the delivery of public services.
5.38 The Commission, in its interim report,20 raised some of the issues related to this 
plurality of public service provision, particularly in relation to the Fair Deal policy. Since 
then, the Government has established reviews of Fair Deal and the discount rate, which will 
examine the issues we raised in more detail. In this section we will review current scheme 
membership arrangements and their implications.
Overview of current scheme membership details
5.39 The Commission has worked closely with the largest public service pension schemes 
to understand the landscape of their membership. Whilst this has produced useful and 
informative data, there have been gaps in the availability of data and notable differences 
in the amount of data available between the schemes. This has complicated comparisons 
between the schemes and has made it harder to achieve a full understanding of the 
membership landscape. In future, the Commission believes there is a need for schemes’ 
membership information to be systematically collected and readily accessible, given the 
potential implications for government.
5.40 Table 5.A below sets out the UK-wide headline membership information we have 
received across the local government, NHS, and teachers schemes. We have concentrated on 
19 They are mostly private sector employees but some are employed by other public sector employers. 
20 IPSPC (2010) Interim report, paragraph 6.20.
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these because they are the largest public service pension schemes with significant non-public 
service membership.
Table 5.A: Headline membership information for some of the largest 
public service pension schemesa
Scheme Total 
number of 
employers
Number of 
admitted 
organisations
Members
in whole 
scheme 
(million)b
Members 
in an 
admitted 
body (%)
Total active 
membership 
for whole 
scheme (%)
Average 
membership 
per 
employer
LGPS 7,942 6,3832 4.8 23.4c 41 609
NHS 10,506 453 2.7 1.9 55 258
TPSd 2,870 1,421e 1.7 6.3f 34 608
Source: IPSPC analysis of scheme data returns.
a Total and average membership figures include deferred and pensioner members.
b Total non-local government employers, including scheduled bodies.
c Total non-local government employers, including scheduled bodies.
d Information relates to teachers’ last period of service. Some teachers will have moved between sectors during their careers 
(particularly the independent and local authority sectors) and some deferred TPS members and pensioners may have worked 
in independent schools that are no longer within the scheme.
e Independent schools.
f Independent schools.
5.41 Of all public service pension schemes, the LGPS has the largest membership at 4.8 
million and the highest number of additional organisations, with more than 6,000 non-local 
authority bodies in the scheme. This includes organisations from the private and voluntary 
sectors, as well as a range of public sector bodies such as housing associations, fire authorities, 
police authorities, colleges and universities. Almost 25 per cent of LGPS members belong 
to bodies other than local authorities; these organisations are generally smaller than local 
authorities, with an average membership (including deferred and pensioner members) of 
177, compared to 2,375 in local authorities (a figure that is in itself reduced by the inclusion 
of many small town and parish councils). Active membership in these bodies is 45 per cent, 
slightly higher than the overall active membership of 41 per cent for the whole scheme. 
The LGPS is the only scheme that operates a shorter vesting period21 of three months 
(most public service pension schemes have a two-year vesting period), which increases the 
proportion of deferred members compared with active members.
5.42 The NHS scheme has a much smaller proportion of admitted organisations (Direction 
Bodies), comprising 4 per cent of employers and 2 per cent of members. The scheme also 
includes over 9,500 self-employed General Practitioner (GP) practices, with an average of 
20 If members leave the employment during the vesting period they will receive a contribution refund or a transfer value 
but they do not have the right to become a deferred member.
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8 members in the NHS scheme. Direction Bodies themselves have an average membership 
of 116. Overall, the NHS scheme has the highest proportion of current active members 
amongst the three public service pension schemes in Table 5.A, at 55 per cent. The level of 
active membership within Direction Bodies (54 per cent) is in line with the scheme’s overall 
average.
5.43 In contrast the TPS has the lowest overall proportion of current active members, at 34 
per cent. There is a much higher proportion of active membership in Scotland (51 per cent) 
and Northern Ireland (47 per cent) than in England & Wales (33 per cent). There are more 
than 1,400 independent schools in the scheme, with an average of 77 members (including 
deferred and pensioner members). The level of active membership within independent 
schools (44 per cent) is 10 per cent higher than the level of active membership for the 
scheme as a whole.
5.44 It is worth noting that there is likely to be some double counting in these numbers. 
For example, there may be some double counting in employer numbers because employees 
of the same organisation can be members of different schemes; teachers in local authority 
schools are members of the TPS but teaching assistants and support staff are members of the 
LGPS, to give just one example. 
5.45 The Commission believes that the landscape presented here is the most comprehensive 
produced to date but more would need to be done to understand the full membership 
picture of public service pension schemes. In the future, it would be helpful for government 
to have a complete breakdown of the membership of these schemes, in particular in relation 
to the precise level of membership from employees in the private sector. 
Overview of current scheme membership arrangements
5.46 Some public service pension schemes have long histories of extending their access to 
non-public service employees, but this extension of access has not happened consistently 
across the schemes. 
5.47 As noted earlier, the LGPS has the highest number of additional organisations of 
any public service pension scheme. There are more than 6,000 such bodies in the LGPS 
scheme, covering 23.4 per cent of LGPS members. These include contractors that take on 
local authority services (transferee admission bodies), charities and non-profit organisations 
(community admission bodies) and a range of other public sector organisations. Admitted 
bodies may be required to provide the scheme with an indemnity or bond, if they are 
considered to be at heightened risk of defaulting on their pension commitments. They are 
also likely to be charged a higher contribution rate than a local authority (because their 
pension liabilities are typically funded over the shorter contract period) and the participation 
terms (including any risk-sharing mechanism) will depend on the terms of their admission 
agreement. 
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5.48 The teachers scheme also includes a wide range of organisations, almost 3,000 across 
the UK, including local authorities, higher and further education establishments, academies 
and independent schools.22 There are more than 1,400 independent schools, covering just 
over 6 per cent of the membership. Independent schools do not receive funding from 
government. It is believed that the majority of independent schools are within the private 
sector and also hold charitable status. Independent schools are required to provide evidence 
of a financial guarantee, indemnity or bond to be accepted into the scheme. All teachers 
employed by academies automatically become members of the TPS, unless they have elected 
to opt out of the scheme. Non-teaching staff (including teaching assistants) employed by 
local authority schools are members of the LGPS, but other teaching employers will often 
make different pension arrangements for their non-teaching staff.
5.49 The NHS scheme includes the staff of Direction Bodies,23 which are additional 
organisations approved to join the scheme by the Secretary of State. Under current policy, 
Direction Bodies are not allowed to be profit-making and in the majority of cases non-NHS 
work carried out by staff cannot be pensioned. The NHS scheme also includes self-employed 
GPs and their staff, as well as Dental Practitioners. As noted earlier, Direction Bodies make 
up a smaller proportion of additional organisations than the teachers and local government 
schemes. However, it is also worth noting that 91 per cent of scheme employers are self-
employed GP practices.
Implications of access rules on public finances
5.50 The membership of the major public service pension schemes has expanded over time, 
responding pragmatically to changing circumstances. This has resulted in a variety of people 
and organisations entering the schemes that was not always envisaged when those schemes 
were set up, including a significant number of private sector employers and staff.
5.51 This expansion has happened inconsistently. Different professions within the same 
organisation can be members of different schemes and different organisations within the 
same sector can be members of different schemes.
5.52 Increasing access to public service pension schemes has had practical benefits, in terms 
of enabling non-public sector organisations to take over public sector functions, services and 
transferred staff. As a result, there are now many public service pension scheme members 
who do not work within the public sector.
5.53 There are clear pros and cons to allowing access to public service pension schemes. 
In terms of advantages, enabling access helps to remove the pensions barrier for external 
contractors with in-house services. This can enable more transparent contract prices, as bids 
can focus on the costs of service delivery rather than pension provision. Enabling access 
22 Registered under Section 161 of the 2002 Education Act.
23 The direction is made on a case-by-case basis by the Secretary of State, under Section 7 of the Superannuation 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1967.
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can facilitate the transfer of staff to new employers and can also maintain the cash flow of 
contributions into schemes, which is particularly important for the unfunded schemes.
5.54 However, there are also clear disadvantages to enabling access, as it increases the 
Government’s risk of taking on liabilities for a workforce that it does not control. By 
allowing external organisations into public service pension schemes, the Government is 
at risk from the financial consequences of those organisations failing, awarding excessive 
pay rises, being unable to pay their exit fees when they leave schemes or of them paying 
insufficient contributions whilst they are in the scheme for the long-term liabilities that their 
members accrue.24
5.55 Given that the Government is keen to extend alternative models of public service 
delivery, the issues related to public service pension scheme access are likely to be of 
relevance to an increasing number of people and organisations in the years ahead. 
5.56 As mentioned above, since the publication of the Commission’s interim report the 
Government has announced reviews of the Fair Deal policy and the discount rate, which are 
relevant to many of the issues discussed here. The Commission expects that the outcome of 
these reviews would, at least in part, help to facilitate the Government’s aim for increased 
plurality of provision for public services. 
5.57 A redefined public service pension scheme framework, as laid out in this report, 
including a move to schemes based on career average revalued earnings, should over time 
also help to remove some of the barriers to plurality of service provision. 
5.58 It is ultimately for the Government to decide how much long-term pensions risk it is 
willing to bear in order to meet its wider policy objectives. However, it is clear that enabling 
access to public service pension schemes for non-public service workers does increase the 
long-term risk government bears in relation to those schemes.
Recommendation: It is in principle undesirable for future non-public service workers to 
have access to public service pension schemes, given the increased long-term risk this places 
on the Government and taxpayers (Recommendation 16).
5.59 The issues concerning access to public service pension schemes are complex and wide-
ranging. Enabling access to public service pension schemes has clear pros and cons and it will 
ultimately be for the Government to consider how best to address these issues, in the light of 
its wider policy priorities.
24 Although it should be noted that some schemes have rules in place to mitigate these risks.
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6 A transparent and effective system
Box 6.A: Summary 
 • The publication of public service pension scheme data is inconsistent and this hinders 
effective monitoring and analysis. All public service pension schemes should regularly 
publish data which, as far as possible, is produced to common standards and 
methodologies and is then collated centrally. This information should be of a quality that 
allows simple comparisons to be made across government, between schemes and between 
individual Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS) Funds.
 • Governance arrangements for public service pension schemes vary considerably. All scheme 
members deserve to know that their scheme is being properly run and every public service 
pension scheme (and individual LGPS Fund) should have a properly constituted, trained and 
competent Pension Board, with member nominees, responsible for meeting good standards 
of governance, including effective and efficient administration. There should also be a 
pension policy group for each scheme at national level, for considering major changes to 
scheme rules.
 • Communication with scheme members is considered crucial in improving general pension 
knowledge and in promoting a sense of pension ‘ownership’. All public service pension 
schemes should issue regular benefit statements to active scheme members, at least 
annually and without being requested and promote the use of information technology (IT)
for providing information to members and employers.
 • Governance and the availability and transparency of information would be improved 
by government establishing a framework that ensures independent oversight of the 
governance, administration and data transparency of public service pension schemes. 
Government should consider which body or bodies, including for example, The Pensions 
Regulator, is most suitable to perform this role. 
 • When assessing the long term sustainability of public finances it is important that the 
impact of public service pensions is subjected to closer scrutiny than is currently the case. 
The Office for Budget Responsibility should provide a regular published analysis of the long 
term fiscal impact of the main public service pension schemes (including the funded LGPS).
 • Managing investment funds is an additional aspect of pension scheme governance for the 
funded LGPS schemes. Currently the funding and investment strategies are too narrowly 
focused on the individual Funds rather than on the overall sustainability of the LGPS. 
Centrally collated comprehensive data, covering all LGPS Funds, should be published 
including Fund comparisons, which, for example, clarify and compare key assumptions 
about investment growth and differences in deficit recovery plans.
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Box 6.A (continued): Summary 
 • Good administration is essential if pension schemes are to be run well. Many schemes seem 
to be, but costs vary significantly and meaningful comparisons are hampered by a lack of 
defined standard outputs. Government should set what good standards of administration 
should consist of in the public service pension schemes based on independent expert 
advice. The Pensions Regulator might have a role, building on its objective to promote good 
administration. A benchmarking exercise should then be conducted across all the schemes 
to help raise standards where appropriate. 
 • New initiatives to save costs by sharing administrative services and contracts are being 
trialled by a number of LGPS authorities across the UK. Central and local government 
should closely monitor the benefits associated with the current co-operative projects within 
the LGPS, with a view to encouraging the extension of this approach, if appropriate, across 
all local authorities. Government should also examine closely the potential for the unfunded 
public service schemes to realise greater efficiencies in the administration of pensions by 
sharing contracts and combining support services, including considering outsourcing.
 • The current public service pension schemes are established under a variety of legislative 
arrangements. In order to provide greater transparency, simplicity and certainty, the 
Government should introduce primary legislation to adopt a new common UK legal 
framework for public service schemes.
The need for change
6.1 In its interim report1 the Commission noted that the debate around public service 
pensions is hampered by a lack of consensus on key facts and figures and a lack of readily 
available and relevant data. There are also inconsistent standards of governance across the 
schemes. Consequently it is difficult for scheme members, taxpayers and commentators to 
be confident that schemes are being effectively and efficiently run. It also makes it more 
difficult to compare between and within schemes and to identify and apply best practice for 
managing and improving schemes. 
6.2 This chapter looks at the current arrangements for the overall governance, 
administration and financial management of public service pension schemes, including the 
publication of data, comparing these where appropriate with the arrangements for private 
sector occupational pension schemes. It recommends improvements which the Commission 
believes will help improve both trust and confidence in the way the schemes are managed. 
6.3 The legal and regulatory framework that applies in the private sector would not be 
appropriate for the public service given, for example, the statutory roles of Secretaries of 
State and others and the effective underwriting of unfunded and funded public service 
1 IPSPC (2010) Interim report, paragraph 7.2.
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pension promises by the State. However, there seems no good reason why the main 
principles and some of the best practice of the private sector should not also be applied in 
the public services. The Government might also consider whether such changes should be 
framed by new overarching primary legislation, which would replace provisions such as the 
Superannuation Act 1972.
Governance
Current governance arrangements for public service pension 
schemes
6.4 Currently the governance arrangements for public service pension schemes vary 
considerably with some schemes having structures in place that are as good as benchmarked 
examples in the private sector, whilst others are not yet to this standard. There are various 
categories of governance structures at present, which can broadly be categorised as unfunded 
and centrally administered, unfunded and locally administered and funded and locally 
administered. These are described in Table 6.A.
Table 6.A: Types of governance structures for public service pension 
schemes
Unfunded centrally 
administered e.g. 
teachers, NHS, armed 
forces
Unfunded locally 
administered i.e. police 
& firefighters
Funded locally administered i.e. 
LGPS 
The appropriate Secretary 
of State or Minister is 
legally responsible for the 
scheme and sets policy 
and rules, but delegates 
the day to day running 
to an Accounting Officer, 
accountable to Parliament.a 
Some schemes have a 
pension board or group.
The relevant Secretary 
of State (Home Affairs 
and Communities and 
Local Government)b is 
responsible for the scheme, 
but local police and fire 
authorities administer the 
schemes.
The Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government 
(or equivalent for Devolved 
Administrations)c is responsible for 
the scheme. Each local authority 
responsible for a Fund is required to 
appoint an officer responsible for 
pension administration. The majority 
of Funds have a pensions committee 
overseeing investments. 
Source: IPSPC.
a There are equivalent arrangements for schemes run by Devolved Administrations. In Northern Ireland the Department 
of Finance and Personnel appoints the Accounting Officers who are responsible to the Northern Ireland Assembly. In 
Scotland, Ministers have devolved responsibility for five public service schemes; the day to day running is delegated to an 
appropriate Accountable Officer. 
b ibid.
c ibid.
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6.5 There are a great variety of governance arrangements in the public service pension 
schemes. Some unfunded schemes have governance groups which look at scheme pressures 
and reform proposals in detail, while others have bodies for negotiating rule changes which 
do not involve the same level of detailed scrutiny. These groups and bodies include employee 
representation. Such governance and negotiating groups can only be advisory on matters of 
policy as the relevant Secretary of State is responsible for policy and for setting scheme rules 
and is ultimately accountable to Parliament for policy decisions.
6.6  However, only one unfunded scheme, the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme 
(PSCPS), has a formal pension board, responsible for managing the scheme in accordance 
with its governing legislation and rules and for the stewardship of the resources it consumes.
6.7 The Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS) has a range of local pension 
committees which consider various matters, including local discretions under national 
scheme rules and investments, but these do not have the legal status of trusts. At present 
their fiduciary duty for the Fund monies is to taxpayers rather than to members and other 
beneficiaries (as it would be in a trust based scheme) and overall responsibility for the 
scheme lies with the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government.2 The Policy 
Review Group for England and Wales run by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) considers possible changes to rules.
6.8 This position, for both the unfunded schemes and the funded LGPS, contrasts with 
trust based funded schemes in the private and public sector. These are required by law to 
have a board of trustees, usually consisting of a fixed number of members (management; 
nominees of employees and pensioners; and independents). These are required to have 
knowledge of their scheme (often involving training), meet regularly and oversee pension 
administration. 
6.9 Ultimately the board of trustees is legally responsible for the operation of the scheme, 
including effective administration of benefit payments and communications with members, 
the investment of scheme assets, setting appropriate funding principles and plans to recover 
deficits and ensuring adequate internal controls are in place. The scheme rules are set out 
in a trust deed, but the powers to amend this deed and the roles of employer and trustees 
in making amendments vary considerably from scheme to scheme. While there are valid 
reasons for the difference between the governance models of the public and private sectors, 
lessons can be learned from the trustee model. 
Establishing good governance 
6.10 The current arrangements described above mean that there is sometimes no clear 
separation of duties between those responsible for policy changes, for the governance of 
the schemes and the delivery of administration. For example, between those charged with 
2 Or equivalent Minister in the Devolved Administrations.
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setting the scheme’s rules, those who oversee the schemes and their financing and those who 
implement changes in scheme rules and handle other administrative tasks. 
6.11 Some of these responsibilities fall to departments running schemes, some to employers 
and some to contractors. This can lead to a lack of transparency and clarity (for members 
and the public) as to who is responsible for what, which in turn can confuse lines of 
responsibility and accountability. To provide greater clarity, avoid conflicts of interest and 
help increase the focus on efficiency and effectiveness there needs to be clear separation 
between these roles. 
6.12 Evidence presented to the Commission3 (both in the second call for evidence and 
in stakeholder roundtables) suggested that where there currently are boards, groups or 
committees, members of public service pension schemes (both funded and unfunded, 
centrally run and locally administered) are sometimes not formally represented, for 
example, by nominees specifically elected by the members. In some cases representatives 
of the workforce covered by the scheme, such as union officials, sit on formal governance 
or negotiating groups, but schemes vary greatly in this and in the extent to which there is 
formal member involvement.
6.13 But there are examples of good practice, for example, the majority of local authorities 
have some form of member representation in their governance arrangements. In November 
2008 DCLG issued statutory guidance to local authorities administering pension schemes 
requiring them to publish governance compliance statements grading themselves against 
17 criteria, ranging from the structure of and representation on their pensions committee 
through to frequency of meetings, voting rights and the training of members. A DCLG 
survey found that 96 per cent of the 89 local authorities in England and Wales classify 
themselves as compliant with that guidance. The 2010 annual survey of LGPS funds 
conducted by the National Association of Pension Funds has found that about 90 per cent 
of Funds have a LGPS member or a trades union representative on their main pension 
committee.4 
6.14 However, it seems that only a minority of member representatives have full voting 
rights. UNISON submitted evidence to the Commission that by, 2009, only seven of the 
89 England and Wales Fund authorities had allowed voting by scheme members of pension 
committees. This difference reflects current limitations on Committee members’ roles, for 
example, where democratically elected councillors are responsible for individual Funds. 
But there does seem to be some room for improvement in this area; without a standard 
requirement for member representation members may not feel adequately involved in 
decisions concerning their pension scheme. 
 
3 See Annex D.
4 NAPF Annual Survey 2010 consisting of 24 Local Government Pension Schemes. 
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Recommendation: Every public service pension scheme (and individual LGPS Fund) should have 
a properly constituted, trained and competent Pension Board, with member nominees, 
responsible for meeting good standards of governance, including effective and efficient 
administration (Recommendation 17a). 
6.15 The Commission believes scheme members in all the public services should be able 
to nominate persons to pension boards and committees along similar lines to the rights 
of members in the private sector to nominate persons to sit on boards of trustees. Pension 
boards should therefore include independent professionals and scheme members in similar 
proportions as apply in the private sector to boards of trustees.5 It is also very important that 
as well as the ‘lay persons’ there are also independent members, usually professionally trained 
and with experience of the pensions environment. 
6.16 Good board member appointments and behaviours are arguably more important 
than board structures and much can be learned from good examples, both in the public and 
private sectors. There will need to be coherent policies on the appointment of members. It 
will be crucial to the success of pension boards that members have appropriate training and 
that employers help board members to commit enough time to their duties. Clear guidance 
will be required for members of pension boards on their role and duties. They would fulfil 
similar duties to trustees, acting in accordance with scheme rules, impartially and prudently, 
balancing the interests of scheme beneficiaries and of taxpayers. There will be a need for 
effective committee structures to facilitate sound decision making and strong oversight of 
scheme administrators and fund managers. 
6.17 It will be important that measures are put in place to ensure clear separation of duties 
and the avoidance of conflicts of interest by the members of the pension board.
6.18 The Commission recognises that progress has been made in the area of governance 
structures across the centrally and the locally managed schemes. Two examples of how some 
improvements have been delivered so far are set out below: the first covers the introduction 
of a formal pension board to an unfunded scheme, the PCSPS, shown at Box 6.B; the 
second describes the governance arrangements for a local funded scheme, the London 
Pension Fund Authority and is shown at Box 6.C. 
5 The Pensions Act 2004 stipulates that all trustee administered pension schemes should have a minimum of one-third of 
trustees nominated by members of the scheme. 
127
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report - 10 March 2011
Box 6.B: Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme (PCSPS) Governance 
The PCSPS covers over 200 employers and has 1.5 million members. Following a review of 
PCSPS administration, the Cabinet Office has transformed administration arrangements and 
governance, adopting best practice in the private sector, where possible. 
A twelve member Scheme Management Board was set up in April 2010 chaired at Permanent 
Secretary level with four members’ representatives, four representatives from scheme employers, 
one representative of central government (HM Treasury) and two (non-voting) non-executive 
members who chair the Board’s Risk and Operations Committees. All Board members were 
selected on the basis of having relevant experience in areas such as finance and human 
resources. 
The Board’s terms of reference specify its role as:
 • managing the Scheme in accordance with the relevant legislation and rules;
 • developing and managing a risk management framework and internal controls system; and
 • oversight of the Scheme administrator.
As Scheme Manager (with responsibilities akin to a trustee board for a private sector scheme) 
the Board reports to the Head of the Civil Service, who is the Accounting Officer and is in turn 
responsible to the Secretary of State and ultimately to Parliament. The Board oversees improved 
service for members while at the same time providing reassurance to employers, and ultimately 
the taxpayers who fund those employers, that the Scheme’s administration gives value for 
money. 
The Board is supported by an executive that manages relationships with the Scheme 
administrators and the employers covered by the Scheme. The executive has participation 
agreements in place with each employer, which set out their responsibility to provide accurate 
data and the right financial contributions to the Scheme.
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Box 6.C: London Pension Fund Authority (LPFA) Pension Board
The LPFA is a statutory body, with a local authority’s powers in relation to the LGPS, although 
unlike almost all other LGPS Funds it has been set up independent of direct local political control. 
It has over 200 employing authorities and 73,000 members. The LPFA has a constitutional 
document setting out a formal governance structure of its pension board and committees.
The LPFA Pension Board Chairman and Vice Chairman are appointed by the Mayor of London 
and are independent of the employers covered by the fund. The Mayor appoints a further nine 
board members following public advertisement, five of which are subject to consultation with 
representatives of London local government. The aim is to have a mix of board members with a 
variety of skills including investment management, business, pensions finance, local government 
finance, general management and corporate social responsibility.
The Board regularly meets and reviews its strategic objectives for the medium term, including the 
investment strategy. The Board delegates business to its committees which review investments, 
performance, administration and auditing. In addition, a remuneration committee and an 
urgency committee meet on an ad hoc basis as required. For example, the Board sets the overall 
investment policy and strategy of the Fund and the investment committee is responsible for 
implementation, including the appointment of Fund managers and monitoring the performance 
of the Fund and of investment managers against targets.
Regular newsletters are sent to all members and all employers. Annual forums are held for Fund 
members and employers. A Fund member panel has been established and is invited to attend 
each board meeting. A formal panel meeting is held after the Board with board members and 
senior officers in attendance. There is also an employer panel with similar arrangements.
6.19 The introduction of new governance arrangements would not diminish the role of 
the responsible government minister who will remain legally responsible and in overall 
control of each scheme, or that of the formally appointed accounting officers for schemes, 
nor, for LGPS Funds, would it replace the statutory administering authority6 responsible 
for implementing ministers’ policies and regulations. This reflects the point that these 
pension promises are backed by the State, and therefore taxpayers, and that the legislative 
and executive arms of government should retain overall responsibility for public finance and 
expenditure. 
6.20 A diagram showing the responsibilities that the public service pension boards would be 
expected to perform is shown at Box 6.D.
6 The Fund is usually controlled by locally elected councillors.
129
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report - 10 March 2011
Box 6.D: Proposed governance arrangements for scheme 
administration
Source: IPSPC.
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6.21 The Pension Board would focus on the implications of administering pension scheme 
rules. However, even if all schemes have a pension board in future, there will still be a need 
for separate pension policy groups to consider at national level major changes to scheme 
rules and the value of the pension scheme to the membership. As noted in paragraph 6.5 
above, many schemes have such groups or bodies.7 These tend to be established as part of 
the consultation and negotiation machinery for handling pensions as an element of the 
remuneration package and to have member and employer representation as appropriate.8 The 
Government should introduce such groups for the schemes that do not have them. All policy 
review groups should ensure that information about key proposals for change and related 
costs is publicly available. 
Recommendation: There should also be a pension policy group for each scheme at national 
level, for considering major changes to scheme rules (Recommendation 17b).
Locally administered schemes
6.22 The Commission does not propose rationalising governance and administration of 
local schemes through moving to wholly national arrangements, instead advocating greater 
co-ordination and collaboration consistent with retaining local identity and accountability. 
There would be some efficiency to be gained from putting the locally run schemes (the 
LGPS, police and firefighters schemes) fully on a national basis, so that they were run 
in the way that the scheme for locally-employed teachers in England and Wales is run. 
However, the Commission recognises that such a potential change raises issues to do with 
local accountability and the role of democratically elected local government representatives, 
which goes beyond consideration of good governance for pension schemes. Equivalent 
considerations apply to the separate schemes run by Devolved Administrations, such as the 
schemes for NHS staff in Scotland and in Northern Ireland.
6.23 Neither does the Commission advocate a uniform governance model in terms of the 
way responsibilities are allocated within the updated governance structures. The Commission 
has been given examples of best practice in pension scheme governance and evidence of how 
different schemes have established their governance structures and it is clear that a variety of 
different models operate across the public service schemes to good effect. 
6.24 However, where schemes with nationally determined rules are administered locally, as 
is the case for the LGPS, police and firefighters schemes, there is a case for supplementing 
local pension boards with a national pension board for each scheme separate from the 
individual local authorities and employers. The locally administered schemes are a hybrid of 
7 There are, for example, such groups for most of the very big schemes: NHS and Civil Service Pension Scheme 
Governance Groups; a Teachers Pensions Committee; the Police Negotiating Body; the Fire Pensions Committee; and the 
LGPS Policy Review Group. 
8 In some cases these groups operate separately from the remuneration negotiations between employer representatives 
and members.
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nationally set statutory scheme rules, subject to a minor amount of local discretion and local 
management. 
6.25 It would be for the Government to decide how they would be set up, for example, 
whether this would be under the Department responsible for the scheme’s rules or another 
body. These national pensions boards might build on existing arrangements such as operated 
by the Local Government Association and the Local Government Employers organisation 
for the LGPS in England and Wales.
6.26 The role of national pensions boards in respect of the locally administered schemes 
would be facilitative. While not taking on a regulatory or oversight role national pensions 
boards might help analyse and recommend on comparative performance of governance 
and administration. They might point to the scope for efficiencies in those areas that raise 
standards across the piece. In the case of the LGPS, their national pensions board could 
also look at overall funding and the comparative performance of individual Funds, fostering 
links between different individual LGPS Funds and perhaps making recommendations on 
opportunities to capture efficiencies and to improve investment performance. The boards 
could include nominees of individual scheme members and employers as well as those 
responsible for national scheme rules and local financing.
Transparency 
Communication with scheme members 
6.27  Not all schemes communicate with active members on a regular basis. Currently 
defined contribution schemes are required to provide members with an annual benefit 
statement which shows a statutory money purchase illustration, based on a number of 
assumptions, projecting a possible income in retirement. However, almost all public service 
pension schemes are defined benefit and defined benefit schemes are formally required to 
provide a statement only if the member requests one.9 
6.28 Some public service schemes do provide annual statements that may show information 
such as a projected annual pension and lump sum if the member retires10 at their Normal 
Pension Age (NPA), or had died or retired on ill health grounds, or otherwise took a pension 
around the date the statement was produced. But some schemes do not provide regular 
statements to members. 
6.29 The Commission considers that regular updates to scheme members regarding pension 
benefits earned to date and forward projections of pensions are crucial in improving general 
pension education and in promoting a sense of personal ownership of pension benefits. 
9 The Personal Pension Schemes (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 1987 and the Occupational Pension Schemes 
(Disclosure of information) Regulations 1996. 
10 This may be based on same level of pensionable pay that would be used to calculate an immediate pension award but 
assuming that level continues in future. 
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Statements could also usefully include member and employer contribution rates. The 
information in statements should be clear and as easy to understand as possible. 
Recommendation: All public service pension schemes should issue regular benefit 
statements to active scheme members, at least annually and without being requested and 
promote the use of information technology (IT) for providing information to members and 
employers (Recommendation 18).
6.30 Some public service pension schemes provide pension calculators which allow scheme 
members to access information via web-sites. Such calculators can be used to provide 
estimates of their pensions at specific career or age points, which can, for example, be useful 
when someone is considering retiring early or working beyond their normal pension age. 
6.31 The Commission welcomes the increasing use of technology, such as web-sites, the 
provision of online pension calculators and the provision of annual statements electronically 
to members if they wish. It should become standard to utilise a variety of channels to 
communicate pension scheme information to members and employers, in addition to 
paper-based methods. Government should promote the use of IT to assist members in 
understanding their pension entitlements and retirement options.
6.32 Those running individual LGPS Funds should also provide details of Fund investments 
and performance to scheme members.
Publication of scheme data
6.33 Scheme members, the public, Parliament11 and commentators should be able to access 
scheme data easily to enable them to determine the performance, viability and key facts 
associated with the different schemes. However, the Commission has concluded that at 
present the availability of such data is at best patchy: some key data is not available, at least 
not publicly.12 This needs to be improved. 
6.34 Currently the various schemes, local administrators and others such as HM Treasury, 
the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), 
publish different information in reports, accounts, valuations and statistical compilations. 
Departments responsible for individual schemes and also individual local authorities do 
publish reports containing some information on public web-sites. However, there is no 
central, publicly available, depository of information to enable comparisons between schemes 
or individual administrators, e.g. between administration costs, membership profiles and (in 
respect of the LGPS) return on investments.
11 Including Parliaments and Assemblies for the Devolved Administrations.
12 IPSPC (2010) Interim report, paragraph 7.5.
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6.35 The Government does not at present publish a single set of figures that covers the 
total fiscal impact of public service pension schemes, but instead publishes partial figures on 
differing bases in a variety of places. Equally government does not identify separately the 
total amount of public spending on the LGPS, police or firefighters scheme at national level, 
as, for example, it does with the NHS. This lack of transparency prevents comparisons and 
hinders adequate analysis, which adversely affects the quality of the public debate about the 
future of public service pensions.
6.36 There should be ready access to information which demonstrates that a scheme is 
being well-managed in accordance with the relevant rules and regulations, that it is fully 
compliant with all codes of practice and with other requirements. Full valuation reports 
as well as annual accounts should be published. For the police, firefighters and the LGPS, 
these should cover the position nationally as well as locally and enable comparisons across 
different authorities, for example, between particular aspects of the individual LGPS Funds. 
For funded and unfunded schemes they should also separate government employers and 
admitted bodies and show both the potential membership and actual membership. 
6.37 In the case of the LGPS, this data also needs to include consolidations across all LGPS 
Funds that enable investment performance to be compared over time. Where schemes or 
LGPS Funds necessarily do things differently, either in comparison to each other or to 
private schemes, then this should be explained accordingly.
6.38 Similarly detailed membership data (consistent with data protection requirements) 
might be released regularly and related to the value of prospective and actual pension benefits 
payable.
6.39 Without such overall data on the schemes it is not possible to see the extent of 
challenges and the potential costs of the benefits accruing.
Recommendation: All public service pension schemes should regularly publish data which, 
as far as possible, is produced to common standards and methodologies and is then 
collated centrally. This information should be of a quality that allows simple comparisons 
to be made across Government, between schemes and between individual LGPS Funds 
(Recommendation 6).
Monitoring of ill-health retirement 
6.40 The Commission has seen evidence13 which illustrates that changes in the monitoring 
and design of ill-health pension provisions and measures to avoid and remedy the causes 
of ill-health retirement have led to major reductions in ill-health retirement levels across 
schemes. Examples include: local authority-maintained schools in England and Wales, where 
levels fell from 18 per cent of all retirements in 1997-98 to 3 per cent in 2008-09; and the 
13 Information provided by schemes.
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NHS, where ill-health retirements in England and Wales fell from around 23 per cent of all 
retirements in the mid to late 1990s to around 8 per cent in 2009-10. 
6.41 In the case of police and firefighters, in the late 1990s ill-health retirements represented 
about half of all annual police retirements (13 per 1,000 active members) and about two-
thirds of all annual firefighter retirements (19 per 1,000), whereas the present figures for 
both are between 2 and 3 per 1,000 actives.14 This is a welcome development. However, the 
Commission noted that data, while available, is fragmented and not always comparable. 
6.42 As part of improved transparency of data, the Commission suggests that ill-health 
retirement figures in all public service pension schemes should be collected and published 
on a regular and common basis. This would make it easier for government to systematically 
compare ill-health retirement rates across the major schemes. 
External scrutiny 
6.43 The Commission believes that improved governance, and transparency and accessibility 
of key data, would be assisted by greater external and independent scrutiny of public service 
pension schemes.
6.44  Some form of external scrutiny of public service pension schemes would help 
build trust and confidence of both the members and taxpayers in the running of public 
sector schemes by encouraging schemes to follow common and appropriate standards of 
governance and administration, publish appropriate data and provide an overview of their 
performance. 
6.45 Currently the departments which sponsor particular schemes, such as DCLG for the 
local government and firefighters schemes, Education for the teachers, the Home Office 
for police and Health for the NHS, together with HM Treasury as the lead department for 
public service pensions policy, combine to oversee the performance of public service pension 
schemes. The argument has been put to the Commission that the statutory backing for the 
schemes effectively guarantees that scheme members’ benefits will be paid and therefore 
external scrutiny of public service schemes does not need to be as extensive as The Pensions 
Regulator’s functions in respect of private sector schemes. The Commission agrees with that.
6.46 However, even with this government guarantee to meet the pension promise, there is a 
case for scrutiny of public service pension schemes that is independent of stakeholders with a 
direct interest, such as employers, local councillors and ministers. This scrutiny should cover 
issues such as the service provided to scheme members and the delivery of value for money 
for taxpayers. While some local authorities consider the DCLG as their pension regulator, 
this does not seem appropriate given that best practice advocates the separation of powers. 
Audit Scotland has stated that they would not regard the Scottish Public Pensions Agency 
14 Information provided by schemes.
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(the DCLG’s equivalent in Scotland) as regulators as they have no oversight of pension 
administration or the management of pension funds in the administering authorities.15
Recommendation: Governance and the availability and transparency of information would be 
improved by government establishing a framework that ensures independent oversight 
of the governance, administration and data transparency of public service pension 
schemes. Government should consider which body or bodies, including for example, The 
Pensions Regulator, is most suitable to perform this role (Recommendation 19). 
6.47 This framework should include the requirement for all schemes to meet minimum 
standards of governance and administration. This independent external oversight would 
not replace existing internal and external audit of schemes, including by bodies such as the 
National Audit Office and Audit Scotland. 
Long term sustainability 
6.48 When it comes to assessing the viability of continuing to provide the public service 
pension schemes in future and of financing the cost of past pensions promises, there is a 
need for fiscal policy to take account of the sustainability of such commitments over the long 
term, looking at the schemes’ long term impact on public finances in the context of other 
pressures on public spending.
6.49 Chapter 4 discusses the concept of an overall cost control mechanism, and 
recommends that a cost ceiling be implemented based on measuring cost as a percentage 
of pensionable pay. This cost control is based on the value of benefits accruing within a 
particular period. In addition to monitoring and controlling costs on this basis, it will also be 
important to monitor and make transparent the commitments that have been made and the 
likely implications of these in the future.
6.50 There has, in the last few years, been a focus on net cash movements for the unfunded 
schemes which looks at how much the Exchequer has had to pay centrally to cover pension 
expenditure after allowing for employer and employee pension contributions. However, as 
the interim report noted16,  this is an inherently volatile measure, reflecting changes in the 
balance between active members who contribute to schemes and pensioner members who 
draw benefits. Looking at net cash movements therefore obscures the point that most of 
the contributions come from public monies and the obligations have to be met irrespective 
of whether or not contributions are levied by schemes. As discussed in Chapter 5, it is 
reasonable for government to continue to structure public service pension provision on a 
mainly unfunded basis, but this needs to be done in a fully transparent manner and, as noted 
in paragraph 6.36 above, some improvements could be made.
15 Audit Scotland (2011) The cost of public sector pensions in Scotland. 
16 IPSPC (2010) Interim report, paragraph 4.6.
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6.51 For the funded LGPS, it is arguably easier to assess whether the pension benefits 
promised are sustainable by considering whether the liabilities built up to date are being 
fully covered by the assets held by the Funds and any deficit recovery plans approved by 
the Fund. Relevant information on assets, liabilities and deficits for individual LGPS Funds 
is generated by triennial actuarial funding valuations. However, this information is not 
available at an aggregate national level.17 Although the overall position of the LGPS is due to 
feature in Whole of Government Accounts, it is the funding valuations, not accounting data, 
which affect LGPS contribution rates and council tax. This means that, at present there is no 
independent and publicly available assessment of the likelihood of the LGPS in England and 
Wales eliminating its overall deficit over the long term and the consequences of not doing so. 
That overall deficit is in effect an unfunded liability.
6.52 The Audit Commission made an initial examination of the sustainability of the LGPS 
in its July 2010 information paper, ‘Local government pensions in England’18 and took the 
view that the current approach, with unfunded liabilities being deferred into the future, 
could not continue indefinitely. Following the planned abolition of the Audit Commission, 
it will be necessary for another body to follow up this conclusion. 
6.53  Two measures that could be used to examine sustainability in the public service 
pension schemes are: a measure based on an estimate of total liabilities; or one based on 
a projection of actual gross cash payments to pensioners. The latter option would need to 
consider how, in funded schemes, payments are made out of the individual Funds and so 
the link to Government expenditure is indirect. A liabilities measure represents the value in 
today’s money of all expected future pension payments from benefits that have been built up 
to date. Such measures already exist for schemes and will feed in to Whole of Government 
Accounts. 
6.54 A further version of liabilities for the unfunded schemes is in the process of being 
worked up by the ONS, as part of the updating of the European System of Accounts (ESA) 
within the worldwide System of National Accounts that is due to come into effect from 
2014.19 The UK Government has also been conducting a consultation on the discount 
rate they use for funding valuations, as recommended by the Commission in its interim 
report.20 For a liabilities-based measure of long term sustainability, the OBR might consider 
producing an analysis that includes the discount rate determined following the current 
UK Government consultation as well as other potential rates, including the rate eventually 
adopted for the new ESA. However, the interim report21 concluded that a liabilities measure 
is of limited use when assessing sustainability. 
17 The individual valuation reports are sent to the responsible Minister, so his advisers can check they meet the 
requirements set out in scheme regulations.
18 www.audit-commission.gov.uk/localgov/nationalstudies/localgovpensions/Pages/Default_copy.aspx.
19 There has already been a decision in principle by ESA members to use a long-term fixed discount rate to value the 
pension liabilities, rather than using the annually revised and hence volatile discount rate employed in accounting for 
such pensions, although there has been no decision as yet about the final discount rate to be used. This approach on the 
discount rate is similar to that used now for funding valuations of the unfunded public service schemes.
20 IPSPC (2010) Interim report, paragraphs 4.64-4.66.
21 IPSPC (2010) Interim report, paragraph 4.9.
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6.55  Alternatively, the OBR could seek to build on the long term projections of future 
cash payments to pensioners in the unfunded schemes, which were published from 2004 to 
2009. These plot projected cash payments to pensioners as a percentage of projected nominal 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), using GDP as a proxy for the size of the tax base available 
to finance those payments. In its interim report the Commission argued that looking at 
projected public service pension benefit payments of the unfunded schemes as a percentage 
of GDP is an effective measure of the future cost of those schemes.22 
6.56 As the LGPS is a funded scheme, where benefits are paid from the individual Funds, 
equivalent projections of future payments to pensioners would not represent the impact on 
public finances. Alternative measures would be needed. These might include projected long-
term levels of employer pension contributions, made by the public sector employers within 
the LGPS.23
6.57 Projected cash flows, such as described above, can, for example, capture the potential 
impact of changes in the size and composition of the future workforces covered by schemes 
and can show the direct and indirect fiscal impact. If a liabilities measure were preferred, 
or used to supplement un-discounted figures, the Commission would advise against using 
an annually variable or otherwise volatile discount rate rather than a long term fixed rate. 
However, it would be for the OBR to determine how sustainability should be assessed and it 
need not confine itself to one approach.
6.58 The OBR needs to be empowered to request from appropriate sources whatever data it 
considers necessary to discharge this responsibility. 
Recommendation: When assessing the long term sustainability of the public finances, the 
Office for Budget Responsibility should provide a regular published analysis of the long 
term fiscal impact of the main public service pension schemes (including the funded LGPS) 
(Recommendation 20).
Investment of local government pension monies 
6.59  Managing investment funds is an additional aspect of pension scheme governance 
for the funded public service pension schemes. As the Audit Commission has noted, 
maintaining the financial health of each individual LGPS Fund is a complex issue that 
involves having to balance competing requirements that change over time against the 
background of statutory backing for the LGPS. The admission of thousands of non-local 
authority private sector employers to the scheme adds a further complication as their 
solvency is not backed by taxpayers.
22 IPSPC (2010) Interim report, paragraph 4.24.
23 In projecting employer pension contributions it would be necessary to allow for factors such as the impact of LGPS 
Funds’ average investment returns and levels of employee contributions.
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6.60  At present and in line with DCLG guidance, each individual LGPS Fund follows 
a Fund-specific strategy which sets out how its pension liabilities are best met, in terms of 
investments and reasonable risk parameters. This is balanced against other aims, such as 
seeking to keep employer contribution levels stable and affordable and taking account of the 
impact on local council tax payers. 
6.61 However, the LGPS Funds are given far more scope to exercise flexibility over their 
approach to funding than trust-based schemes, where the regulatory regime accepts that 
funding should be scheme-specific but triggers firm criteria for funding adequacy and 
ensures that schemes take appropriate action. The LGPS approach helps in balancing 
conflicting aims. It reflects the Funds’ ability to accept higher levels of investment risk and 
their capacity to recover deficits over decades. These in turn arise as a result of the statutory 
basis of the LGPS, the constitutional permanence of local government as an employer and a 
Fund’s current positive cash flow position. 
6.62  In seeking to make best use of the scope conferred by their status, the individual 
LGPS Funds are in many respects models of good practice in their governance of funding 
and investment. In general, they publish openly and follow transparently a clearly stated set 
of relevant policies, covering key areas, such as: setting appropriate investment objectives, 
identifying and controlling risks and communicating with stakeholders. They typically 
review all aspects of these policies and of performance in line with them, on a regular 
basis, taking action in the light of review findings to try to ensure that the standard of the 
governance arrangements is maintained and where possible improved. 
6.63 However, Funds could in theory gradually build up ever larger deficits, in effect 
accepting higher long-term costs in order to secure short term affordability for employers 
and employees. The Audit Commission cited evidence to the Commission that this has 
been happening.24 The Audit Commission also indicated in the same report how investment 
strategies are vulnerable to a significant reduction in the proportion of active members, 
which could result in a negative cash flow.25 That would mean that pensions could not be 
paid without cashing in investments, which could reduce investment in long-term growth 
assets.26 
6.64 Neither of these important points, which clearly relate to the long term sustainability 
of LGPS funding, is readily apparent from the large volume of information about funding 
strategies and investment performance currently published by and about LGPS Funds. 
This suggests that the management of funding in the LGPS is not in some critical respects 
sufficiently transparent. 
24 Audit Commission (2010), Local government pensions in England’ paragraph 43, www.audit-commission.gov.uk/
localgov/nationalstudies/localgovpensions/Pages/Default_copy.aspx.
25 As explained in the interim report paragraph 4.79.
26 See paragraph 31 and footnote in ‘Local Government Pensions in England’. This negative cashflow would arise in any 
case in due course as the LGPS become a more mature scheme, with an increasing proportion of the liabilities relating to 
pensioners rather than active members. 
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6.65  There is a strong case for making sure that ministers, Parliament, commentators 
and taxpayers can understand the trends regarding the funding of liabilities, for example, 
whether or not there is an established or developing trend to defer unfunded liabilities into 
the future. This is a good indicator of whether the amount being invested, after taking into 
account the unique characteristics of LGPS Funds, is sufficient to meet liabilities in the long 
term. This should supplement, not replace, the existing legal responsibilities of individual 
Funds, including for publishing information locally about the Fund. 
6.66 Similarly, it is important to make clear how much is being added to long term costs 
by decisions to recover deficits over a period longer than a standard benchmark term. That 
would be a measure of how far future generations are facing greater burdens because of 
decisions to trade off the short term against the long term. Such information cannot easily 
be obtained at present for individual Funds or for the LGPS collectively. There is also a gap 
in the availability of regular information about the comparative investment performance of 
different Funds, as discussed in the section in this chapter on publication of scheme data. 
6.67 The Audit Commission and others have also argued in their evidence to the 
Commission that significant improvements in investment performance and risk control 
could be generated in a number of cases, in particular across London, by moving to fewer, 
larger LGPS Funds. However, the way that investment arrangements have been linked to 
each individual Fund’s governance arrangements seems to have been an obstacle. There 
is, for example, a risk that potential investment gains are seen as outweighed by loss of 
influence over employer contribution costs. An individual LGPS Fund might not pursue 
rationalisation through pooling investment assets with other Funds if it then expects to have 
to alter assumptions about investment growth or to change deficit recovery periods in ways 
that put upward pressure on contribution costs. It would be desirable for LGPS Funds to 
have incentives to obtain performance improvements, including merging the investment of 
assets or even the underlying Funds where appropriate. 
6.68 The governance of LGPS funding and investment at present seems to be too narrowly 
focused on the individual Fund rather than the overall sustainability of the LGPS. Therefore, 
as recommended earlier in this chapter, comprehensive data covering all LGPS Funds should 
be published. In addition, the OBR should include the LGPS in looking at the long-term 
sustainability of public service pensions.
Recommendation: Centrally collated comprehensive data, covering all LGPS Funds, 
should be published including Fund comparisons, which, for example, clarify and 
compare key assumptions about investment growth and differences in deficit recovery plans 
(Recommendation 21). 
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Improvements to administration and rationalisation of 
costs
6.69 Good administration is essential to the delivery of accurate and timely pension 
payments. However, good pension scheme administration goes beyond this, including 
accurate record keeping and the provision of appropriate and timely disclosure to all scheme 
members, as well as to the individual employers in multi-employer schemes. This may be 
in the form of guidance manuals, individual benefits statements, the provision of online 
calculators, or the operation of a call-centre to provide members with one-to-one advice and 
query resolution. 
6.70 Expenditure on the administration of pensions is a significant cost to schemes: as an 
example, in 2009-10 the LGPS in England paid £115 million in administration costs (not 
including investment management).27 
6.71 A great deal of evidence was received by the Commission regarding the costs of the 
administration of pensions and overall the majority of the larger public service pension 
schemes compare very favourably with the average private sector cost (among the largest 
schemes) of £41to 47 per member.28 By way of comparison, the average LGPS Fund 
administrative costs were in the order of £2429 to £28.30 For the larger unfunded public 
service pension schemes, annual administrative costs per scheme member (active, deferred 
and pensioner) range from £631 for the Teachers Pension Scheme (TPS), through £1632 for 
the NHS Pension Scheme (NHSPS), to £2433 for the PCSPS.
6.72 It is important to avoid drawing superficial conclusions about differences between 
schemes’ administration costs as different schemes have different characteristics and offer 
different levels of service to their members, including for example in the provision of 
benefit statements. Average costs per member will also vary significantly depending upon 
whether deferred members are included in the calculations; particularly if little or no cost is 
expended on this, often significant, percentage of the scheme membership. Also important 
are membership characteristics such as staff turnover, ratios of deferred members to actives 
and pensioners and members’ IT literacy and access; and, of course, the overall size of the 
schemes and the numbers handled by individual scheme administrators within each scheme, 
which vary considerably. 
27 Local Government Pension Scheme Funds England 2009-10, Statistical Release, 13 October 2010, Communities and 
Local Government, www.communities.gov.uk/documents/statistics/pdf/1738358.pdf.
28 Capita Hartshead Annual Pension Administration Survey 2010; the average administration charges were £47 per 
member with in-house administration and £41 with outsourced administration. 
29 The National Association of Pension Fund 2009 Annual Survey. 
30 Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accountancy Benchmarking Club, which covers 68 LGPS local authorities across 
the UK. 
31 Information provided by the Scheme to the Commission.
32 ibid.
33 ibid.
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6.73 Evidence submitted to the Commission did not by itself demonstrate either good or 
bad public service pension scheme administration, but it did highlight the absence of a clear 
definition of what good standards of administration and governance might be.
Recommendation: Government should set what good standards of administration 
should consist of in the public service pension schemes based on independent expert 
advice. The Pensions Regulator might have a role, building on its objective to promote good 
administration. (Recommendation 22a).
6.74 Many schemes already submit themselves to benchmarking assessments, but 
participation is inconsistent and voluntary. Schemes should be required to participate so that 
value for money comparisons can be made, examples of best practice can be identified and 
changes can then implemented. 
Recommendation: A benchmarking exercise should be conducted across all the schemes 
to help raise standards where appropriate (Recommendation 22b).
6.75 The Commission has received suggestions and evidence from a number of 
commentators that public service pension schemes offer scope for streamlining and 
combining of their administration functions.
6.76 Looking first at the administration of locally administered schemes, the obvious 
question is whether it is efficient and desirable to have over 50 police authorities and 
perhaps over 50 fire authorities and 101 different local bodies administering the LGPS (89 
in England and Wales, 11 in Scotland and one in Northern Ireland) when they are schemes 
that essentially have nationally set rules with only minor discretionary local variations. There 
seems an opportunity for these schemes to combine their operations to reduce costs and 
potentially exploit economies of scale. 
6.77 There is clear evidence that the administration of pension schemes can benefit from 
economies of scale, particularly where existing schemes are below 100,000 members. Chart 
6.A demonstrates how economies of scale can dramatically reduce costs of administration. 
The data is based on 90 defined benefit schemes with a total of 37 million members within 
the UK, Europe, USA, Canada and Australia collected during 2009 and 2010. The largest 
had 4 million members and the smallest 10,000. The UK part of the sample included 15 
schemes, both public and private sector, covering 6 million members. 
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Chart 6.A: Economies of scale in pensions administration
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6.78 The Commission welcomes the fact that a number of local authorities, particularly in 
the LGPS, have already begun to explore opportunities to share administrative services and 
contracts (the Commission received evidence about existing or potential projects in Scotland, 
Wales, the South-West of England and London). The costs and risks for local authorities 
from such ventures will need to be assessed carefully, but at this early stage it would seem 
reasonable to assume that there will be financial savings.
Recommendation: Central and local government should closely monitor the benefits 
associated with the current co-operative projects within the LGPS with a view to 
encouraging the extension of this approach, if appropriate, across all local authorities 
(Recommendation 23a).
6.79 Opportunities to share services and contracts between the unfunded centrally 
administered public service pension schemes appear less obvious. 
6.80 Different unfunded schemes have a variety of scheme features, for example, normal 
pension ages, contribution rates (both employer and employee), accrual rates and benefit 
packages. This makes it more difficult to share administration. However, this Commission’s 
proposals will reduce the differences between scheme designs. 
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6.81 Also there has already been some movement to streamline administrative arrangements 
for some of the major schemes that deal with multiple employers. For example the 
introduction of the My Civil Service Pension programme34 in the civil service has accelerated 
the process of reducing the number of civil service pension scheme service centres from 
ten to six. In addition, much of the cost of payroll and benefits administration is already 
outsourced. For example, the Ministry of Defence estimates that outsourcing represents 
some 80 per cent of the costs of administering its pensions. 
6.82 Nevertheless, there may be opportunities for greater use of shared services. But any 
potential savings and efficiencies from sharing by schemes must be weighed against the 
risks associated with integration issues, one-off costs and operational challenges given the 
difference in rules and current administration procedures between these schemes. 
Recommendation: Government should examine closely the potential for the unfunded public 
service pension schemes to realise greater efficiencies in the administration of pensions 
by sharing contracts and combining support services, including considering outsourcing 
(Recommendation 23b).
6.83 Other aspects of public service pension administration also have to be considered. 
There are currently a multitude of public service payroll and pension administrative systems 
in operation, using a variety of different IT platforms, software and data formats. There is 
a great variety of scheme rules: most schemes need to operate systems for members being 
pensioned under current rules and for members still being pensioned under old rules. At 
best having a multitude of arrangements can impede efficient administration and at worst 
potentially cause errors and inconsistencies and make it difficult to implement reform.
6.84  The Commission has also heard evidence of monthly payroll details necessary for 
pension calculations, such as contribution amounts, being regularly transferred late to 
outsourced contractors, with resultant delays in payments. The public service pension 
schemes seem to have lagged behind the private sector with regards to investment in payroll 
and pension IT systems. Scheme administrators have emphasised to the Commission 
that there is considerable pressure on their systems because of the various changes they 
are already managing. This situation will need to be taken into account when considering 
implementation of the reforms.
The case for a new legal framework 
6.85 The existing public service pension schemes are established under numerous, separate, 
sources of legislation, and in the case of the Armed Forces Pension Scheme 1975 under 
Royal Prerogative. There is no single legislative framework to cover issues such as: 
34 A programme to improve the governance and administration of the Civil Service pension schemes.
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 • the basis on which the schemes can be amended; 
 • the procedures to be followed when implementing any such amendment, including 
relevant bodies to be consulted and the nature of such consultation in respect of a 
proposed change; 
 • what constitutes an accrued right and the extent to which such rights are protected; 
 • the structure of governance within the schemes; and 
 • defining where responsibilities in respect of the schemes rest. 
6.86 The current position means that some schemes may be amended by consultation with 
appropriate associations and representative bodies,35 whilst other schemes contain specific 
consent requirements. Also, some schemes can be amended by secondary legislation, whereas 
others, in particular judicial pensions, require primary legislation for all but very minor 
amendments. This clearly impacts on the flexibility of the schemes where procedural changes 
are necessary, making them compatible with provisions for occupational pensions in general 
under UK and EU law, and can be seen to create a degree of unfairness across the public 
service schemes. 
6.87 Although the legislation which currently establishes the existing public service pension 
schemes (such as the Superannuation Act 1972) typically provides a general power to 
implement pension benefits, such power is conferred on many people. For example, the 
power to implement and administer the PCSPS is with the Minister for the Civil Service, 
whereas the equivalent power in respect of the LGPS, TPS and NHSPS rests with the 
relevant Secretary of State (although any change to the TPS and NHSPS regulations is 
ultimately subject to the consent of HM Treasury). 
6.88 The current primary legislation, other than for judicial pensions, does not provide any 
detail on issues such as the nature of the scheme and benefits to be provided, the manner 
in which the scheme should be governed or the division of responsibilities among those 
responsible for implementing and managing the schemes. To date, the general enabling 
powers contained in legislation such as the Superannuation Act 1972 have been relied 
upon to introduce all provisions necessary for the administration and management of 
the schemes.36 However, in some schemes there are currently no such express provisions 
under which regulations could determine administration and management obligations and 
responsibilities. Overall this leads to a lack of transparency in terms of who is responsible for 
the schemes and how decisions affecting those schemes can and should be taken. 
35 For example, the LGPS can, at present, be amended for existing members in respect of their future service provided the 
Secretary of State has consulted with “such associations of local authorities as appear to him to be concerned, any local 
authority with whom consultation appears desirable and such representatives of other persons likely to be affected as 
appear to him as appropriate.” (Section 7(5) of the Superannuation Act 1972).
36 For example, the Local Government Pension Scheme (Administration) Regulations 2008.
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The benefits of change 
6.89  There appears to be a strong case for introducing new, overarching, primary legislation 
to establish the new public service pension scheme framework. This would provide greater 
transparency, simplicity and certainty over the reforms and ensure they satisfy common basic 
principles.
6.90 New primary legislation would need to cover key areas, such as:
 • who has ultimate responsibility for the new schemes; 
 • the regulatory framework; 
 • the governance structure; 
 • provisions dealing with scheme amendments, including consultation obligations; 
 • the extent to which member benefits are protected; 
 • member involvement and engagement, including communication requirements; and 
 • transitional provisions in respect of existing schemes.
6.91  In particular, new primary legislation could be structured to:
 • provide for a standard power of amendment to be used across all schemes. Such 
power of amendment could determine the nature and extent of consultation as well 
as any formal consent needed for future changes. This might address the overall 
role of HM Treasury in respect of controlling schemes and public service pensions 
policy and establish whether Treasury consent would be required for future changes 
in benefit design as well as for key assumptions for valuing benefits in order to 
help maintain the common UK public service pensions framework. Providing such 
decision-making or ultimate consent, power to HM Treasury would certainly be one 
option for consideration given the need to ensure cost control for the taxpayer. It is 
notable in this respect that amendments to regulations for schemes such as the NHS 
and the TPS are already, ultimately, subject to the formal consent of HM Treasury;
 • confirm the level of protection afforded to members’ accrued rights and define what 
constitutes an accrued right. In particular, such a definition could clarify the extent 
to which any protection is afforded beyond the benefits which a member would 
receive as an ‘early leaver’;
 • establish the core benefit design features of the new schemes and any scope for 
variation at scheme level and the procedures for implementing such variations;
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 • provide the basis on which the cost ceiling for the new arrangements is determined, 
reviewed and modified. This would include determining who or which body would 
have responsibility for this and what factors would be taken into account in the 
timing and extent of any review;
 • create a new body, or appoint an existing body, to have overall responsibility for 
oversight of public service pension schemes and the quality and transparency of 
information about them. Legislation could establish the statutory duties of such a 
body, its powers and relationship with the schemes and the employers participating 
in them;
 • establish the framework for a formal governance structure for the new public service 
pension arrangements; and
 • introduce transitional provisions which would apply in respect of the benefits 
provided by the current schemes.
6.92  The protections might also cover the extent to which there might be limitations on 
adjustments to existing judicial pensions to meet international conventions for protecting 
judicial remuneration, while also having regard to factors such as increases in the value of 
pensions from increasing longevity. 
6.93  The new primary legislation would need to be supplemented by regulations 
containing the detail on matters such as benefit structure, regulatory framework, reporting 
requirements, disclosure obligations and member participation on appropriate committees.
6.94 Consideration would have to be given to structuring any such legislation in a way 
which covers those numerous public service pension schemes which have been established 
by or for the staff and members of non-departmental public bodies (NDPB), often under 
general statutory powers used to establish those bodies. It will therefore be necessary to 
clarify which NDPB schemes are intended to be covered by the new legislation, whilst 
recognising that there may be some schemes (such as those that were established under a 
separate trust) that cannot be amended directly by legislation. 
6.95 The introduction of any overarching legal framework for UK public service pensions 
would also have to recognise the issue of devolution. Although pension policy is not, 
currently, a devolved function, it would nevertheless be necessary to consider the role 
of devolved administrations within the national pensions policy framework discussed in 
Chapter 5 and how they would implement pension provisions within that overarching 
framework.
Recommendation: The Government should introduce primary legislation to adopt a new 
common UK legal framework for public service schemes (Recommendation 24).
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7 Delivering the change
Box 7.A: Summary
 • Implementation is key: the first stage of reform will involve the more detailed development 
of proposals for applying the common design principles, which will need a structured 
approach with central co-ordination, for example, to set cost ceilings and timetables for 
consultation and overall implementation. 
 • However, consultation on details should be undertaken inclusively, scheme by scheme. 
This will give employees and their representatives the opportunity to participate fully in the 
detailed design of the schemes, with the statutory consultation only being carried out once 
this is complete. Each statutory consultation will need a full equality impact assessment to 
allow for deeper consideration of the issues for various groups. 
 • This approach will also allow a longer timeframe for implementation, where this might be 
needed for specific schemes because of the scale of the change or for legal reasons, for 
example, for schemes such as the armed forces, police and judges.
 • There will also need to be early upfront communication with members, to encourage 
participation in the consultation process.
 • The Government should aim to complete most of the implementation process during this 
Parliament, which seems feasible. To help meet the implementation timetable delivery 
issues, such as scheme administration, should be considered at an early stage.
 • There will also need to be the right resource, on top of business as usual, to drive the 
reforms, particularly given the challenging timescale and scope of the reforms, and there 
should be a robust implementation governance structure to ensure the implementation 
process is completed effectively.
 • Too many risks are held by government and the taxpayer in the present schemes and they 
produce an unfair distribution of benefits between members. It would not be fair to allow 
this to continue for decades. Therefore, members of the current defined benefit schemes 
should be moved to the new schemes. 
 • In managing the changes there will need to be protections for existing members, such as 
the protection for past service of the final salary link to future earnings. This means that 
the final salary link would be maintained for years of service earned in final salary based 
schemes, up to the date the member is awarded all his or her benefits from that scheme. 
 • The Commission’s expectation is that existing members who are currently in their 50s 
should, by and large, experience fairly limited change to the benefit which they would 
otherwise have expected to accrue by the time they reach their current scheme Normal 
Pension Age. This would particularly be the case if the final salary link is protected for past 
service, as the Commission recommends. 
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Implementing change
7.1 Implementation is key to the reform of public service pensions. Reform will only be 
successful if the planned reforms are capable of being implemented in a timely and efficient 
manner with a smooth transitional period. This chapter discusses that challenge and some of 
the areas that will need to be tackled to make sure the reforms can be delivered as planned.
7.2 There are three main stages of the implementation process itself:
 • the Government’s consideration of the report, its response and detailed development 
of proposals;
 • detailed scheme by scheme consideration of the proposals followed by formal 
consultation; and
 • legislation and delivery of the reforms.
Developing the details
7.3 It will be up to the Government to decide whether or not to accept the 
recommendations of this report. But whatever the decisions there will need to be a process 
to develop the policy from a framework proposal to an implementable blueprint. How this is 
approached could make a real difference to how and when the reforms are implemented. 
7.4 Crucial to this is whether the process is one of control from the centre or whether it 
is devolved to the different schemes to manage. Both approaches have benefits. A central 
approach allows the Government to keep tight control over the process, driving it forward 
along a set timetable; whilst a devolved approach would give schemes the ability to develop 
the proposals in line with their specific needs. But they also both have downsides. The 
central process makes it more difficult to build in scheme by scheme variation; whilst the 
devolved process could result in duplication of work between the different schemes, reducing 
the efficiency and speed of the process.
7.5 Currently the schemes are run in a highly devolved manner and whilst this can deliver 
schemes focused on members’ needs it has also led to a wide variety of outcomes and 
contribution levels for members. When this approach was followed in the last round of 
reforms it led to a large spread in the timetable for implementation between the different 
schemes and varying scheme structures. And rather than this approach being actively chosen 
as best practice or for efficiency, it seems rather to have developed organically. It would 
be better for the policy development process to be a more structured one, but still allow 
schemes to enter into individual negotiations and discussions.
7.6 There will also need to be a degree of central control: setting cost ceilings for the 
schemes; outlining the principles to be adhered to as part of the framework; setting limits 
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to the degree of variation allowed; setting the timescales for consultation and overall 
implementation; and providing oversight of the scheme-by-scheme implementation process. 
7.7 This would have the benefit of allowing standardisation whilst still giving schemes 
control over the details of the proposals for their particular areas. It would also allow a 
longer timeframe for implementation, where this might be needed because of the scale of 
the change or for legal reasons, for example, for schemes such as the armed forces, police and 
judges.
Agreeing the deal
7.8 Once the Government and schemes have come to an initial view on the detailed future 
form of the schemes they will need to consult with stakeholders on their proposed approach. 
Whilst this could be done via one consultation from central government, the Commission 
would not recommend this: it is likely to be cumbersome given the number of different 
schemes and the possibility for variation within them. 
7.9  The other question is how the consultation process will be carried out. This could 
either be on a formal basis, such as the normal 12 week consultation period followed by 
government consideration of the responses, or there could be a more informal initial process, 
which would take place over a longer period of time and leave more room for open dialogue 
between the parties, followed by a full statutory consultation. The latter approach would help 
develop trust and confidence in the process and is favoured by the Commission.
Recommendation: The consultation process itself should be centrally co-ordinated: to 
set the cost ceilings and timetables for consultation and overall implementation. However, the 
consultation on details should be conducted scheme by scheme involving employees 
and their representatives (Recommendation 25).
7.10 For the statutory consultation, as required by law, each consultation document will 
need to be supported by a full equality impact assessment to allow for a deeper and more 
considered examination of the issues for particular groups and schemes within a formal 
framework.
Getting members involved
7.11 The Commission has found it helpful to engage as many interested parties as possible 
in developing its knowledge base and in forming its opinions. Evidence from stakeholders 
during the Commission’s roundtable events, as described in Annex D, has allowed a wide 
range of interested parties to put their views forward, often in areas they had specific 
expertise in. 
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7.12 Discussions during the roundtables on implementation emphasised the importance 
of good communication for successful pension reform. The Commission’s view is that there 
should be early upfront communication of the changes with employees, including using 
methods that allow direct member participation in the consultation process. This will help 
members become involved in shaping their scheme and fits with the culture of ownership 
and responsibility the Commission would like to encourage.
The timetable and achieving it
7.13 These reforms cannot be achieved overnight. As the discussion above shows there are 
several steps that will need to be taken before the necessary legislative process can be started 
and the consequent administrative changes made. And these steps are crucial in ensuring that 
the reforms are a success and deliver sustainable public service pensions schemes.
7.14 The administrative change will be one of the largest challenges. The roundtable 
events the Commission held had valuable evidence to share on this point. The complexity 
of, and possibility for, efficiencies in public service pension scheme administration is 
discussed in Chapter 6, but the importance of taking early account of administration, 
and communicating with scheme administrators, early in the change process is not to be 
overlooked. Our stakeholders told us that following this approach should lead to a much 
smoother implementation process. So, consideration of the delivery process, particularly the 
administration of the schemes, needs to be built into the policy development process early 
on.
Recommendation: The Commission’s view is that even allowing for the necessary processes 
it should be possible to introduce the new schemes before the end of this Parliament 
and we would encourage the Government to aim for implementation within this timeframe 
(Recommendation 26).
7.15 This will not be easy, but it should be achievable. But the delivery of this timetable is 
heavily dependent on having the right resource available to manage all the stages. There is 
the need to maintain business as usual, making sure pensioners get their correct entitlement 
on time, at the same time as resourcing the redesign and its implementation. At present there 
appears to be a concentration of knowledge of public service pensions, their legal basis and 
their management in a few specialists. A wider spread of knowledge will be needed to drive 
through this change. And the skills needed for change management are not necessarily those 
needed for business as usual. 
Recommendation: There will need to be the right resource, on top of business as usual, 
to drive the reforms; particularly given the challenging timescale and scope of the reforms. 
(Recommendation 27b).
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7.16 This should be seen in the context of a robust governance structure for the reform 
programme itself. As discussed in Chapter 6, governance in the public service pension 
schemes could be improved generally, and it is important that the governance process for 
implementation is also robust. Chapter 6 highlights the example of the civil service pensions 
administration transformation programme that has:
 •  created an independent board with responsibility for managing business as usual 
within the scheme, its risks and scheme controls, including having oversight of the 
scheme administrator; and
 • also established a separate, robust governance structure that has managed the 
transformation programme and the risks associated with change.
7.17 The governance arrangements for business as usual and the transformation programme 
are necessarily different, but both draw on best practice in the private sector.
Recommendation: Best practice governance arrangements should be followed for both 
business as usual and the transformation process, for each scheme (Recommendation 27a).
7.18 This is important for several reasons. First, it increases transparency in the process. 
Second, it allows the monitoring of delivery against targets and gives early warning if it 
looks like the timetable is slipping. Third, it allows individuals responsible for delivering the 
reforms to be held to account. 
7.19 The Commission believes that focusing on communication and administration early, 
resourcing the change sufficiently and putting a robust governance structure in place will 
lead to successful implementation.
Transition
7.20 Turning to the terms of the deal to be implemented, the Commission has pointed out 
in previous chapters that in the present schemes too many risks are held by government and 
the taxpayer and they produce an unfair distribution of benefits between members. 
7.21 As noted above and in the interim report,1 the old, mainly final salary, designs give 
unfair advantages to those with considerable earnings progression, typically the higher 
earners, and they disadvantage those with flatter careers, when overall costs are constrained. 
Moving to a career average structure, as recommended in this report, will produce fairer 
outcomes. 
1 IPSPC (2010) Interim Report, Chapter 5.
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7.22 And as the interim report showed,2 existing members have benefited from increasing 
longevity, but that has not been taken into account in the features of current public service 
pension schemes. Therefore, fundamental reform will need to include increasing pension 
ages for almost all existing members, as discussed in Chapter 4. Allowing current members 
to continue to accrue benefits in the present schemes for many decades would be unfair and 
inequitable to the new members coming behind them. 
Recommendation: As soon as practical members of the current defined benefit public 
service pension schemes should be moved to the new schemes for future service 
(Recommendation 5a).
7.23 It will also be essential for there to be good planning for, and communication of, 
the transition to new pension terms. This should ensure that, while implementing revised 
pension systems satisfactorily in ways that meet the need for fundamental reform indicated 
in this report and the interim report, members have their rights protected and are given the 
opportunity to adjust their expectations and retirement plans. 
Accrued rights
7.24 The Commission takes as its starting point the principle that accrued rights must 
be protected, as stated in its terms of reference. For example, service earned on the basis 
of a specific pension age could not be changed without a member’s consent and therefore 
pension rights earned up to the date of any change would be based on the current pension 
ages that apply to that service. To illustrate that, someone who had been earning benefits 
that would be paid on an unreduced basis from a Normal Pension Age (NPA) of 60 would 
continue to be able to take those pension rights earned up to the date of the change at age 
60. 
7.25 However, legally the full extent of those accrued rights is inherently uncertain. For 
example, general provisions of occupational pensions law require that an active member is at 
least awarded a deferred pension, but the actual nature of a member’s rights and protections 
has to be considered and can vary scheme by scheme, depending on scheme rules and how 
the scheme has been operated. 
Deferred and pensioner members
7.26 For those members who have already ceased pensionable service, whether they are 
deferred or pensioner members, all rights to future benefits, including those potentially 
payable on death, will be deemed to be accrued rights. Those rights also include the ages 
2 IPSPC (2010) Interim Report, Chapter 4.
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from which members are entitled to take pensions, so the pension will continue to be 
payable at 60 for most schemes or the relevant scheme age. 
Current active members
7.27  For those who are active members of the existing schemes when scheme rules change, 
it might be argued that accrued rights could be assessed on the basis that the member had 
opted to leave the scheme immediately before the date of change. Such an approach would 
be consistent with general legislation concerning accrued rights in private sector schemes,3
7.28 However, the powers to amend the schemes and the extent to which there are any 
scheme-specific protections for accrued rights must also be considered. That is of central 
importance, as has already been seen in legal cases relating to accrued rights in both private 
and public sector schemes.
7.29 Although the powers of amendment for at least two public service schemes explicitly 
refer to that general legislation on accrued rights,4 most powers do not. But there are some 
specific provisions and requirements in the amendment powers of some of the other schemes 
that limit the scope and process for amending benefits.5 Also, more general claims could 
be made that there are protections for groups of members based on legal provisions and 
principles that would limit or prevent changes to core features of the benefit design, such as 
final salary links. Such protections would, for example, be based on legitimate expectations, 
contractual promises that may have been made, fairness and the principle of not making 
retrospective changes that reduced entitlements.
Final salary link for past service
7.30 The Commission has also noted in the evidence submitted to it the widespread 
expectations among public servants that the final salary link would be maintained. The 
Commission is sympathetic to the argument that it would be in line with the principles 
underlying accrued rights to maintain the final salary link for past service and would be fair 
given the scale of the changes involved in moving to the reformed schemes.
7.31  It would also be an important factor in helping to ensure that future pension 
arrangements were seen as fair to taxpayers and members. This would assist in the 
successful delivery of the reforms and the maintenance of trust and confidence in public 
service pensions. This should, in turn, help to maintain levels of scheme membership. It 
is important to bear in mind that decisions about whether to belong to a pension scheme 
are individual rather than collective and that scheme membership is not compulsory. The 
3 See Section 67 of the Pensions Act 1995, as amended by the Pensions Act 2004.
4 The Armed Forces Pension Scheme 2005 and the Reserve Forces Pension Scheme.
5 For example the Police Pensions Act 1976 and the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993.
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Commission wishes to maintain, and ideally increase, the proportion of members who join 
public service schemes.
Recommendation: The Government should honour in full the pension promises that 
have been accrued by scheme members: their accrued rights. In doing so, the Commission 
recommends maintaining the final salary link for past service for current members 
(Recommendation 4).
7.32 This means that the final salary link would be maintained for years of service earned in 
final salary based schemes, up to the date the member is awarded all his or her benefits from 
that scheme, which could be before, at, or after the NPA. In effect that would mean there 
would be a final salary link as long as the member remained within the existing scheme or its 
successor.6
7.33 The fair treatment of accrued rights must apply to all relevant benefits and conditions. 
The Commission is clear that: 
 • the definition of pensionable pay for the accrued pension should be defined as at the 
point when the member moves to new schemes for future accrual; 
 • comparable death and ill-health benefits should be retained; 
 • movement to another scheme within the public sector transfer club7 should be 
regarded as continuous service for the purpose of the final salary link; 
 • those on a career break of up to five years at the point of transfer to new schemes or 
who take such a break in future should retain the final salary link for past service; 
and 
 • those serving public servants who are already in career average pension schemes 
should receive comparable protections, so, for example, the amounts of pension they 
had accrued should continue to be indexed in the same way as at present up to the 
date a member is awarded benefits.
6 That would build on the existing civil service precedent used, for example, where someone with final salary rights enters 
the Nuvos career average scheme; and for those members who opted to keep PCSPS Classic 1/80th accrual rights for 
past service when they moved in 2002 to PCSPS Premium 1/60ths rights for future service. One consequence would, for 
example, be that those NHS scheme members who, as part of the NHS Choice exercise, opted to convert their NPA 60, 
1/80ths accrual pension rights into NPA 65, 1/60ths accrual rights, would continue to have those resulting NPA 65 years 
of service linked to their final salary and payable unreduced from age 65.
7 A group of 120 defined benefit related occupational pension schemes designed to allow easier movement of staff, 
mainly within the public sector, by making sure that employees receive broadly equivalent credits when they transfer their 
pensionable service to their new scheme.
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Effects on members near to retirement
7.34 The Commission’s expectation is that existing members who are currently in their 
50s should, by and large, experience fairly limited change to the benefit which they would 
otherwise have expected to accrue by the time they reach their current scheme NPA. This 
would particularly be the case if the final salary link is protected for past service, as the 
Commission recommends. This limitation of impact will also extend to people below age 
50, proportionate to the length of time before they reach their NPA. Therefore special 
protections for members over a certain age should not be necessary. Age discrimination 
legislation also means that it is not possible in practice to provide protection from change for 
members who are already above a certain age.
7.35 Those employees who intend to take their pension in the next few years could do so 
before the new terms are introduced. An employee now aged around 50 with many years 
of service in a scheme with an NPA of 60 would retain the link to his or her final salary for 
past service, while accruals from about the age of 55 would be under the new terms with a 
higher NPA. Although the exact impact of this will depend on individual circumstances and 
the scheme parameters, it is likely that most people currently in their early 50s will have a 
slightly lower pension if they choose to retire at their current pension age. Individuals could 
choose either to retire at the age of 60 with a slightly reduced pension, or work for a little 
longer in order to obtain the same pension income as that which would previously have been 
payable at 60. 
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8 Conclusions
How the deal meets the Commission’s principles
8.1 The Commission’s view is that if the recommendations outlined in this report were to 
be implemented as a full reform package it would ensure the future of good quality, defined 
benefit pension provision within the public services. 
8.2 Throughout the report the Commission has assessed the design choices against its 
principles. Here we show how the recommended package as a whole meets the principles 
that were first set out in the interim report.1
Affordable and sustainable
8.3 The proposed reforms provide safety valves in the system, which should help to assure 
sustainability. Linking Normal Pension Age (NPA) to State Pension Age (SPA) will adjust 
for the improvement in longevity seen over recent past decades and the resulting increase 
in the proportion of life spent in retirement. It also provides a way to manage any future 
expected increases in longevity. Having a limit on costs through a fixed cost ceiling, which if 
exceeded will result in action to get costs back down, will further guarantee affordability of 
the schemes, providing the taxpayer with confidence that controls are in place.
Adequate and fair
8.4 The Commission has recommended that public service pensions, in conjunction with 
a full state pension, should provide a level of income that meets agreed adequacy levels 
for those with a full career. Moving away from final salary schemes and moving current 
members into the new defined benefit schemes recommended in this report will mean that 
the schemes are fairer between different types of members. In addition, maintaining defined 
benefit provision, but sharing key risks, will mean that schemes are fairer between members 
and taxpayers.
1 IPSPC (2010), Interim Report, Chapter 3.
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Supports productivity
8.5 Removing the final salary element of scheme design will help to break down barriers 
to labour mobility between the public and private sectors, as well as reducing some of the 
barriers to plurality of provision for public services. 
Transparent and simple
8.6 A single scheme across the income distribution, with improved minimum standards 
for communications with scheme members, will help ensure public service pensions are 
simple and transparent for public service workers. More consistent information published by 
schemes with oversight of fiscal sustainability from the Office for Budget Responsibility will 
ensure there is greater transparency for taxpayers too.
Looking forward
8.7 These reforms cannot be achieved overnight and the journey to full implementation 
may well be a difficult one. But the Commission is clear that it represents the best chance of 
achieving a public service pensions system that is both sustainable for the future and delivers 
a good deal for both scheme members and taxpayers.
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A List of recommendations
A.1 The Table A.1 lists the recommendations which the Commission is making to the 
Government.
Table A.1: Recommendations
Chapter 1: The case for reform revisited
No. Recommendation Page No.
1
The Government should make clear its assessment of the role of public 
service pension schemes. Based on its framework of principles, the 
Commission believes that the primary purpose is to ensure adequate levels 
of retirement income for public service pensioners.
8 
35
2
Pensions will continue to be an important element of remuneration. The 
Commission recommends that public service employers take greater account 
of public service pensions when constructing remuneration packages and 
designing workforce strategies. The Government should make clear in its 
remits for pay review bodies that they should consider how public service 
pensions affect total reward when making pay recommendations.
8 
36
Chapter 2: The deal
No. Recommendation Page No.
3
The Government should ensure that public service schemes, along with a 
full state pension, deliver at least adequate levels of income (as defined 
by the Turner Commission benchmark replacement rates) for scheme 
members who work full careers in public service. Employers should seek 
to maximise participation in the schemes where this is appropriate. 
Adequate incomes and good participation rates are particularly important 
below median income levels.
9
40
4
The Government must honour in full the pension promises that have 
been accrued by scheme members: their accrued rights. In doing so, the 
Commission recommends maintaining the final salary link for past 
service for current members. 
9
156
5
As soon as practical, members of the current defined benefit public 
service pension schemes should be moved to the new schemes for 
future service, but the Government should continue to provide a form of 
defined benefit pension as the core design.
9
44
154
6
All public service pension schemes should regularly publish data 
which, as far as possible, is produced to common standards and 
methodologies and is then collated centrally. This information should 
be of a quality that allows simple comparisons to be made across 
Government, between schemes and between individual Local Government 
Pension Scheme (LGPS) Funds.
10
133
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Chapter 3: The design
No. Recommendation Page No.
7
A new career average revalued earnings (CARE) scheme should be 
adopted for general use in the public service schemes. 
10
58
8
Pension benefits should be uprated in line with average earnings 
during the accrual phase for active scheme members. Post-retirement, 
pensions in payment should be indexed in line with prices to maintain their 
purchasing power and adequacy during retirement.
11
66
71
9
A single benefit design should apply across the whole income range. The 
differing characteristics of higher and lower earners should be addressed 
through tiered contribution rates. The Government should consider the 
trade off between affordability and the impact of opt outs on adequacy 
when setting member contribution levels. 
12
65
79
80
10
Members should have greater choice over when to start drawing their 
pension benefits, so they can choose to retire earlier or later than their 
Normal Pension Age and their pension would be adjusted accordingly on 
an actuarially fair basis. Flexible retirement should be encouraged and 
abatement of pensions in its current form for those who return to work 
after drawing their pensions should be eliminated. In addition, caps on 
pension accrual should be removed or significantly lifted.
12
83
Chapter 4: The controls
No. Recommendation Page No.
11
The Government should increase the member’s Normal Pension Age 
in the new schemes so that it is in line with their State Pension 
Age. The link between the State Pension Age and Normal Pension Age 
should be regularly reviewed, to make sure it is still appropriate, with a 
preference for keeping the two pension ages linked.
13
94
12
The Government, on behalf of the taxpayer, should set out a fixed cost 
ceiling: the proportion of pensionable pay that they will contribute, on 
average, to employees’ pensions over the long term. If this is exceeded 
then there should be a consultation process to bring costs back within 
the ceiling, with an automatic default change if agreement cannot be 
reached.
13
97
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Chapter 5: Applying the design
No. Recommendation Page No.
13
The Commission is not proposing a single public service pension 
scheme, but over time public service pensions should move towards 
a common framework for scheme design as set out in this report. 
However, in some cases, for example, the uniformed services, there may 
need to be limited adaptations to this framework.
14
110
14
The key design features contained in this report should apply to all public 
service pension schemes. The exception is in the case of the uniformed 
services where the Normal Pension Age should be set to reflect the 
unique characteristics of the work involved. The Government should 
therefore consider setting a new Normal Pension Age of 60 across the 
uniformed services, where the Normal Pension Age is currently below 
this level in these schemes, and keep this under regular review.
14
112
15
The common design features laid out in this report should also 
apply to the LGPS. However, it remains appropriate for the Government 
to maintain the different financing arrangements for the LGPS in 
future, so the LGPS remains funded and the other major schemes remain 
unfunded.
15
114
115
16
It is in principle undesirable for future non-public service workers to 
have access to public service pension schemes, given the increased 
long-term risk this places on the Government and taxpayers.
15
119
Chapter 6: A transparent and effective system
No. Recommendation Page No.
17
Every public service pension scheme (and individual LGPS Fund) should 
have a properly constituted, trained and competent Pension Board, 
with member nominees, responsible for meeting good standards of 
governance including effective and efficient administration. There 
should also be a pension policy group for each scheme at national level 
for considering major changes to scheme rules.
16
126
130
18
All public service pension schemes should issue regular benefit 
statements to active scheme members, at least annually and without 
being requested and promote the use of information technology for 
providing information to members and employers. 
16
132
19
Governance and the availability and transparency of information would 
be improved by government establishing a framework that ensures 
independent oversight of the governance, administration and data 
transparency of public service pension schemes. Government should 
consider which body or bodies, including, for example, The Pensions 
Regulator, is most suitable to undertake this role.
16
135
20
When assessing the long term sustainability of the public finances, the 
Office for Budget Responsibility should provide a regular published 
analysis of the long term fiscal impact of the main public service 
pension schemes (including the funded LGPS).
17
137
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21
Centrally collated comprehensive data, covering all LGPS Funds, 
should be published including Fund comparisons, which, for example, 
clarify and compare key assumptions about investment growth and 
differences in deficit recovery plans. 
17
140
22
Government should set what good standards of administration 
should consist of in the public service pension schemes based 
on independent expert advice. The Pensions Regulator might have 
a role, building on its objective to promote good administration. A 
benchmarking exercise should then be conducted across all the 
schemes to assist in the raising of standards where appropriate.
17
141
23
Central and local government should closely monitor the benefits 
associated with the current co-operative projects within the 
LGPS, with a view to encouraging the extension of this approach, 
if appropriate, across all local authorities. Government should also 
examine closely the potential for the unfunded public service schemes 
to realise greater efficiencies in the administration of pensions by 
sharing contracts and combining support services, including considering 
outsourcing.
17
143
24
The Government should introduce primary legislation to adopt a new 
common UK legal framework for public service schemes. 
18
147
Chapter 7: Delivering the change
No. Recommendation Page No.
25
The consultation process itself should be centrally co-ordinated: 
to set the cost ceilings and timetables for consultation and overall 
implementation. However, the consultation on details should be 
conducted scheme by scheme involving employees and their 
representatives. 
18
151
26
The Commission’s view is that even allowing for the necessary processes 
it should be possible to introduce the new schemes before the end 
of this Parliament and we would encourage the Government to aim for 
implementation within this timeframe. 
18
152
27
Best practice governance arrangements should be followed for both 
business as usual and the transformation process, for each scheme. 
And there will also need to be the right resource, on top of business as 
usual, to drive the reforms; particularly given the challenging timescale and 
scope of the reforms.
19
152
153
Source: IPSPC.
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B Case studies of best practice
B.1 The Commission explored various examples of best practice pension scheme design. 
This included looking at both the international arena and the private sector. Below are case 
study examples that the Commission found particularly useful.
Private sector case studies
Box B.1: Tesco
Tesco operates a Career Average Revalued Earnings pension scheme with an accrual rate of 
1.5 per cent of salary and a pension age of 65. It is open to all employees. There is no waiting 
period, but employees aged over 25 are automatically enrolled after a year and can choose 
to opt-in in their first year if they so wish. Member contributions are 5 per cent of salary and 
employer contributions are currently just over 11 per cent. Pensions are indexed by inflation for 
all members subject to a cap of 5 per cent during the accrual phase and also post retirement. 
Death in service benefits include a spouse’s pension for qualifying partners (60 per cent of 
pension) and a lump sum of three times pay.
Box B.2: The Co-operative Group
The Co-operative Group operates a Career Average Revalued Earnings (CARE) pension scheme 
called PACE (Pension Average Career Earnings Scheme). It has an accrual rate based on 1/60th 
of pensionable earnings for every year that a member remains in the scheme, which is uprated 
in line with inflation for both active and deferred members, subject to a five per cent cap. The 
scheme has a pension age of 65 and is open to all eligible employees of the Co-operative Group 
and its subsidiaries, with a waiting period of three months. 
Member contributions are 6 per cent of pensionable earnings. The employer pays the balance 
of cost of providing all members’ benefits. Pensions in payment are indexed according to 
inflation subject to a cap of 2.5 per cent. Death in service benefits include a spouse’s pension for 
qualifying partners (50 per cent of accrued pension plus 25 per cent of notional pension to age 
65) and a lump sum of three times pay. 
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Box B.3: John Lewis
In October 2008 the company made some changes to their non-contributory final salary scheme. 
These changes reduced the waiting time for the scheme to three years and established a nursery 
defined contribution scheme with matched contributions of up to six per cent. 
The organisation also introduced a Life Expectancy Adjustment Factor (LEAF) as a way of sharing 
pre-retirement longevity risk with members. The risk associated with longevity projection 
changes between October 2008 and retirement are passed onto the member while any further 
changes in longevity projections post-retirement are borne by the scheme.
The LEAF factor is calculated each year by the scheme actuary who takes into account life 
expectancy, pension increases and the interest the pension fund earns on its investments to work 
out the cost of providing £1,000 per year of pension for a 65 year old. LEAF is then calculated 
as the ratio between the cost of a £1,000-per-year pension for a 65 year-old scheme member in 
2008 (when LEAF was introduced) and the cost of a £1,000-per-year pension for a 65 year-old 
scheme member in the year of calculation. This figure is then used to calculate pension benefits 
by multiplying the original expected benefits by the LEAF. 
The LEAF is calculated and announced a year ahead and the current LEAF is used in pension 
statements with the provision that this is an estimate and subject to change. It is also phased in 
over the year. The maximum benefit change year on year is +/- 0.5 per cent.
Death in service benefits include a spouse’s pension for qualifying partners (50 per cent of a 
spouse’s prospective pension) and a lump sum of three times pay. 
All changes were agreed by employees and their representatives before being implemented.
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International case studies
Box B.4: Sweden
Why was the Swedish pensions system reformed?
In 2003 Sweden adopted an unfunded Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) system affecting 
all who work in the country (similar to the UK’s State and Second State Pension). The old system 
was a defined benefit career average system, based on an individual’s 15 years of highest 
earnings. The principle reasons for reform were increasing pensions costs while economic 
growth remained low, as well as the belief that the old system was less fair to people who had 
lower income growth and worked over a long period of time.  
How does the new scheme work?
In the Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) scheme total contributions of 16 per cent (7.5 per 
cent employee with the rest made up of employer and tax efficiencies) of salary are credited to 
an individual’s account, up to a capped amount. Individual account balances grow with annual 
contributions and are then recalculated every year based on per capita wage growth. However, 
an ‘automatic adjustment mechanism’ exists which responds to changes in the economy, e.g. 
accrual rates can alter from average wage growth if financial imbalances occur due, for example, 
to excessive changes in longevity.
What benefits does the new scheme bring?
 • Sustainability: benefits are driven by past contributions, limiting taxpayer liability.
 • Risk reduction: annuities are calculated on life expectancy at retirement so longevity risk lies 
with employees up to the point of retirement. 
 • Immediate response to economic shocks: the rate of return used to grow individuals’ 
pension pots is linked to economic factors that allow for automatic reductions in benefits 
during times of poor economic growth.
 • Fairness between generations: defined contribution schemes by design ensure that 
intergenerational transfer is avoided.
 • Removing labour market distortions: pensions reflect an individual’s entire career earnings.
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Box B.5: The Netherlands
What is the Dutch Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) model?
The Dutch public sector has adopted this model (the ‘ABP’) and several companies within the 
private sector have implemented similar systems. The scheme runs like a defined benefit scheme. 
It is based on a career-average model; the difference lies in the onus of risk placed onto the 
employer. This is managed through:
 • solvency margins: 130 per cent of the liabilities are funded, meaning contributions are 
higher, yet in the instance that the market does badly, a buffer fund exists that will absorb 
the damage and allow liabilities to be paid, and monies are invested in relatively low-risk 
areas; and
 • conditional indexation: every few years, the indexing of the pension funds is re-assessed to 
counteract the losses/gains to the buffer fund.
There is no explicit risk-sharing between generations; if necessary a proportion is taken from 
each generation’s ‘pot’ to cover any liabilities.
What benefit does the scheme bring?
 • Conditional indexation: indexation alters according to the achievement of the fund. 
However, during the recession, funding ratios fell drastically for the vast majority of the 
Dutch CDC schemes’ pension funds, which had to submit recovery plans to their regulator, 
specifying how their underfunding would be eliminated.a The recovery plans have in almost 
all cases included suspending indexation of acquired pension rights through the conditional 
indexation mechanism until the appropriate funding levels are regained.
 • Solvency margins: 130 per cent of liabilities are funded to deal with market shocks.
 • Employees do not have the burden of managing individual accounts.
 • Significantly reduced investment fees and other costs.
 • Removing labour market distortions: pensions reflect an individual’s entire career earnings.
a) Høj, J. (2011), ‘Making the Dutch Pension System Less Vulnerable to Financial Crises’, OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers, No. 832, OECD Publishing. doi: 10.1787/5kgkdgg5fxd3-en.
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Box B.6: United States of America
Why was the US civilian employee pensions system reformed?
The Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) was implemented in 1987 to replace the old 
defined benefit plan for all new federal civilian employees. FERS consists of three parts: state 
social security (much like the UK basic State Pension); an unfunded defined benefit plan; and a 
funded defined contribution plan.
The reform was instigated because the old system did not involve contributing to Social Security, 
but additional Social Security contributions were needed in order for the Social Security system 
to remain solvent.
How does the new scheme work?
Under the defined benefit element, the pension is based on the highest three year average of 
service earnings and accrues at a rate of 1 per cent per annum, or 1.1 per cent from age 62 with 
20 or more years’ service, to a maximum total accrual of 40-44 per cent of pay after 40 years 
service. The employee contribution to the defined benefit plan is 0.8 per cent of salary.
Under the defined contribution element (the ‘Thrift Savings Plan’) the Government automatically 
contributes an amount equal to 1 per cent of salary for each employee. In addition, employees 
may contribute up to 10 per cent of their salaries and receive government-matching 
contributions on the first 5 per cent.
What benefits does the new scheme bring?
 • Certainty and risk-redistribution: the defined benefit core grants post-retirement income 
certainty for employees, and the defined contribution top-up redistributes some of the risk 
away from the employer. 
 • Lower costs: the defined contribution element of the new scheme has lowered the costs of 
the new scheme compared to the old scheme.
 • A ‘loans’ feature: the defined contribution element has a ‘loans’ feature in which members 
can access their retirement savings, whilst still working, on a loan basis.
 • Removing labour market distortions: the defined-contribution element allows flexibility 
between labour markets.
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Box B.7: Australia
Why was the Australian government employee’s pension system reformed?
The Australian Government introduced the Public Sector Superannuation Accumulation Plan 
(PSSap) as a fully funded accumulation scheme for most new Australian Government employees 
that joined from 1 July 2005. The old Public Sector Superannuation Scheme (PSS), which was an 
unfunded defined benefit scheme, was closed to new members from 30 June 2005. Australia 
chose to close most public defined benefit superannuation schemes to new members and 
replace them with fully funded accumulation schemes in response to fiscal challenges. 
How does the new scheme work?
The employer contributes at a rate of 15.4 per cent of pensionable salary. Members have the 
option of making voluntary personal contributions, including salary sacrifice contributions. These 
amounts are paid into the PSSap Fund, in which members can make their own decisions as to 
how contributions are invested. The PSSap benefit is a lump sum.
What benefits does the new scheme bring?
 • Employee choice: employees can choose how their accounts are invested.
 • Lower risks to the taxpayer: the move from a defined benefit to a defined contribution 
scheme moves more of the risk away from the employer. 
 • Fairness between generations: each individual has their own personal pensions pot which 
they are responsible for, removing risk sharing between generations.
 • Removing labour market distortions: the system allows flexibility between labour markets.
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Box B.8: Poland
Why was the Polish pensions system reformed?
The defined benefit pensions system that Poland inherited from the Communist era was 
not suited to a market economy. Problems included a large number of pensioners because 
coverage was high and pensionable age low, and pension benefits varying hugely, bearing little 
resemblance to contributions or need.
How does the new scheme work?
The Polish reform was launched in 1999 and consisted of: a notional defined contribution, 
unfunded first pillar (equivalent to the UK basic State Pension); a mandatory defined 
contribution, privately-managed, funded second pillar (which plays a similar role to the UK State 
Second Pension); and voluntary employee pension plans in the third pillar.
Contributions to the reformed pension system account for 19.52 per cent of employees’ taxable 
income, with employers and employees each paying half. Of that amount, 12.22 per cent goes 
into the public notional account scheme and 7.3 per cent is credited to the defined contribution 
pension plan. Contributions to the unfunded first pillar are indexed in line with 75 per cent of 
the quarterly growth of the covered wage bill.
What benefits does the new scheme bring?
 • Diversification of retirement savings: labour market developments determine the notional 
rate of return in the unfunded scheme and financial market developments determine rate 
of return in the funded scheme.
 • Transparency of costs: early retirement options can be maintained, but workers must pay a 
higher contribution rate to reflect the additional cost.
 • Ease the transition to a funded system: the long-term aim with the new scheme is to have 
50 per cent of contributions going to the unfunded pillar and 50 per cent to the funded 
pillar (initially 62.5 per cent and 37.5 per cent respectively).
 • Fairness between generations: defined contribution schemes by design ensure that 
intergenerational transfer is avoided.
 • Removing labour market distortions: pensions reflect an individual’s entire career earnings.
170
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report - 10 March 2011
171
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report - 10 March 2011
C Technical modelling
PPI analysis of pension scheme structure
C.1 The Commission asked the Pensions Policy Institute (PPI) to carry out an analysis 
of different scheme structures that could be used as future public service pension schemes. 
Starting from a proxy final salary scheme (intended to broadly replicate a typical public 
sector pension scheme), the aim was to define the parameters for a set of alternative scheme 
structures in order that they would, on average, provide the same value of benefits to the 
scheme membership. The distributional impact of the alternative structures on members of 
different age, income level and gender was then analysed.
C.2 The analysis was based on the following three alternative scheme structures:
 • career average scheme;
 • career average scheme with a cap on pensionable earnings at £75,000; and
 • career average scheme capped at £35,000 and a DC top-up scheme for earnings 
above the cap with employee and employer contributions of 5 per cent and 10 per 
cent respectively.
C.3 Further to the over-arching structure, different options within these broad structures 
were considered. This was primarily around the level of pre-retirement indexation in the 
CARE schemes where a prices measure and an earnings measure were considered.
C.4 From these results it is also possible to infer the potential implications of a cash balance 
scheme structure with a combination of accrual rate and fixed conversion factor that is 
equivalent to the accrual rate in the CARE scheme. However, it should be noted that not all 
cash balance schemes have a fixed conversion factor. 
C.5 The parameters included here and elsewhere in the final report are not the 
Commission’s recommendations or suggestions for those that should be used in future 
public service pension schemes. These will need to be set by the Government, in consultation 
with scheme members, after full actuarial calculations have been carried out.
Methodology
C.6 The PPI Proxy Public Sector Scheme is a final salary scheme which broadly emulates the 
current arrangements offered to new entrants of the NHS, Teachers and Local Government 
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pension schemes. It is used as a standard benchmark against which to measure the broad 
impacts of reforms. However it should be recognised that the proxy scheme is not identical 
to any of the current public service pension schemes, for example, many public service 
scheme members have a Normal Pension Age of 60.
Table C.1: PPI proxy scheme structure
PPI proxy scheme Parameter
Scheme design Final salary
Normal pension age 65
Contributions Tiered by income
Accrual 1/60th of salary for each year of service
Indexation Final salary link for active members, CPI 
indexation for deferred and pensioner members
Source: PPI modelling.
C.7 Tiered contributions within the proxy scheme vary as shown in Table C.2, set to fall 
broadly within the existing tiered contributions of the NHS and the Local Government 
pension schemes.
Table C.2: Tiered contributions in the PPI proxy scheme
Band Earnings range (£) Rate (%)
1 0-20,000 5.25
2 20,000-40,000 6.5
3 40,000-70,000 7.0
4 70,000-100,000 7.5
5 Over 100,000 8.0
Source: PPI modelling.
C.8 The measure adopted to assess the value of benefits to the scheme membership was the 
effective employee benefit rate (EEBR).1 This represents the amount that would need to be 
set aside to ‘buy’ one year’s accrual of benefits under a particular set of assumptions, if the 
scheme were funded, expressed as a percentage of pay. Member contributions are deducted, 
therefore the EEBR represents the notional amount that is contributed by the employer on 
behalf of the member. The calculation takes account of the main features of the schemes’ 
designs, including their Normal Pension Age (NPA), accrual rate, indexation rate and 
ancillary benefits.
1 More information on the broad methodology of the effective employee benefit rate can be found in previous PPI 
publications, for example, in appendix 1 of An assessment of the Government’s reforms to public sector pension, PPI, 
October 2008.
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C.9 The first stage of the analysis determined the accrual rate required for the alternative 
scheme structures such that the resulting value of benefits to the scheme membership was, on 
average, the same as that under the proxy final salary scheme. This was achieved by varying 
the accrual rate until the overall EEBR (the weighted average of each member’s EEBR across 
the whole income, age and gender distribution) in the alternative scheme was the same as the 
overall EEBR in the proxy final salary scheme.
C.10 Assuming that employer contributions were set using broadly the same assumptions2 
adopted when considering value to members, and that the salary and age distribution 
structure of the schemes were to remain unchanged, then this would also mean that the 
long-term cost of the schemes in terms of employer contributions would be broadly similar. 
This does not mean that benefit expenditure cash flows in respect of pensions paid from the 
scheme would be equivalent in each future year, as these would likely differ. However it does 
mean that the expected present value of those cash flows would be broadly similar.
C.11 While the overall EEBRs are equivalent in the proxy final salary and alternative 
schemes, the differing structures and parameters of the schemes lead to different distribution 
of the benefits between individual members in those schemes (due to differences in age, 
gender and income). The second stage determined how benefits were distributed between 
members, by calculating EEBRs for differing income deciles, age bands, career progression 
and genders.
C.12 The third stage analysed the benefits received from the scheme relative to the member 
contributions made, for differing career progression. This was done to assess whether the 
benefit derived from the scheme for different types of member was proportional to the 
member contributions made.
Assumptions
C.13 There are a number of key financial assumptions in the calculation of the effective 
employee benefit rate, these are in Table C.3.
2 The accrual rate calculated to be required to maintain a broadly equivalent value to members between the different 
schemes considered is not sensitive to the choice of discount rate. However, the actual level of contributions required to 
meet the long-term cost of a pension scheme is sensitive to the discount rate used, and HM Treasury has been consulting 
on the appropriate discount rate to use in setting employer pension contributions.
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Table C.3: Key financial assumptions
Assumption Nominal (%) Real (% 
above RPI)
Consumer price index (CPI) 2.00
Retail price index (RPI) 2.75
Earnings inflation 4.29 1.50
Discount rate 5.32a 2.50
Source: PPI modelling.
a) This is set to be consistent with previous PPI analysis. The discount rate will affect the EEBR but will not affect the 
relative differences between the different types of scheme.
C.14 The discount rate used is in line with previous PPI and IPSPC EEBR estimates. The 
calculated accrual rates for the CARE schemes are not sensitive to the choice of discount 
rate and discussion of the effects of the structure of the pension scheme therefore remain 
unchanged by the level of the discount rate. However, the discount rate would affect the 
levels of the EEBR.
C.15 Life expectancies are assumed to be in line with the Office for National Statistics 2006 
based principal projections.
C.16 Promotional salary scale assumptions are used to allow for pay rises above general 
salary inflation, for example, pay increases as a result of promotion. Table C.4 sets out an 
index of expected promotional increases by age.
Table C.4: Salary scale assumptions
Age 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Male 100 131 168 201 224 237 249 253 256 256
Female 100 131 157 176 187 192 196 200 202 202
Source: GAD Pay-As-You-Go Public Service Pension Schemes December 2009 Cashflow Projections Methodology, 
data and assumptions.
Results 
Specification of scheme designs
C.17 The first stage of the analysis was to derive a set of CARE scheme structures that would 
be of approximately equivalent value to the proxy scheme. The results of this are summarised 
in Table C.5. The IPSPC specified all scheme parameters (employee contribution rates, 
Normal Pension Age (NPA), indexation, levels of cap and DC top-up) except for the accrual 
rate. The PPI then derived the accrual rate that would give an overall EEBR equal to that of 
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the proxy final salary scheme when applied to the membership profile of the public service 
schemes. These accrual rates are given in the final column. 
Table C.5: Scheme designs
Band Type NPA Pre-retirement 
indexationa
 Capb DC top up Accrual rate
Proxy Final salary 65 Final salary / CPI None - 1 / 60ths
Scheme 1a CARE SPAc CPI None - 1 / 40ths
Scheme 2a CARE SPA CPI £75,000 No 1 / 40ths
Scheme 3a CARE SPA CPI £35,000 Yesd 1 / 39ths
Scheme 1b CARE SPA Earnings None - 1 / 61sts
Scheme 2b CARE SPA Earnings £75,000 No 1 / 61sts
Scheme 3b CARE SPA Earnings £35,000 Yes 1 / 59ths
Source: PPI modelling.
Note: Employee contributions in all scenarios are based on the proxy tiered contribution structure.
a) The proxy scheme has a final salary link for active members and CPI indexation for deferred and pensioner members. 
The CARE schemes have the same level of pre-retirement indexation for both active and deferred members. For all 
schemes post-retirement indexation is assumed to be in line with CPI. 
b) Cap on pensionable earnings that qualify for CARE benefit.
c) The NPA is assumed to move in line with the changes in male State Pension Age (SPA) legislated in the Pensions Act 
2007, increasing from age 65 to age 66 by 2026, to age 67 by 2036 and to age 68 by 2046.
d) DC top-up based on a total contribution of 15 per cent of salary (10 per cent employer, 5 per cent employee) into a 
defined contribution arrangement.
C.18 This initial analysis led to the following conclusions:
 • The CARE scheme structures that would be approximately equivalent in overall 
value to the PPI proxy final salary scheme would be:
 • accrual rate of 1/40ths, CPI indexation pre-retirement, NPA in line with SPA; 
and
 • accrual rate of 1/61sts, earnings indexation pre-retirement, NPA in line with 
SPA.
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 • the second scenario here has a slightly lower accrual rate than the proxy scheme due 
to deferred benefit indexation being earnings linked, while in the proxy scheme it is 
assumed to be CPI-linked. Effectively the savings from the removal of the final salary 
link have been recycled into providing better benefits for those who do not work a 
full career in public service;
 • applying a cap on pensionable pay at £75,000 or above would have a negligible effect 
on the accrual rate that would then be able to be offered on earnings below the cap 
for the same average value to the employee. This is because very few public sector 
employees earn above this level; and
 • applying a cap at a lower level of £35,000 with a DC top-up above this level would 
mean a slightly more generous accrual rate could be offered on earnings below the 
cap for the same average value to the employee.
Effective employee benefit rates by age and income
C.19 The analysis includes EEBRs broken down into age bands and income deciles, which 
allows the consideration of a CARE benefit structure on different categories of member. 
Chart C.1 shows how the EEBR varies with age for members with median earnings. 
Chart C.1: Age effects of schemes based on median earner
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Under 25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56 plus
E
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
 E
m
p
lo
y
e
e
 B
e
n
e
fi
t 
R
a
te
Age group
Proxy CARE (CPI)
CARE (earnings) CARE (CPI) + £35k cap with DC top up
CARE (earnings) + £35k cap with DC top up
Source: IPSPC analysis of PPI results.
177
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report - 10 March 2011
C.20 The EEBR generally increases with age in the proxy scheme. The only exception is for 
the under 25 age group where the EEBR is higher than for the 26-35 group as a result of the 
under 25s being assumed to have a high initial salary growth.
C.21 The CPI indexation schemes show very strong age effects. The EEBR increases 
substantially with age, with the value of benefits significantly higher for older members than 
younger members. The cap has very little impact because a median-earning employee does 
not earn at a level that breaches the cap, but they do benefit from the slightly higher rate of 
accrual that having a cap on high earners allows.
C.22 In the CARE scheme with pre-retirement indexation linked to growth in average 
earnings, the age effects are less than in the CPI indexation scheme but are still apparent, to a 
similar extent as in the final salary structure. As with the CPI indexation scheme the capped 
version is slightly more generous to median earners
C.23 The picture for low earners is very similar to that for median earners. Chart C.2 shows 
how the EEBR varies with age for members with high earnings (at the 90th percentile of 
earnings across public service pension scheme members). 
Chart C.2: Age effects of schemes based on 90th percentile earner 
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C.24 For high earners the uncapped schemes show similar patterns of EEBR as for median 
earners. However the impacts of capping are greater for higher earners:
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 • in the CPI indexation schemes, younger members have a higher EEBR from capped 
schemes. But older members do better in uncapped schemes. This is because for 
younger members, where the value of the CARE scheme is low, the value from the 
DC top-up portion of the capped scheme is more valuable than the CARE portion. 
For older members, the CARE portion is more valuable than the DC top-up 
portion; and
 • in the earnings indexation schemes, higher earning members of all ages are expected 
to fare better in the pure CARE scheme than the hybrid CARE and DC top-up 
scheme. This is because the DC top-up portion is less valuable to members of all ages 
than the CARE portion of the scheme.
Effective employee benefit rates by gender
C.25 Chart C.3 shows EEBRs by gender for the different scheme structures.
Chart C.3: Effective employee benefit rates by gender
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C.26 Under the set of particular assumptions used to derive the figures the following 
conclusions could be drawn:
 • men fare better under final salary structures, primarily because men are expected to 
have stronger salary progression than women. This more than offsets the assumption 
that women will live for longer; and
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 • women fare better under CARE structures, because the salary effects are largely 
stripped out, leaving the effects of the assumption that women will live longer.
Effective employee benefit rates by career progression
C.27 The EEBRs have been determined for three career progression scenarios representing 
low, mid-level and high flyers:
 • low flyers are assumed to receive earnings growth in line with general wage inflation;
 • mid-level workers are assumed to experience standard assumed promotional salary 
scale and earnings inflation; and
 • high flyers are assumed to receive standard assumed promotional salary scale 
increases and earnings inflation plus an additional 1 per cent per annum.
C.28 Chart C.4 shows how members with these career progressions could fare under 
the different scheme structures. The EEBRs are taken as an average across the whole age 
distribution but are assumed to have initial earnings of around £16,000.3
Chart C.4: Effective employee benefit rates by career progression
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Source: IPSPC analysis of PPI results.
3 This is at the 30th percentile level and explains why the capped schemes show an overall slightly higher level of EEBR 
than the uncapped CARE schemes – see Chart C.1 for further details.
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C.29 Chart C.4 illustrates how high flyers fare better under final salary structures than 
mid-level and low flyers. In a CARE scheme the final salary link is broken, and so career 
progression has a much reduced effect on the EEBR.
Benefits received relative to contributions paid
C.30 Chart C.5 illustrates the amount of benefit received from the scheme as a multiple of 
the member contributions paid, split by career progression. 
Chart C.5: Ratio of benefits received to contributions paid, split by 
career progression
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Note: Ratio of benefits received to contributions paid for a 35 year old man initially earning around £16,000.
C.31 These results show that high flyers benefit considerably more than low or mid flyers 
in a final salary scheme. In a CARE scheme, where there is no link between benefits and 
final salary, members who experience different career progression receive very similar levels 
of benefit for pension accrued in a given year. The chart shows that a high flyer could see a 
return on their contributions of around 50 per cent more than a low flyer under the final 
salary structure, with no such effects in any of the CARE structures.
C.32 As shown in Chart C.1 and Chart C.2, the earnings indexation scheme is more 
generous than the CPI indexation scheme for younger people compared to older people. 
Chart C.5 is for a 35 year old, which is why the earnings scenario appears more generous for 
all career progression scenarios. If an older member had been chosen (someone aged 55, for 
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example) then the CPI indexation scheme would appear more generous. On average across 
the membership, the schemes are of broadly equivalent value.
Pensim2 adequacy analysis
C.33 Using data from the Department for Work and Pensions’ Pensim2 model, the 
Commission applied the parameters calculated by the Pensions Policy Institute to analyse 
the impact of different scheme designs on adequacy of retirement incomes. 
C.34 Pensim2 is a dynamic microsimulation model, which aims to estimate the future 
distribution of incomes of pensioners. It is thus valuable in assessing the distributional 
impact of policy changes. It incorporates several data sources to build up synthetic life 
histories for many thousands of individuals (currently including 60,000, with between 500 
and 700 ‘born’ each year). These data sources include the Lifetime Labour Market Database 
(one per cent survey of National Insurance and PAYE administrative data), the Family 
Resources Survey, and the British Household Panel Study.
C.35 The Institute for Fiscal Studies assessed Pensim2 comprehensively in 2004; it 
concluded that “In the main, our assessment of Pensim2 is very positive.”4 Since then, there 
have been several further incremental changes to the model, including State Pension reforms, 
private pension reforms and updated assumptions. 
C.36 There are limitations to the Pensim2 model. In particular, it is impossible to predict 
with certainty how work patterns and state pension provision will evolve over the next ninety 
years. If, for instance, state pensions were to become significantly more or less generous, 
the likelihood of achieving adequate retirement incomes could be transformed. But the 
model should give a good picture of how different scheme designs are likely to affect the 
distribution of pensions.
C.37 The analysis was carried out on a subset of Pensim2, comprising the 933 individuals 
born between 1991 and 2000 who work at some stage of their careers in the public sector. 
856 of these reach State Pension Age (SPA), and the model tracks their life histories until 
2100. 
C.38 Chapter 2 outlines the Commission’s approach to adequacy, concluding that the 
benchmark replacement rates set out by Lord Turner’s Pensions Commission provide 
a minimum standard for retirement incomes (Table C.6). So, for instance, someone 
earning £30,000 at retirement should have an income in retirement of at least £18,000 
(a replacement rate of 60 per cent). In line with the interim report, the bands have been 
increased with the Average Earnings Index (such that, for instance, the lowest band division 
is currently at around £11,000).5
4  An Assessment of Pensim2, IFS Working Paper 04/21, Emmerson, Reed and Shephard, 2004.
5  It is assumed that average earnings increase by 2.93 per cent per annum in the long term.
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Table C.6: Pensions Commission benchmark replacement rates
Gross income Gross income 
(approximate 2011 
terms)
Benchmark gross 
replacement rate (%)
Less than £9,500 Less than £11,000 80
£9,500 - £17,499 £11,000 - £20,499 70
£17,500 - £24,999 £20,500 - £29,499 67
£25,000 - £49,999 £29,500 - £58,999 60
£50,000 and above £59,000 and above 50
Source: Pensions Commission (2004), Pensions: Challenges and Choices – The First Report of the Pensions Commission.
C.39 The replacement rates are calculated from the point that an individual reaches the 
State Pension Age (68 for those born between 1991 and 2000),6 and are based on the 
individual’s final full-time equivalent salary.
C.40 Using the statistical software package Stata, the Commission calculated total pension 
income for individuals at the age of 68. This was done on the basis that public service 
employment provided pension accruals from three of the scheme designs assessed by the 
Pensions Policy Institute (a final salary proxy scheme, uncapped CARE with indexation 
by average earnings and uncapped CARE with indexation by inflation).7 Since most of 
the individuals in the Pensim2 database also work in the private sector at some stage in 
their careers, they usually have other income from employer-sponsored pension schemes 
(including NEST). Pension income also includes the State Pension, private pensions and any 
inherited pensions (for instance from a deceased spouse). As the Pensim2 database includes 
its own projections for public service pension income, this income was subtracted to give the 
final figures for total pension income based on each of the three different scheme designs.
C.41 The calculations of total pension income do not take into account any means-
tested benefit income (such as Pension Credit and housing benefit). This is because the 
Commission does not believe public service pensions would be adequate if pensioners 
were to be reliant upon such benefits. Rerunning the analysis including these means-tested 
benefits increases the proportion achieving their benchmark replacement rates, but it does 
not have a dramatic impact.
C.42 The analysis assumes that members do not take any lump sum and that they begin to 
draw their public service pensions at the State Pension Age (SPA). If they took a lump sum, 
or draw their pension before SPA, this would reduce the proportion of members receiving 
adequate income levels in retirement.
6  In this database, many people stop work before this age; the median retirement age is 65.
7  Because final salary pension schemes are typically based on the highest salary in the years before retirement, this 
analysis uses the individual’s maximum full-time equivalent salary in public service as the basis for his or her final salary 
pension payments.
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C.43 The three different scheme designs on average provide similar levels of pension 
payments at retirement. However, according to Pensim2, the CARE scheme with earnings 
indexation provides somewhat higher benefits. This is partly because Pensim2 and the PPI 
make different assumptions about the age structure of public sector workers, with the PPI 
assuming that public sector workers are on average older. These different assumptions would 
tend to skew adequacy calculations; the scheme with earnings indexation would seem to be 
more likely to produce adequate retirement incomes because its average payments are higher. 
To equalise average pension payments across the schemes, pension payments on retirement 
from the scheme with earnings indexation were multiplied by just over 90 per cent.8
C.44 The Commission then used these slightly revised scheme designs to calculate whether 
total pension income at the State Pension Age is greater than or less than the benchmark 
replacement rate for each individual. Because relatively few people are in the highest income 
band, the results in Chapter 3 and below show the top two income bands together.
C.45 Chart C.6 shows the proportion expected to achieve the benchmark replacement rate 
split by pre-retirement income and scheme design. Under each design around two thirds 
of members are expected to do so. The Commission’s view is that public service pension 
schemes should deliver adequate levels of income in retirement for people who spend a full 
career in the public services, so these results are not surprising. 
Chart C.6: Proportion expected to achieve adequacy targets from 
different scheme designs
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8  Payments under the scheme with earnings indexation were multiplied by 90.35 per cent, those under the final 
salary proxy scheme by 99.17 per cent. This reduces average scheme payments relative to those expected from the PPI 
modelling, so tends to underestimate the proportions achieving adequacy targets.
Table C.6: Pensions Commission benchmark replacement rates
Gross income Gross income 
(approximate 2011 
terms)
Benchmark gross 
replacement rate (%)
Less than £9,500 Less than £11,000 80
£9,500 - £17,499 £11,000 - £20,499 70
£17,500 - £24,999 £20,500 - £29,499 67
£25,000 - £49,999 £29,500 - £58,999 60
£50,000 and above £59,000 and above 50
Source: Pensions Commission (2004), Pensions: Challenges and Choices – The First Report of the Pensions Commission.
C.39 The replacement rates are calculated from the point that an individual reaches the 
State Pension Age (68 for those born between 1991 and 2000),6 and are based on the 
individual’s final full-time equivalent salary.
C.40 Using the statistical software package Stata, the Commission calculated total pension 
income for individuals at the age of 68. This was done on the basis that public service 
employment provided pension accruals from three of the scheme designs assessed by the 
Pensions Policy Institute (a final salary proxy scheme, uncapped CARE with indexation 
by average earnings and uncapped CARE with indexation by inflation).7 Since most of 
the individuals in the Pensim2 database also work in the private sector at some stage in 
their careers, they usually have other income from employer-sponsored pension schemes 
(including NEST). Pension income also includes the State Pension, private pensions and any 
inherited pensions (for instance from a deceased spouse). As the Pensim2 database includes 
its own projections for public service pension income, this income was subtracted to give the 
final figures for total pension income based on each of the three different scheme designs.
C.41 The calculations of total pension income do not take into account any means-
tested benefit income (such as Pension Credit and housing benefit). This is because the 
Commission does not believe public service pensions would be adequate if pensioners 
were to be reliant upon such benefits. Rerunning the analysis including these means-tested 
benefits increases the proportion achieving their benchmark replacement rates, but it does 
not have a dramatic impact.
C.42 The analysis assumes that members do not take any lump sum and that they begin to 
draw their public service pensions at the State Pension Age (SPA). If they took a lump sum, 
or draw their pension before SPA, this would reduce the proportion of members receiving 
adequate income levels in retirement.
6  In this database, many people stop work before this age; the median retirement age is 65.
7  Because final salary pension schemes are typically based on the highest salary in the years before retirement, this 
analysis uses the individual’s maximum full-time equivalent salary in public service as the basis for his or her final salary 
pension payments.
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C.46 Chart C.7 looks only at those with at least 20 years of public sector employment, 
showing that overall almost 95 per cent of these individuals are expected to meet the level 
of income that the Turner Commission assessed was a minimum level in their report. These 
results are before any lump sum has been taken. If scheme members choose to take a lump 
sum it is likely they will fall below these minimum levels. But this is less likely to occur when 
members work full careers in public service, which is likely to be in excess of forty years in 
the future schemes.
Chart C.7: Proportion expected to achieve adequacy targets with at 
least 20 years’ public sector employment
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C.47 The Commission has made clear that the benchmark replacement rates should be 
seen as minimum standards, so it is important to investigate the extent to which different 
pension scheme designs enable overachievement of adequacy targets. Chart C.8 shows that 
the average individual receives about 20 per cent more than his benchmark replacement 
rate from each of the scheme designs. The overachievement is greater for those with longer 
careers in the public sector. The average public sector employee with at least 20 years’ service 
receives total pension income at State Pension Age that is around 50 per cent higher than the 
adequacy target.
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Chart C.8: Median ratios of pension income to adequacy target from 
different scheme designs
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D Summary of evidence
D.1 This annex details some of the ways in which the Commission has collected 
information and evidence from a wide range of interested parties since the interim report 
was published in October 2010.
Second Call for Evidence
D.2 On 1 November 2010, Lord Hutton issued a second call for evidence to inform 
the Commission’s final report. The call for evidence asked specific questions that were 
categorised into themes.
D.3 The Commission received a total of 185 submissions as detailed in Chart D.1.1
Chart D.1: Number of submissions received by group
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Source: Responses from ‘Call for Evidence’, November 2010.
1 This figure does not include general correspondence that the Commission received such as emails and letters. This 
figure is in relation to explicit replies to the call for evidence.
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D.4 Summarised below are the responses received according to the themes set out in the call 
for evidence.
Scheme design
D.5 Whilst some of the responses the Commission received described elements of a new 
scheme design and how this could operate, most of the evidence instead concentrated on 
describing fundamental principles which should be enforced through scheme design, such as 
‘simplicity’ or ‘adequacy’, or the issues to consider in deciding upon a scheme. 
D.6 Of those describing an appropriate scheme, there were a large number of submissions 
advocating the continued use of final salary schemes. Some of these were prepared to accept 
changes to other scheme features (such as increases in pension age or contribution rates) if 
this would make the current schemes sustainable. 
D.7 Many other submissions argued for a career average defined benefit scheme as this was 
perceived as being fair whilst relatively simple to understand. However, there were a number 
of submissions that advocated a career average scheme only if the benefits were of equal value 
to those in the current pension schemes. Those submissions which supported career average 
schemes also stressed the importance of the indexation method used during accrual. Most 
parties argued that pre-retirement indexation should be based on earnings and not prices. 
Several submissions cited the recent indexation change from Retail Prices Index (RPI) to 
Consumer Prices Index (CPI) and that this has led to a devaluation in pensions, especially 
for the current public service career average scheme, nuvos, where indexation during the 
accrual phase is now based on CPI. It was felt that for career average schemes, if indexation 
were based on a measure less generous than earnings, then this should be compensated for 
with a more generous accrual rate.
D.8 In addition to defined benefit models, several submissions discussed defined 
contribution schemes, collective defined contribution schemes and how these schemes 
could be operated in an unfunded model. For example, through the use of notional defined 
contribution schemes.
D.9 Other schemes that were advocated included hybrids (such as defined benefit schemes 
with a defined contribution top-up or a career-average/final salary hybrid model), schemes 
with capped pensionable pay.
Risk-sharing
D.10 There was a wide variety of views from different parties concerning the types and level 
of risk that members and employers should bear. Some parties argued that members should 
bear more risk, particularly as the private sector has moved in this direction, whilst others 
believed that adequate measures were already in place to share further risk, such as current 
cap and share arrangements. 
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D.11 Suggestions of risk sharing included: the employer bearing the bulk of the risk (in 
particular investment and inflation), as they are better placed to manage these over the long 
term; employees sharing the risk of longevity on a progressive basis; and employers bearing 
investment risks on a core pension with the employee bearing investment risk above this.
D.12 There was a general acceptance amongst most parties submitting to the Commission 
that longevity was increasing and that this needed addressing. Though a number of 
submissions stated concern over shifting the increased costs associated with increases in 
longevity to members, only a small minority of these submissions argued that the employer 
should bear this risk. 
D.13 In terms of contribution rates between the employer and member, there was a large 
consensus on this ratio being a split of 2:1 employer to employee. Some respondents felt that 
there should be differences in contribution rates and pension ages for different professions. 
For example, some respondents felt that a lower pension age should be allowed if physical 
fitness is an important part of the job, whilst others felt that higher contribution rates should 
be applied if pension age is lower for certain professions. 
D.14 Tiered contributions by income were advocated in some submissions. However, 
others warned that regard would have to be given to part time staff and to middle income 
workers who could be ‘squeezed’ to protect lower income groups if tiered contributions were 
introduced. 
Adequacy
D.15 Adequacy of pension income is a subjective judgement and this was reflected in the 
evidence sent to the Commission. There were a large number of submissions that felt that 
the post-retirement replacement rates identified by Lord Turner’s Pension Commission 
were adequate, and others gave figures of either 50 per cent or 67 per cent of pre-retirement 
income (which would be a full pension earned under either a 1/80ths or 1/60ths final salary 
scheme). 
D.16 Many submissions were of the view that the occupational pension provided by a 
career in public services, in conjunction with a full basic state pension, should ensure that 
people have adequate resources in retirement. The reason for this was their view that people 
generally do not make additional provision, so if the occupational pension in conjunction 
with a full basic State Pension did not provide an adequate income then more people would 
end up relying on additional support from the welfare state. 
D.17 For people who work part careers in public services, there was a view that benefits 
should be proportionate to the period of service. However, there was a consensus that 
arrangements should remain in place to allow people to boost their incomes (by transferring 
in other benefits, buying added years or contributing to an Additional Voluntary 
Contributions scheme). 
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Employee understanding and choice 
D.18 Most of the submissions suggested that public servants closer to retirement value their 
pension arrangements more than younger workers, as do those on higher incomes. Equally, 
the majority of submissions agreed that pension understanding seems generally poor, and 
so the need for simplicity and strong communication in any new reform programme was 
emphasised. Submissions on choice were mixed, with some advocating more choice over 
elements such as contribution rates and retirement ages. Others questioned the concept, 
arguing that inadequate understanding of pensions would lead to people making poor 
financial choices if given the option. 
D.19 Regarding scheme types most likely to encourage people to save for their retirement, 
many submissions felt that a defined benefit model would incentivise more people to save, 
on the premise that more members would be encouraged to join a scheme where risks were 
shared rather than one in which they bore all the risk.
D.20 Some submissions discussed allowing members to view their retirement savings as 
a ‘pot’ or cash sum. They argued that this would allow a clearer perception of the value of 
one’s pension.
Pensions and plurality of provision of public services
D.21 Evidence was very mixed on this issue, yet one element that all parties agreed on was 
that any reform in this area should seek to make the pensions system more transparent both 
for the public sector and providers outside of the public sector. 
D.22 Parties felt that legislation surrounding the Transfer of Undertakings Protection 
of Employment regulations (TUPE), the Fair Deal policy and Admitted Body Status was 
complex, often citing section 75 of the 1995 Pensions Act and the statutory debt this can 
trigger for employers that cease to participate in the scheme. Many submissions cited the 
confusion and financial problems this can cause, particularly for third sector organisations. 
D.23 There was a mixed response to Fair Deal and the requirement for public service 
providers to provide ‘broadly comparable’ pensions to transferred workers out of the public 
sector. Some parties argued that this was necessary in the name of fairness to public service 
workers that may be outsourced, and others argued that it stifled the innovation of public 
service providers and contributed to a ‘two-tier’ workforce.2
2 As recommended in the Commission’s interim report the Government launched a consultation on the Fair Deal policy on 
3 March 2011.
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Administration costs
D.24 Most evidence submissions acknowledged the large variation in scheme administration 
costs, with some suggestions around moving to a shared service model to increase efficiency. 
There were suggestions around the actual Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS) Funds 
themselves, arguing for the combining of Funds to increase their investment efficiency. 
However others acknowledged that this may also compromise local democracy. 
Transition issues
D.25 A large number of submissions advocated the need to consult with unions and scheme 
governance groups before any reform recommendations are implemented. Appropriate 
transferring of accrued rights was deemed essential, though there were differing views on 
whether the final salary link should be maintained or not (views included maintaining 
the final salary link for future salary increases, treating transferring members as deferred 
members and breaking the final salary link, or diluting the final salary link to something like 
CPI plus 1 or 2 per cent). 
D.26 Communication and simplicity were also regarded as key elements of any transition. 
Respondents also noted the need to be aware of any associated administration costs in 
changing pension schemes.
D.27 Views were mixed regarding who should enter any reformed schemes. Some parties 
felt that any new arrangement should only apply to new entrants or should be tiered 
according to time until retirement, whilst others felt that there should be a ‘clean break’ with 
all staff joining the new scheme.
Local Authority Responses
D.28 A large number of responses came from local councils and local government scheme 
administrators. There were a number of recurring themes throughout these submissions. 
This included the need to recognise the LGPS as a different entity to the unfunded public 
service pension schemes. They felt that the LGPS should not be subject to the same solutions 
as deemed appropriate for other public service pension schemes. It was generally argued that 
the LGPS should be retained as a funded scheme, available to a broad range of employers. 
However there was agreement that mechanisms would need to be further developed to 
protect the LGPS Funds from employers who cease (for whatever reason) to participate in 
the scheme and leave any underfunded liabilities. 
D.29 It was further argued that Fair Deal should be retained, yet simplified, and the option 
in the LGPS for contractors to enter into an admission agreement should be retained.3 
3 As recommended in the Commission’s interim report the Government launched a consultation on the Fair Deal policy on 
3 March 2011.
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There was opposition towards any move that would consolidate LGPS pension scheme 
administration and the LGPS Funds, which was thought to be counter to the ‘localism’ 
agenda. 
D.30 It was generally agreed that any reform should seek to deliver a ‘strategic policy 
framework’ through which individual reforms could take place. There was a strong consensus 
in favour of a career average model for the LGPS from this group of respondents. However, 
several councils and overarching bodies emphasised that if, within this model, alternative 
choices of indexation to earnings were chosen, this should be compensated for by a more 
generous accrual rate. 
Roundtable Events
D.31 Lord Hutton hosted a series of roundtable events during the lifetime of the 
Commission with various stakeholder groups including unions, employer groups, academics 
and experts, think tanks, scheme administrators, local authorities, government departments, 
private sector organisations and third sector organisations. This included events within the 
devolved administrations.
D.32 Initial roundtable discussions were semi-structured and, much like the first call for 
evidence, sought to explore the pensions landscape and views amongst interested parties. 
Roundtable discussions focused on particular issues as the review continued, being structured 
according to theme and areas that the Commission sought to probe further. Such themes 
included total remuneration, risk-sharing, adequacy, eligibility, scheme administration, 
implementation, and the international landscape. These events allowed the Commission to 
hear the views of stakeholders who were often experts in their area, and their views informed 
the Commission’s thinking for the final report.
Deliberative Group Event
D.33 On 31 January 2011, the Commission held an all-day deliberative event in London 
seeking the views and opinions of a sample of public sector workers. There were 89 attendees 
with a broad diversity in terms of gender and representation across the 6 major public service 
pension schemes. Slightly more than half of the attendees were aged 46-59, with an under-
representation of younger workers and those in part-time and manual positions. It is likely 
that the attendees had a higher level of pensions knowledge and understanding and expertise 
than might be typically expected, due to the level of trade union representation at the 
event and the age profile of the attendees. The event allowed the Commission to gauge the 
understanding and gain the views of a range of public service workers on pensions and their 
features. Their opinions informed the Commission’s thinking for the final report.
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Correspondence
D.34 The Commission received a large volume of correspondence from interested parties 
during the lifetime of the review, all of which was taken into account in the Commission’s 
thinking. The Commission received a number of emails relating to pensions contributions 
made by people to Equitable Life in the past, the difficulty experienced by the pension fund 
and the role of government throughout this process. As the Commission’s terms of reference 
relate to public service workers this was not an issue for the Commission to comment on.
Private sector pension schemes data returns
D.35 The Commission sent out questionnaires to approximately 75 UK based private 
companies requesting information concerning the pension arrangements of the company 
schemes. Companies were selected on the basis of their size (i.e. number of employees) and 
where the majority of those employees were based in the UK, to provide a relevant direct 
comparison with public service pension schemes. The companies chosen reflected a range 
of employment fields, for example: retail; leisure; banking; construction; insurance; oil; 
communications; defence; and utilities. 
D.36 21 companies responded to the request for information. The questionnaire asked 
basic questions which included: number of employees; types of schemes operated; opt-out 
rates; rates of contribution; how decisions are made regarding benefits and contributions; 
and administrative costs. The answers provided the Commission with opportunities to 
ask further scheme specific questions, to identify case studies and to invite companies to 
participate in the roundtable discussions.
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F Glossary
Accrual: A payment earned in one period but not paid until a later period.
Accrual rate: The proportion of earnings that a defined benefit (DB) pension scheme pays 
as pension for each year of membership. For example, a scheme with an accrual rate of 1/60  
provides 1/60th of earnings for each year of membership, which is higher than a pension 
based on an accrual rate of 1/80th of earnings.
Accrued rights: Rights to pension and other benefits under scheme rules, deriving directly 
or indirectly from membership of the scheme. Such rights include pension awards already 
received and pensionable service built up so far based on a particular pension age. However, 
there is no standard definition of accrued rights across public service pension schemes: the 
rights will depend on specific circumstances, such as the terms of the individual pension 
schemes.
Active members: These are current employees who are contributing (or have contributions 
made on their behalf) to an organisation’s occupational pension scheme. They are distinct 
from deferred members and pensioners. 
Actuarial valuation: A report of the financial position of a DB pension scheme carried out 
by an actuary every three or four years. The report typically sets out: the scheme’s assets and 
liabilities as at the date of the valuation; the rate at which the sponsoring employer must 
contribute to meet the liabilities accruing as they become due; and the additional rate at 
which the employer must contribute to eradicate any deficit (the excess of liabilities over 
assets) within a stated time period. 
Additional Voluntary Contribution (AVC): These are personal pension contributions 
made by someone who is also a member of an occupational scheme as a top-up to their 
occupational entitlement. AVCs can be made into the occupational scheme or to a stand-
alone product called a Freestanding AVC plan.
Admitted Body Status: Admitted body status refers to the practice of the Local Government 
Pension Scheme of accepting as members the employees of bodies not covered by the 
original or primary ambit of the scheme as set out in its founding statute. It enables 
contractors, who take on an authority’s services or functions with employees transferring 
from the authority, to offer the transferring staff continued eligibility of the transferring 
authority’s pension scheme.
Ancillary benefits: Additional benefits not directly linked to the pension itself.  These 
include death benefits, ill-health benefits, dependants’ benefits and pension guarantees.
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Annuity: A series of regular payments usually payable for the life of the annuitant. Annuities 
are usually purchased by a lump sum of cash. Pension schemes sometimes discharge their 
promise of pension benefit by purchasing an annuity. Individuals can purchase an annuity 
using their own capital. There is a wide range of options available e.g. level, escalating, 
guaranteed, single or joint lives.
Automatic enrolment: A pension scheme where an individual is made a member by default 
and actively has to decide to leave the scheme. 
basic State Pension (bSP): Non-earnings-related pension based on an individual’s National 
Insurance Contribution record. 
Cap and share: This is an arrangement applying to the pension schemes for the NHS, 
Teachers, Civil Service and Local Government, whereby increases or reductions in the costs 
of a scheme identified in a pension scheme actuarial valuation are shared between employees 
and employers up to the value of the cap. Above the cap the increases or reductions are 
borne by employees, either by changing employee contributions or the cost of employee 
benefits or both. Below the cap, increases or reductions are shared between employers and 
employees. 
Capped scheme: A pension scheme where a limit is placed on pension entitlement, for 
example by placing a ceiling on the amount of annual earnings that are pensionable or by 
limiting the amount of pension that might be awarded under scheme rules.
Career average scheme: A defined benefit scheme that gives individuals a pension based on 
a percentage of the salary earned in each year of their working life.
Cash balance scheme: A scheme where the employer puts a notional amount into the 
member’s pension pot every year, which is then guaranteed. This credit can be expressed 
as a percentage of salary for each year worked. If cash contributions from the employee 
and employer, plus investment returns, do not match this promised notional credit then 
the employer has to meet any shortfall. On retirement the resulting cash balance can be 
converted into an annual income stream.
Cohort Life Expectancy: The estimate of an individual’s probability of surviving future 
years allowing for changes in mortality rates over time.
Collective DC scheme: All member pension contributions are placed in one fund that is 
then managed on behalf of the members. As in standard DC schemes the pensions will 
vary according to the value of the underlying investments. However, within collective 
DC schemes there is the option to spread the effects across the various groups of members 
(intergenerational sharing) to smooth the effects of market conditions. 
Commission: The Independent Public Service Pensions Commission.
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Commutation factor: A number used to convert a pension annuity into a lump sum. The 
factor usually depends on the sex of the member and the age at which the conversion takes 
place. The factors are scheme specific and are either set out in the pension scheme’s rules or 
are updated periodically by the scheme’s trustees or administrators. 
Conditional indexation: Where the uprating of a pension fund or pensions in payment 
each year is variable and dependent on other factors, such as investment returns.
Consumer Prices Index (CPI): An internationally comparable measure of inflation based 
on structures in international legislation and guidelines and  launched in 1996. Like the 
Retail Prices Index (RPI) it tracks the changing cost of a fixed basket of goods and services 
over time. However unlike the RPI it disregards some items, such as housing costs. It also 
has a different population base for the indices from the RPI and a different way in which the 
index is calculated. 
Contracting-out: The facility to opt out of the additional state pension and build up 
benefits in a private pension scheme.
Conversion factor: A ratio which determines how much money is needed in the pension 
pot to purchase £1 of annual pension income.
Cost sharing: The cost of any benefit increases is shared between individual and employer.
Current contribution rate: The standard contribution rate as adjusted for past surpluses and 
deficits and payable by employers and employees
Current service cost: A measure of the value of the new pension promises built up over a 
year.
Death benefits: A pension scheme benefit that is usually paid to the dependant of a scheme 
member if that member dies. Death in retirement benefits typically take the form of a 
pension paid to the dependant of a proportion of the pension the member was receiving 
when he or she died. Death in service benefits typically take the form of a lump sum (Death 
Benefit Lump Sum), calculated as a multiple of salary, plus a pension paid to the dependant 
of a proportion of the pension the member would have received if he or she had lived until 
retirement age.
Deferred members: Deferred members are scheme members who have left employment, or 
ceased to be an active member of the scheme whilst remaining in employment, but retain an 
entitlement to a pension from the scheme.
Deferred pension: A pension that will be payable to a deferred member when he or she 
chooses to draw it.
Defined benefit (DB) pension scheme: A pension scheme where the pension is related to 
the members’ salary or some other value fixed in advance.
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Defined contribution (DC) pension scheme: A scheme where the individual receives 
a pension based on the contributions made and the investment return that they have 
produced. These are sometimes referred to as money purchase schemes. 
Dependant member: An individual who is eligible to receive retirement benefits following 
the death of a scheme member.
Employee contribution rates: The percentage of their pensionable salary that employees pay 
as a contribution towards a pension. 
Employer contribution rates: The percentage of the salary of employees that employers pay 
as a contribution towards the employees’ pension.
Fair Deal: A non-statutory code of practice introduced in 1999 that protects the pension 
provisions of public sector workers who have their employment compulsorily transferred out 
of the public sector. In such a situation the transferring organisation is required to ensure 
that the pension provision for future service is broadly comparable after the transfer. 
Final salary scheme: A DB scheme that gives individuals a pension based on the number of 
years of pensionable service, the accrual rate and final earnings as defined by the scheme.
Funded: Pension schemes in which pension contributions are paid into a fund that is 
invested and pensions are paid out of this pot. 
Hybrid scheme: A scheme which incorporates both defined benefit and defined 
contribution elements of benefit provision.
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: An independent commission 
undertaking a fundamental structural review of public service pension provision by Budget 
2011
Indexation: The technique used to adjust income payments or the uprating of a pension 
fund in line with an index.
Life expectancy: Life expectancy at a given age, x, is the average number of years that a male 
or female aged x will live thereafter.
Longevity: The length or duration of human life.  
Member contributions: The amounts paid by active scheme members into their pension 
schemes. 
Mutualisation: Employee participation in, and of, an organisation. Implied sharing of the 
risks and benefits.
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National Insurance (NI): The national system of benefits paid in specific situations, such 
as retirement, based on compulsory earnings-related contributions by employers and 
employees. Self-employed people make contributions on a different basis. 
NEST (National Employment Savings Trust): The arms length from Government, low 
cost pensions scheme associated with the automatic enrolment reforms planned for 2012.
Net cash expenditure: Benefits paid to recipients less contributions received by central 
government from employees and employers in one year.
Normal Pension Age: The earliest age at which, in the normal course of events, a scheme 
member may retire with payment of his or her unreduced accrued superannuation benefits. 
Notional defined contribution scheme: A scheme whereby the values of the pensions at 
retirement are determined by an assumed return on contributions and an annuity rate or 
rates. 
Occupational pension: A pension, which is provided via the employer, but from a pension 
scheme that typically takes the form of a trust arrangement and is legally separate from the 
employer.
Open market annuity: An annuity purchased from the competitive insurance market. 
Pension Credit: The main income-related benefit for pensioners, which combines the 
Guarantee Credit and the Savings Credit.
Pensioner member: Individuals who now draw a pension and who are mainly former 
employees. However they may also include widows, widowers and other dependants of 
former active members.
Period Life Expectancy: Represents the amount of time an individual is expected to live if 
mortality rates were equal to the experience of other individuals in that year.
Public sector pension schemes: These comprise both public service pension schemes 
and other schemes in the wider public sector such as the BBC, Transport for London, the 
Bank of England and the Royal Mail. These schemes are not authorised by statute and the 
organisation concerned makes the rules of the schemes.
Public Sector Transfer Club: A group of some 120 salary related occupational pension 
schemes. It allows easier movement of staff mainly within the public sector. It does this 
by making sure that employees receive broadly equivalent credits when they transfer their 
pensionable service to their new scheme regardless of any increase in salary when they move 
to their new employment.
Public service pension schemes: Pension schemes authorised by statute where the relevant 
Ministers make the rules of the schemes. The main schemes are those for civil servants, 
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the armed forces, NHS employees, teachers, local government employees, the police and 
firefighters. There are over 200 public service pension schemes.
Replacement rate: The ratio of pension income to salary at retirement.
Retail Prices Index (RPI): A measure of inflation and like the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) 
it tracks the changing cost of a fixed basket of goods and services over time. However, unlike 
the CPI it takes into account items such as housing costs. It also has a different population 
base for the indices from the CPI and a different way in which the index is calculated. 
SCAPE (Superannuation Contributions Adjusted for Past Experience): A methodology 
used to set employer contribution rates across public service intended to mirror the operation 
of a funded scheme by keeping track of a notional ‘Pension Account’.
Scheme liabilities: The scheme liabilities at a given date are an estimate of the total value 
of future payments that the scheme will have to make to all scheme members in respect of 
pension rights which have been earned before that date. 
State Pension Age (SPA): The age from which an individual can claim their state pension. It 
is currently 65 for men and will increase to 65 for women by November 2018.
State Second Pension (S2P): The National Insurance pension that gives benefits based on 
an individual’s earnings and contributions. 
Top-up DC: Where a DC arrangement is available to supplement another form of pension 
provided by an employer.
TUPE: Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006.
Unfunded pension schemes: Pension schemes, which are not backed by a pension fund. 
Instead current contributions are used to pay current pensions along with other funds 
provided by the employer. Most public service schemes are unfunded, except for the Local 
Government scheme, which is funded.
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G Abbreviations
CARE  Career Average Revalued Earnings
CPI  Consumer Prices Index
DB  Defined Benefit
DC  Defined Contribution
DCLG  Department for Communities and Local Government
DWP  Department for Work and Pensions
ESA  European System of Accounts
GAD  Government Actuary’s Department
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GP  General Practitioner
HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
IPSPC  Independent Public Service Pensions Commission
IT  Information Technology
LGPS  Local Government Pension Scheme
LPFA  London Pensions Fund Authority
NDPB  Non-departmental public body
NEST  National Employment Savings Trust
NHS  National Health Service
NHSPS National Health Service Pension Scheme
NPA  Normal Pension Age
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OBR  Office for Budget Responsibility
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONS  Office for National Statistics
PCSPS  Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme
PPI  Pensions Policy Institute 
RPI  Retail Prices Index
SCAPE Superannuation Contributions Adjusted for Past Experience
SPA  State Pension Age 
TPS  Teachers Pension Scheme
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